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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
KAREN C. MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JESS M. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Petitioner, 
Case No. 880189-SC 
Priority No. 13 
•ooOoo-
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case arises from a divorce action filed in Davis 
County, State of Utah, pursuant to the provisions of Section 30-
3-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953) . An appeal was filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, this matter was 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its opinion in connection with the original appeal 
on April 19, 1988, in the case of Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 
69 (Utah App. 1988). 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed 
in the Utah Supreme Court by Defendant/Petitioner. That Petition 
was granted and the Utah Supreme Court now has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 48 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. The wife, the Plaintiff/Respondent 
in this matter, filed a Complaint against her husband, the 
Defendant/Petitioner. Subsequently, the parties entered into a 
written Stipulation and Settlement Agreement which was signed by 
both parties and filed but, evidently, never implemented (R. 10). 
The Plaintiff then, through new counsel, filed an Amended 
Complaint seeking a Decree of Divorce, asking for custody, 
alimony, child support, a property award of the home, furniture, 
a cash settlement for a portion of the husband's medical degree, 
and attorneys1 fees. The Defendant secured counsel, answered, 
counterclaimed and asked for, among other things, an award of 
joint custody, an equitable distribution of the real and personal 
property and debts of the marriage, and an order requiring him 
not to pay alimony. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Rodney S. Page on 
May 31, 1985. Each side was represented by counsel and presented 
documentary evidence, as well as their own testimonies. In 
addition, the Plaintiff presented the testimony of two witnesses 
in connection with her position on the Defendant's medical 
degree. After hearing closing arguments, the trial court issued 
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its ruling. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree of Divorce were signed and filed on October 7, 1985, after 
the Defendant had objected to portions of the Findings and Decree 
as prepared by Plaintiff's counsel and the trial court had ruled 
on the same. No post trial motions were filed by Plaintiff nor 
did she object to any of the findings made by the Court at trial. 
The Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on November 6, 1985. No 
cross-appeal was filed. 
On April 19, 1988, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion. On May 17, 1988, Defendant/Petitioner filed a Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari with this Court seeking a review of the 
Court of Appeals decision related to the doctrine of equitable 
restitution, its sua sponte increase of the trial court's alimony 
and child support awards and its award of the dependency 
exemptions. On September 7, 1988, this Court granted that 
Petition as to the equitable restitution issue only. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant/Petitioner seeks an order from this Court 
vacating that portion of the opinion in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 
P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), which pertains to the creation of the 
doctrine of equitable restitution and affirming the trial 
court's overall support, property and debt awards, except as may 
have been modified by the Court of Appeals related to the 
alimony, child support and dependency exemption issues, 
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Defendant/Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari having 
been denied as to those issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marital History and Respective 
Contributions of the Parties 
The parties married on June 6, 19 68, when Defendant was an 
E-5 in the United States Army (Tr. 4). At that time, both had a 
high school education (Tr. 6) . After a year of marriage, the 
parties moved to Hill Air Force Base where the Defendant 
obtained employment as an instrument repair mechanic and earned 
$8,000-9,000.00 per year (Tr. 5). From 1968 through 1977 the 
Defendant was continuously employed and was the primary income 
producer (Tr. 52-53). Between 1968 and 1982, the date of the 
parties1 separation, the Plaintiff worked part time for a total 
of three years (Tr. 52). Plaintiff's Exhibit A, set forth below, 
reflects the income of the parties during the time they lived 
together and one year after their separation. 
FAMILY INCOME 
TOTAL HUSBAND WIFE OTHER 
1973 $10,840 $10,840 
1974 11,411 11,381 $ 30.36 
1975 13,324 13,323 
1976 14,797 14,464 $ 116 
1977 15,968 13,089 2,663 216.00 
MEDICAL SCHOOL • 
1981 11,248 64.00 
1982 26,990 189.00 
1983 35,579 185.00 
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In 1970, after leaving the Army, the Defendant decided to 
attend college, and Plaintiff reluctantly agreed (Tr.13). At 
that time, Defendant was working and receiving education benefits 
from the G.I. Bill (Tr. 53). Defendant received those benefits 
for his four years of college and the first year of medical 
school at the University of Utah. That income, together with the 
monies Defendant was earning while working, supported his family 
while he was in school and paid for his tuition and books (Tr. 
34) . In addition, during this time, the parties purchased a home 
and built an equity which was ultimately used to purchase a 
second home (Tr. 57) , the residence involved in this divorce 
action. He also saved money which was then used to support the 
family during the last three years of medical school (Tr. 34). 
At the conclusion of his undergraduate work, the Defendant 
decided that he wanted to go to medical school. He applied twice 
and was finally accepted by the University of Utah in 1977 (Tr. 
7). The Plaintiff was adamantly opposed to his decision (Tr. 14, 
31, 33) , and the Defendant testified that the marriage almost 
broke up at that time (Tr. 14) . 
During the marriage, Plaintiff did not work except in 1978, 
1979 and 1980, when she was employed as a part-time waitress (Tr. 
34 and 53) . During that period, she thought she netted around 
$200.00 per month. She also thought those sums were used for 
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regular living expenses (Tr. 35). While she worked, the 
Defendant stayed home and watched the children (Tr, 30, 35). 
In addition to Defendant's earnings and the benefits from 
his G.I. Bill, he also received $7,000.00 from his mother's 
estate which went to general family expenses (Tr. 53) . 
Defendant took out three student loans, one of which was for 
$20,000.00 (Tr. 54), and all of which he is now repaying and for 
which the Plaintiff is not responsible (R. 215). 
The Defendant graduated from medical school in 1981 and 
secured an internship in Danville, Pennsylvania, through the 
National Intern Matching Program (Tr. 7) . The parties moved to 
Pennsylvania and rented their Utah home (Tr. 52) . The Plaintiff 
objected to the move at the outset (Tr. 16, 55). She ultimately 
did go; however, after six months she returned to Salt Lake in 
March of 1982 and, since that time, the parties have been 
separated (Tr. 18) . Her reasons for leaving were that she did 
not like the area, was uncomfortable in that setting and missed 
her family, friends and job (Tr. 17) . Her dissatisfaction 
affected the Defendant's work and internship and placed an 
extreme amount of additional pressure on him (Tr. 17) . 
After the Plaintiff left, the Defendant secured a residency 
as an emergency medical room physician in Pennsylvania which was 
to be completed in 1986 (Tr. 8). Upon Plaintiff's return to 
Utah, she secured a job with Mountain Fuel Supply, where she 
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worked full time until just prior to trial. At trial, she stated 
she had just voluntarily gone to three-quarter time so she could 
spend more time with her children and get an education (Tr. 48, 
59). Mountain Fuel will pay all costs of her education and allow 
her to continue working (Tr. 48). She nets $846.00 per month 
(Tr. 42). At trial her monthly expenses were $2,056.00 (Ex. F, 
Tr. 43, 58), which included a $309.00 per month mortgage payment 
on the Utah home (Tr. 26). No definite amounts were presented by 
her as to any additional expenses (Tr. 2 6). 
At the time of trial, Defendant was employed under a two-
year contract with Cannonsberg General in Pennsylvania (Tr. 3) . 
One year was left under that contract (Tr. 100), and no evidence 
was presented as to what he intended to do when the contract 
expired. At trial he testified he intended to complete his 
residency in 1986 and was not yet Board Certified (Tr. 8). Under 
his employment contract in effect at the time of trial, he earned 
$100,000.00 per year, or $8,333.00 per month, and netted 
$7,100.00 per month after deducting certain expenses such as 
malpractice insurance, but before deducting taxes (Tr. 9-11 and 
66). He put one-half of his gross earnings in a tax account (Tr. 
102), had no tax deductions or shelters (Tr. 103), and had 
nothing left in the tax account after April 15 of each year (Tr. 
102). He is paying back his student loans (Ex. 3), and had 
expenses, including the $1,100.00 temporary support payment, of 
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$4,337.00 (Ex. 3). His net monthly salary after taxes was 
$4,022.00 (Tr. 102). He had no outside employment (Tr. 100). 
The oldest child of the parties lived with him from October, 1983 
until July, 1984 (Tr. 49-50) . That child then went back with 
Defendant one day after trial to live with him (8/29/85, Tr. 4). 
In August, 1984, Plaintiff requested $1,650.00 per month 
temporary support (R. 74), and the court granted her $1,100.00 
per month (R. 87) which the Defendant paid up through trial (Tr. 
107). 
Ruling of the Trial Court 
After each side gave their closing arguments, the trial 
court ruled as follows: 
1. It granted Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce (R. 213). 
2. It awarded Plaintiff the custody of the parties1 three 
children, subject to Defendant's reasonable visitation rights (R. 
213). 
3. It ordered Defendant to pay $300.00 per month per child 
as child support ($900.00), subject to a $100.00 per month per 
child abatement if any of the children came to live with him, and 
further subject to that support continuing until each child 
reached the age of 21, so long as they were full-time students 
and not married (R. 213) . 
4. It gave Defendant tax exemptions for the two older 
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children and gave Plaintiff the exemption for the youngest (R. 
213-214). 
5. It ordered Defendant to provide medical insurance on 
the children and a life insurance policy on his life naming the 
children as beneficiaries (R. 214) . 
6. It ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff $4 00.00 per month 
alimony for five years with that award not to terminate should 
she remarry within the first three years (R. 214). 
7. It gave Plaintiff the marital residence subject to a 
lien in Defendant's favor payable when the youngest child reached 
18 or 21 years of age if the child was a student living at home, 
when the home was sold or when she cohabits with an adult male 
not her spouse but not payable upon her remarriage (R. 214-215). 
8. It gave each party the personal property in their 
respective possessions (R. 215) • 
9. It ordered each party to pay the debts which they 
incurred after separation and ordered the Defendant to pay 
approximately $20,000 in student loans (R. 215-216). 
10. It ordered the Defendant to pay his attorneys1 fees and 
$2,500.00 to Plaintiff for her attorneys1 fees and costs (R. 
216) . 
The court made the following specific findings related to 
the Defendant's medical education: 
9. During the course of the marriage, the 
parties lived together as husband and wife 
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for approximately 14 years, having separated 
during March, 1982, and having lived separate 
and apart since that time. (R. 2 05) 
10. During the period 1977 through 1982, 
the parties experienced a particularly 
stressful period while Defendant was engaged 
in medical school. During that time 
Defendant did not work, and the family 
obligations were met by a series of student 
loans, a bequest from the estate of 
Defendant's mother and income earned by 
Plaintiff during her employment. During the 
14 years that the parties lived together, 
Plaintiff assisted extensively in Defendant's 
obtaining a college education, medical degree 
and internship. In addition, Plaintiff made 
substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate 
the completion of Defendant's medical 
schooling and internship. (R. 205-206) 
21. The court finds that alimony is 
designed not only to meet the needs of 
Plaintiff in this case, and is not solely 
based upon her ability to support herself and 
Defendant's ability to contribute to that 
support, but also a means of repayment to 
Plaintiff for her years spent caring for the 
household, helping the husband in his 
educational pursuits and support of the 
family, and for her involvement through the 
extensive educational process utilized to 
obtain the medical training. (R. 208) 
23. The court further finds that the 
medical degree and training are not 
specifically a property right subject to 
distribution by this court under the current 
law of this state. Such degree and training 
are applicable only to the determination of 
alimony and child support. The court has 
considered the medical training and license 
to practice only as it impacts income and 
Defendant's present ability to pay 
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appropriate alimony and child support. Such 
income will also be taken into account "in 
future years as it raises in stability [sic] 
the rate of child support." (T.T. Page 13 5, 
Line 10) (R. 208) 
Plaintiff's counsel prepared the Findings and Decree (R. 
203, 212). (Copies have been included in the Addendum to this 
brief.) She did not make a Motion for a New Trial or for an 
order to amend the Findings and Decree. 
Mrs. Martinez appealed the trial court's decision to this 
Court. Dr. Martinez did not cross-appeal. Pursuant to Rule 4A 
of the Rules of the Supreme Court, this Court transferred the 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Mrs. Martinez filed her 
Appellant's Brief. Dr. Martinez filed his Respondent's Brief. 
Mrs. Martinez did not file a Reply Brief. 
In the original appeal, Mrs. Martinez raised the following 
claims of error: 
1. The trial court erred in connection 
with the way it dealt with Dr. 
Martinez's professional degree. 
2. The trial court's award of alimony and 
child support were unjustifiably low. 
3. The trial court should not have awarded 
Dr. Martinez any of the dependency 
exemptions. 
4. The trial court should have awarded Mrs. 
Martinez more attorneys' fees than it 
did. 
Dr. Martinez responded and argued: 
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1. The trial court acted within its broad 
discretion in fashioning a remedy which 
was fair to both parties. 
2. The trial court did not err in the 
manner it dealt with Dr. Martinez's 
medical education in that a medical 
degree is not "property11 under Utah 
statutes; that Mrs. Martinez failed to 
present adequate evidence to support a 
finding that a medical degree was a 
marital asset; and that the trial court 
properly dealt with compensating Mrs. 
Martinez for any of her alleged 
sacrifices in its award of child 
support, alimony and property and debt 
distribution. 
3. The trial court's award of alimony and 
child support was fair and reasonable 
based upon the facts of the case. 
4. The trial court's allocation of income 
tax dependency exemptions was fair and 
statutorily permissible. 
5. The trial court did not err in its award 
of attorneys' fees. 
Oral argument was presented to Judges Davidson, Billings 
and Jackson of the Utah Court of Appeals and on April, 19, 1988, 
that Court in a 2-1 decision (Judge Jackson dissenting) issued 
its opinion, concluding that Judge Page had erred in the way he 
dealt with Dr. Martinez's medical education, in his awards of 
alimony and child support, and in his allocation of the 
dependency exemption. A copy of that opinion (Martinez v. 
Martinez , 754 P.2d 69 [Utah App. 1988]) has been included in the 
Addendum to this brief. At no time prior to the issuance of 
that opinion had either party raised, argued or urged the 
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creation of the doctrine of equitable restitution, a concept 
evidently formulated by the majority in its deliberations 
pertaining to the medical degree issue. 
Dr. Martinez timely filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
with this Court, claiming error by the Court of Appeals in its 
creation of the doctrine of equitable restitution; its unilateral 
increase of Dr. Martinez's alimony obligation from $400.00 per 
month to $750.00 per month, and child support obligation from 
$900.00 per month to $1,800.00 per month; and its decision to 
automatically award dependency exemptions to Mrs. Martinez, the 
custodial parent. 
On September 7, 1988, this Court granted Dr. Martinez's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the equitable restitution 
issue, but not as to the support and dependency exemption issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in its creation of the 
doctrine of equitable restitution to deal with the Defendant's 
medical degree. 
Under Utah law, as set out in the Petersen, Rayburn, and 
Gardner cases, a medical degree or, for that matter, any 
educational achievement or job training obtained by a party 
during a marriage, is not "property" as that term is used in 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953) . If the education or 
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training so obtained enhances or increases earning potential, 
that is to be considered by the trial court in awarding support. 
Contrary to this position, an award of equitable restitution 
is, for all practical purposes, the same as treating a 
professional degree as a marital asset subject to division upon 
divorce. This is especially true in the Martinez case because 
the Court of Appeals begins by awarding Mrs. Martinez an 
increased amount of permanent alimony based upon Dr. Martinez's 
increased earning capacity. It then also awarded her an amount 
of equitable restitution, a remedy expressly distinguished from 
traditional alimony or other spousal support and based on the 
increased earning capacity of a spouse as a result of that 
spouse's professional degree. 
As a result, the Martinez decision is in conflict with 
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court on 
an important question of state law. It represents a drastic 
departure from this law and a theory never raised by the 
Plaintiff in the court below. Its opinion related to the 
doctrine of equitable restitution should be vacated. 
POINT II 
The trial court in this case properly exercised its 
discretion in fashioning a remedy which considered the individual 
facts of the case, including the Defendant's education. An 
integral part of that remedy was an award of alimony to the 
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Plaintiff which was intended to assist her in connection with her 
ongoing monthly financial needs and to reimburse her for the 
effort and monies she claimed she had expended during the period 
the Defendant was securing his education. In recognizing the 
assistance she provided (R. 205-206), the trial court ordered 
certain things not normally done in divorce actions to compensate 
Mrs. Martinez and make certain that she was adequately provided 
for. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the remedy fashioned 
by the trial court was fair and equitable. It was not arbitrary 
or capricious and, consequently, should be upheld. Instead, the 
Court of Appeals panel accepted some portions of the trial 
judge's decision, rejected others and created a new remedy never 
argued, urged, or even mentioned by Mrs. Martinez. What the 
Court of Appeals failed to recognize was that each aspect of the 
trial judge's ruling was interrelated with the other aspects in 
order to arrive at an overall fair and just decision to both 
parties. 
The action on the part of the Court of Appeals to change 
portions of the trial judge's decisions on a "piecemeal" basis 
improperly infringes and inhibits the trial court from fashioning 
an overall remedy which considers all the facts and is fair to 
both parties. 
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POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS 
CREATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
RESTITUTION. 
Mrs. Martinez argued to the Court of Appeals that the trial 
court erred in not including the Respondent's medical education 
as a part of the marital estate for purposes of property 
distribution, a position that has been accepted by only a small 
minority of the state courts which have addressed this issue. 
She claimed that the parties made an investment in "human 
capital" and that she was entitled to a return on her investment 
in Dr. Martinez's medical degree. 
Two judges on the Court of Appeals agreed with that concept 
and concluded that not only should Mrs. Martinez's five-year 
award of $400.00 per month alimony be automatically increased to 
$750.00 per month permanent alimony, but that she should also 
receive some sort of quasi alimony/property award to compensate 
her for her alleged sacrifices and loss of income expectancy. In 
order to provide that additional award, the panel created a new 
and unheard of concept and called it "equitable restitution." In 
so doing, the Court of Appeals erred. 
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah C.A. 1988), (a copy 
of which is included in the Addendum to this brief) created a new 
remedy called "equitable restitution." Under Martinez, an award 
of this type is now to be considered in divorce cases where one 
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spouse has obtained a professional degree during the marriage, 
and the divorce occurs as that spouse begins his/her new career 
and is on the threshold of increased earning capacity. The 
Court expressly distinguished this new remedy from all other 
forms of spousal maintenance or support and stated that 
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 [equitable restitution]1 is nothing more than an equitable 
sharing of the reward of both parties' common efforts and 
expectations." Id. at 78. An award of equitable restitution 
evidently will not terminate upon remarriage and may be payable 
in a lump sum or periodically over time. 
The practical and realistic effect of this decision is in 
conflict of previous rulings by other panels of the Court of 
Appeals and the dictum of the Utah Supreme Court. The basic and 
fundamental issue to be decided in this case is whether an 
advanced degree is marital property subject to consideration and 
division by a trial court in divorce actions. 
The present law in the State of Utah with respect to 
advanced educational degrees is that such degrees are not 
property interests or marital assets subject to division upon 
divorce. This issue was first considered by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). 
(A copy of this case has been included in the Addendum to this 
brief.) In Petersen, the parties had been married for 20 years, 
during which time Dr. Petersen earned his medical degree. While 
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he was in school, he earned approximately $1,000.00 per year and 
Mrs. Petersen worked full time for one year and part time for the 
remaining three years. The couple also received additional 
monies from Mrs. Petersen's parents. 
In addition to a more traditional award of property and 
maintenance, the trial court awarded Mrs. Petersen a $12 0,000.00 
cash settlement, characterizing this award as a property award 
with respect to the medical degree. On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals was squarely faced with the issue of whether Dr. 
Petersen's medical degree was a property interest subject to 
division as a marital asset. In concluding that it was not, the 
Court began by noting that "the majority of jurisdictions that 
have considered the issue have held that advanced degrees or 
professional licenses are not property." Id. at 239 (citations 
omitted). Thereafter, the Court proceeded to analyze and compare 
the characteristics and attributes of a recognized property 
interest such as a retirement plan with the characteristics of 
an educational degree. The Court stated: 
Property can be bought, sold, and devised. 
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought; they are 
earned. They cannot be sold; they are 
personal to the named recipient. Upon the 
death of the named recipient, the certificate 
commemorating award of the degree might be 
passed along and treasured as a family 
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the 
strength of that degree, practice law or 
medicine. In this case, the court awarded 
the parties' home to Mrs. Petersen. But it 
might have awarded the home to Dr. Petersen 
or it might have ordered the home sold and 
the net proceeds divided. The Court had no 
such alternatives with the medical degree 
precisely because the degree is not property. 
Id. at 240. From this analysis as well as from an analysis of 
the cases from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that an 
"advanced degree is or confers an intangible right which, because 
of its character, cannot properly be characterized as property 
subject to division between the spouses." Id. at 241. 
One of the cases analyzed and relied upon by the Petersen 
court in reaching this conclusion is a leading case in the area 
of professional degrees: In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P. 2d 75 
(Colo. 1978). In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
affirmed a decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals, Graham v. 
Graham, 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. App. 1976), which held that an M.B.A. 
degree was not marital property subject to division by the court. 
In Graham, the husband acquired a Bachelor of Science degree in 
engineering and physics and an M.B.A. during a six-year marriage. 
The wife had worked full time throughout the marriage and 
contributed 70% of the total income which was then used for 
family living expenses and for the husband's educational expenses 
during the marriage. The husband had worked only part-time. In 
addition, the wife had done most of the housework and had cooked 
most of the meals. In the divorce action, the trial court found 
the husband's education to be a marital asset and, based on the 
husband's expected future earnings, valued the education at 
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$82,836.00 and awarded the wife a $33,134.00 cash settlement. On 
appeal, the trial court's decision was reversed. The Colorado 
Supreme Court analyzed CRS Section 14-10-113(2) which requires 
the court to consider all relevant factors in making a division 
of marital property and concluded that the husband's education 
was not marital property within the meaning of that statute. In 
so holding, the court concluded: 
An educational degree, such as an MBA, is 
simply not encompassed even by the broad 
views of the concept of "property." It does 
not have an exchange value or any objective 
transferrable value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is 
an accumulative product of many years of 
previous education, combined with diligence 
and hard work. It may not be acquired by the 
mere expenditure of money. It is simply an 
intellectual achievement that may potentially 
assist in the future acquisition of property. 
In our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that terms. 
Id. at 77. 
Both of these cases present a well-reasoned and solid basis 
for concluding that an educational degree is not a property 
interest and is not a marital asset subject to division between 
the parties to a divorce action. It does not follow from that 
position, however, that the non-student spouse is left without a 
remedy. Instead, many of the jurisdictions that conclude that a 
degree is not property provide for an adequate remedy through an 
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increased award of spousal support and maintenance. The law in 
these jurisdictions provides that the amount of this award falls 
within the sound discretion of the trial court after 
consideration of all the relevant factors in each case. Among 
these are the fact that one spouse has obtained an advanced 
degree during the course of the marriage, the extent to which the 
non-student spouse worked to support the family, and the 
sacrifice of that spouse's own educational and professional 
advancement. 
This is the position taken by the Utah and Colorado courts. 
In Petersen, supra, Judge Orme stated that ff[i]n this state, 
traditional alimony analysis is the appropriate and adequate 
method for making adjustments between the parties in cases of 
this type." Id. at 242. While in a footnote to this quotation 
the Court expressed concern over the situation where the parties 
are divorced just as the student spouse is graduating and on the 
threshold of increased earning capacity, it reaffirmed its 
position that an award of maintenance is the proper remedy and 
stated: 
In another kind of recurring case, typified 
by fGraham v. Graham] , 574 P. 2d 75 (Utah 
1978) where divorce occurs shortly after the 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony 
analysis would often work hardship, because, 
while both spouses have modest incomes at the 
time of divorce, the one is on the threshold 
of a significant increase in earnings. 
Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the 
other could attain a degree is precluded from 
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enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree 
will ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a 
spouse is typically not remote in time from 
his or her previous education and is 
otherwise better able to adjust and to 
acquire comparable skills, given the 
opportunity and the funding. In such cases, 
alimony analysis must become more creative to 
achieve fairness, and an award of 
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, 
not terminable upon remarriage, may be 
appropriate. 
Id. at 242, f. 4. 
This approach to adequately compensating a non-student 
spouse through an award of spousal maintenance was reaffirmed by 
the Utah Court of Appeals in Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P. 2d 238 
(Utah App. 1987) where Judge Orme, again writing for the 
unanimous panel stated: 
Recently this Court held that an advanced 
degree or professional license is not 
marital property subject to division upon 
divorce. However, an advanced degree often 
accompanies a disparity in earning potential 
that is appropriately considered as a factor 
in alimony analysis. We reaffirm our holding 
in Petersen and analyze the instant appeal 
under the same analysis employed in that 
case. 
Id. at 240. 
Following Petersen and Rayburn, the questions of valuation 
of a medical degree for property distribution purposes and the 
adequate compensation of a non-student spouse through a support 
award were presented to this Court in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah App. 1988). (A copy has been included in the 
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Addendum to this brief,) The case was decided without having to 
answer the question of whether a degree is a marital asset, but 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, discussed the great 
number of problems associated with attempting to place a value on 
educational achievements and referred at length to the reasons 
relied on by the Colorado Court in Graham for concluding that 
educational achievements are not property. He stated: 
We agree that an educational or professional 
degree is difficult to value and that such 
valuation does not easily fit the common 
understanding of the character of property. 
Id. at 1081. 
The court went on to conclude that the proper remedy for Mrs. 
Gardner was to award her an adequate alimony award. 
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Grahamf supra, the Colorado 
Supreme Court concluded that, while a non-student spouse is not 
entitled to treat the degree as a marital asset, that spouse's 
contribution to that degree is to be considered by the trial 
court in determining the proper award of support and maintenance: 
A spouse who provides financial support while 
the other spouse acquires an education is not 
without a remedy. Where there is marital 
property to be divided, such contribution to 
the education of the other spouse may be 
taken into consideration by the court. Here, 
we again note that no marital property has 
accumulated by the parties. Further, if 
maintenance is sought and need is 
demonstrated, the trial court may make an 
award based on all relevant factors. 
Certainly, among the relevant factors to be 
considered is the contribution of the spouse 
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seeking maintenance to the education of the 
other spouse from whom the maintenance is 
sought. 
Id. at 78 (Citations and statutes omitted.) 
The Graham decision was recently reconsidered and 
reaffirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of 
Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987). (A copy of this case has been 
included in the Addendum to this brief.) In Olar, the husband 
had been a full-time student throughout the parties1 12-year 
marriage, with the exception of one year where he had worked 
full time. Mrs. Olar worked full time for the entire marriage, 
with the exception of a nine-week maternity leave. Mr. Olar's 
education was financed by veteran's benefits, tuition waivers, 
student loans, fellowships, graduate student stipends and an 
inheritance from his father. The only marital assets acquired by 
the parties were two motor vehicles, furniture and miscellaneous 
personal property, a mobile home and a savings account. At the 
time of the divorce, Mr. Olar had completed his doctoral 
dissertation and had only to present this work before his 
committee to obtain his doctoral degree in physiology and 
biophysics. 
At trial, Mrs. Olar did not ask for a property distribution 
of Mr. Olar's degree, but did request an award of support. To 
qualify for such an award in Colorado, a spouse must establish 
the requirements of CRS Section 14-10-114 (1) (a) and (b) . These 
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sections provide that a court may award maintenance only if it 
finds that a spouse lacks sufficient property to provide for his 
"reasonable needs" and is unable to support himself through 
"appropriate employment." After analyzing the facts in the Olar 
case, the trial court denied Mrs. Olar's request for maintenance 
after finding she did not meet these threshold requirements. On 
initial appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, the trial 
court's decision was affirmed. (See, In re Marriage of Olar, 84 
C.A. 0329 [Colo. App., Oct. 17, 1985, unpub.].) 
Thereafter, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
reconsider its decision in Graham v. Graham because the Court was 
concerned about the "harsh and often unfair outcome in a 
dissolution proceeding where one spouse has postponed his or her 
own career and educational goals to support and contribute to the 
career and educational goals of the other spouse." 747 P.2d at 
678. 
After reviewing the issue, the Court found that "the value 
of an educational degree is too dependent upon the attributes and 
future choices of its possessor to be fairly valued." Id. at 
680. Therefore, it reaffirmed its holding in Graham that "an 
educational degree is not marital property." Id. The court went 
on, however, to state that the contribution of one spouse to the 
education of the other is a relevant factor to be considered in 
determining an award of maintenance: 
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In Graham we stated, a spouse who provides 
financial support while the other spouse 
acquires an education is not without a 
remedy. Here, it is the adequacy of the 
remedy with which we are concerned. The 
contribution of one spouse to the education 
of the other spouse may be taken into 
consideration when marital property is 
divided. This remedy is effective only if 
sufficient marital property has been 
accumulated by the parties during their 
marriage. In Graham, and the case at bar, 
the parties were divorced shortly after the 
husband acquired his degree. The situation 
in which the dissolution of marriage occurs 
before the benefits of the advanced degree 
can be realized, and where no material 
property is accumulated, requires us to look 
to another remedy for the inequity that 
results for the working spouse. Another 
option mentioned in Graham was an award of 
maintenance based on all relevant factors 
including the contribution of one spouse to 
the other spouse. 
Id. at 680. The court then remanded the case for an award of 
maintenance on the basis that the threshold of reasonable need 
under the Colorado statute is more than the minimum amount needed 
to sustain life. In interpreting the second statutory requisite 
of "appropriate employment" of the non-student spouse, the court 
held that such employment must be suited to the individual and 
reflect that person's expectations and intentions as expressed 
during the marriage. Thus, Olar, supra, gives the Colorado trial 
courts broad discretion in fashioning an adequate remedy for a 
non-student spouse who has supported his/her partner in obtaining 
an educational degree. This approach is consistent with the 
well-founded doctrine in Utah that a trial court is afforded a 
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wide latitude of discretion in fashioning a fair, equitable and 
comprehensive remedy in divorce actions. See, e.g., Burnham v. 
Burnham, 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); Argvle v. Argvle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 
1984); Higlev v. Higlev, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983); Doritv v. 
Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982); and English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
A very complete, informative and thorough analysis of the 
issue now before this Court is also found in the case of Archer 
v. Archer, 493 A. 2d 1074 (Md. 1985). The facts of Archer are 
similar to the facts of this case. At the time of the parties1 
marriage, the husband had completed one year of medical school. 
The wife had completed two years of undergraduate work but 
discontinued her education in order to work full-time. After 
four years of marriage, two children were born. The husband 
completed three years of medical school, received his medical 
degree and license and completed a two-year residency. The U.S. 
Navy paid his tuition and gave him a monthly stipend during 
school. He worked summers while in medical school. In 
construing a statute related to dividing marital property, (a 
statute very similar to the Utah statute) , the trial court 
concluded that the medical degree was not marital property under 
the act and denied the wife's claim for a monetary award. The 
trial court's decision was affirmed. 
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The Archer decision first analyzes the logic of Graham, 
supra, and gives an informative general summary of how other 
courts have dealt with this difficult issue. 
. . . of the twenty-four jurisdictions which 
have considered the matter, courts in all but 
two jurisdictions have uniformly held that a 
professional degree or license is not marital 
property subject to equitable division. 
Virtually all of these courts, consistent 
with the rationale advanced by the Colorado 
Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Graham, 
supra, have held that an advanced degree or 
professional license lacks the traditional 
attributes of "property,fl being neither 
transferrable, assignable, devisable, nor 
subject to conveyance, sale, pledge or 
inheritance. Some courts, by way of an 
additional reason for concluding that a 
degree/license is not marital property, have 
held that such items are too speculative to 
value. Other courts have said that efforts 
to characterize spousal contributions as an 
investment or commercial enterprise deserving 
of recompense demean the concept of marriage. 
Still other courts have found that the future 
earning capacity of a degree or license-
holding spouse is personal, a mere 
expectancy and a post-marital effort — not 
divisible as "marital property." And some 
other courts, in declining to find that a 
graduate degree or professional license is 
marital property, express the view that such 
items are best considered when awarding 
alimony. 
Id. at 1077-78. (Footnotes omitted.) In holding that the 
medical degree or license was not marital property within the 
meaning of the Maryland Act, the Archer court concluded: 
. . . While, as earlier indicated, we have 
in some contexts construed the term 
"property" in a broad sense, there is nothing 
in the Maryland Act to suggest that the 
28 
General Assembly intended that a medical 
degree or license, earned during marriage, 
would constitute "marital property" subject 
to equitable distribution upon divorce by a 
monetary award. We therefore hold, in 
accordance with the majority view, that a 
professional degree or license does not 
possess any of the basic characteristics or 
property within the ambit of marital property 
under Section 8-201(3) of the Act. While 
pension rights, as in Peering, constitute a 
current asset which the individual has a 
contractual right to receive, such rights are 
plainly distinguishable from a mere 
expectancy of future enhanced income 
resulting from a professional degree. The 
latter is but an intellectual attainment; it 
is not a present property interest. It is 
personal to the holder; it cannot be sold, 
transferred, pledged or inherited. It does 
not have an assignable value nor does it 
represent a guarantee of receipt of a set 
monetary amount in the future, such as 
pension benefits. Quite simply, a 
degree/license does not have an exchange 
value on an open market. In re Marriage of 
Graham, supra, 574 P. 2d at 77. At best, it 
represents a potential for increase in a 
person's earning capacity made possible by 
the degree and license in combination with 
innumerable other factors and conditions too 
uncertain and speculative to constitute 
"marital property" within the contemplation 
of the legislature. See also, Aufmuth v. 
Aufmuth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 152 Ca.Rptr. 668 
(1979), overruled on other grounds. In re 
marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.3d 808, 166 
Ca.Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980); In re 
Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill.App.3d 234, 
83 111.Dec. 425, 470 N.Ed.2d 551 (1984); 
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 
(1982). Moreover, as Dewitt v. Dewitt. 98 
Wis.2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980), makes 
clear, income earned after the marriage is 
dissolved as a result of the degree/license 
would in no event constitute "marital 
property" within the definition of that term 
in Section 8-201(e), since it would not have 
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in Section 8-201(e), since it would not have 
been acquired during the marriage. 
Id. at 1079-80. 
The Archer court then concluded, as did the Graham and Olar 
courts, supra, and Judge Page in this case, that the 
contributions of the supporting spouse could be considered in 
connection with her request for alimony. 
Contrary to this position, the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Martinez reversed the trial court and created the doctrine of 
equitable restitution. In distinguishing equitable restitution 
from traditional maintenance and support, Judge Davidson stated: 
[W]e hold that plaintiff is entitled to an 
award of 'equitable restitution1 in addition 
to traditional alimony. We use the term 
equitable restitution to describe the award 
in order to establish a clear distinction 
between it and traditional alimony or any 
other form of spousal maintenance or support. 
The function of equitable restitution is to 
enable a spouse to share the newly obtained 
earning capacity of a former spouse who has 
achieved that capacity through the 
significant effort and sacrifices of the 
requesting spouse which were detrimental to 
that spouse's development. It is nothing 
more than an adequate sharing of the rewards 
of both parties1 common efforts and 
expectations. 
Martinez, 754 P.2d at 78. (Emphasis in original.) 
While earlier in its opinion the Martinez court purported to 
follow the law as outlined in Petersen and Rayburn, the practical 
effect of equitable restitution is to create a property interest 
in a spouse's newly obtained earning capacity as a result of an 
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advanced educational degree. This result is contrary to Utah 
law. The attempt of the Martinez court to create a property 
interest in increased earning capacity runs afoul of the same 
problems inherent in the creation of a property interest in an 
advanced degree. First, the valuation and division of this 
interest will be as difficult and speculative as the valuation 
and division of a degree as a property interest. Second, just 
like an advanced degree, increased earning capacity cannot be 
bought, sold or devised. It is personal to its holder and its 
value is subject to the attributes, perseverance and career 
choices of its owner. Judge Jackson summarized the problems 
with equitable restitution in his well-reasoned dissent and 
stated: 
By creating a divisible interest in Dr. 
Martinez's enhanced earning capacity, this 
court has awarded a non-terminable property 
interest in a medical degree which goes 
beyond the compensation approved in Petersen. 
The majority has not limited its award to 
Mrs. Martinez's contributions toward her 
husband's medical education costs; it has 
taken the further step of providing financial 
recompense for lost expectations. I would 
reject any compensation formula based on 
future earning capacity. The factors and 
variables involved in the valuation of an 
enhanced earning capacity are as speculative 
as those involved in an attempt to value an 
advanced degree; such speculation can only 
lead to inequity. 
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is best 
dealt with through a generous but fair 
distribution of property and award of 
alimony, not through the creation of a 
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distinctly new form of cleverly disguised 
marital property for which there is no 
precedent. 
Id. at 82. (Footnotes omitted.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recently addressed the issue 
of a party's future earning capacity being included in a property 
distribution in Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). In 
that case, the wife challenged a property distribution, claiming 
that she was entitled to a share of the present value of her 
husband's earning capacity or additional property in compensation 
for the award of Defendant's consulting business to him. This 
Court rejected that approach and concluded that the trial court's 
award of alimony was based upon the earning capacity of the 
husband and that it need not be considered in the property 
distribution. Id. at 567. 
The impropriety of creating the doctrine of equitable 
restitution in addition to provision for spousal support is 
further emphasized by the factors outlined by the Martinez court 
to be used by a trial court in determining an award of equitable 
restitution. The court stated: 
Factors to be analyzed in determining an 
award of equitable distribution include, but 
are not limited to: (1) the length of the 
marriage; (2) the financial contributions and 
personal development sacrifices made by the 
requesting spouse; (3) the duration of these 
contributions and sacrifices during marriage; 
(4) the resulting disparity in earning 
capacity between the requesting spouse and 
the spouse benefitted thereby; and (5) the 
amount of property accumulated during the 
marriage. An award of equitable restitution 
will not terminate upon plaintiff's 
remarriage, and may be payable in lump sum or 
periodically over time depending on the 
circumstances of each case. 
Id. at 78-79. (Footnotes omitted.) 
A careful review of these factors shows that they are either 
already used by trial courts in determining alimony awards or 
they are factors that trial courts should be given discretion to 
consider in determining an overall family maintenance award. As 
a result, not only can the criteria listed above be dealt with 
through the proper award of support, by their nature they are 
better considered in a support determination. 
That a spouse can be adequately compensated through a 
support award is especially true in this case. Judge Jackson 
recognized the inequity of the equitable restitution award under 
the specific facts of this case. He pointed out that Mrs. 
Martinez did not provide the financial capital that enabled Mr. 
Martinez to attend school and obtain his degree and that there 
was no evidence that she had deferred her own career or 
education. In addition, although the majority created equitable 
restitution for those situations where the spouse was on the 
threshold of increased earning capacity, Judge Jackson pointed 
out that Dr. Martinez was already earning $100,000.00 per year 
and the parties had accumulated real and personal property from 
which an adequate compensatory award could have been made. To 
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the factual reasons for his dissent, Judge Jackson added several 
others: 
On the facts presented in this case, there 
are additional reasons why I believe the 
majority's disposition of this appeal is 
misguided; (1) equity can be achieved under 
current alimony and property distribution 
statutes and case law; (2) an award of 
equitable restitution coupled with the 
majority's generous alimony and child 
support awards is double-dipping; and (3) an 
award of equitable restitution, in effect, 
treats the professional education as 
"property" subject to division upon 
dissolution of a marriage. 
Id. at 80-81. Judge Jackson's approach to the property division 
and support awards in this case and his reasons therefor are 
consistent with Utah law that advanced educational degrees are 
not marital assets subject to the division in a divorce action. 
Instead, non-student supporting spouses should be compensated 
through a fair award of spousal support or maintenance, which 
award be based on the individual facts of each case. 
The real question before this Court is not whether a 
medical degree is marital property, but whether the acquisition 
of skills and knowledge during a marriage, which in turn enhance 
the earning capability of one of the parties, is marital 
property. An affirmative answer to this question would 
necessarily have a devastating practical effect on Utah domestic 
relations cases. If the Martinez position is adopted, then its 
application cannot be limited only to professional degrees. It 
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must, likewise, play to masters degrees, bachelors degrees, 
associate degrees, technical qualifications and even a high 
school diploma, if they were acquired either wholly or partially 
during the course of the marriage. It could also then be argued 
that a degree from one institution, such as Harvard, is more 
valuable than a degree from another, such as Utah State. 
Likewise, the concept would have to apply not only to educational 
achievements but also to on-the-job training at a lower salary in 
anticipation of a higher paying position at a later date with a 
company. 
Such an approach will necessarily "open Pandora's box" in 
divorce actions. It would require that expert testimony be 
presented in every divorce action if either party acquired any 
education or job training during the marriage. Not only would 
such testimony be highly speculative, but it would necessarily 
complicate even the simplest divorce actions. These are but just 
a few of the reasons why the vast majority of states have refused 
to adopt the concept that a degree is marital property. 
The better approach is to do just what the trial court did 
in the present case: consider the Defendant's education in 
relation to the support award. The trial court did not err in 
concluding that the Defendant's medical degree was not an asset 
to be considered in a property distribution. 
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On the other hand, it was error for the Court of Appeals 
panel to create the doctrine of equitable restitution• Not only 
does the Court of Appeals create a property interest which is 
contrary to Utah law, but such an award is inequitable and 
unnecessary in light of the ability of a trial court to award 
support based on all the relevant factors of a case. That 
portion of the Court of Appeals opinion should be vacated. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS A FAIR AND 
REASONABLE METHOD TO COMPENSATE THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR ANY EFFORT EXPENDED BY HER WHILE THE 
DEFENDANT WAS ATTENDING SCHOOL AND IT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The trial court in this case properly exercised its 
discretion in fashioning a remedy which considered the individual 
facts of the case. An integral part of that remedy was an award 
of alimony to the Plaintiff which was intended to assist her in 
connection with her ongoing monthly financial needs and to 
reimburse her for the effort and monies she claimed she had 
expended during the period the Defendant was securing his 
education. In recognizing the assistance she provided (R. 205-
2 06) , the trial court ordered certain things not normally done in 
divorce actions. 
First, it awarded Plaintiff $400.00 per month alimony for a 
period of five years, with that award not to terminate on her 
remarriage if the same occurred within the first three years. 
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The Court of Appeals, without additional hearing, sua sponte 
increased that award to $750.00 per month and made it permanent. 
Second, while giving the husband a non-interest bearing line 
in the marital residence, it made the same payable upon the sale 
of the home, the wife's cohabitation, when the youngest child 
reached 18 or 21 years if still a student living at home, but 
not upon her remarriage. 
Third, it awarded child support until each child reached the 
age of 18, or 21 years if the child was a full-time student and 
not married, when no evidence was presented to justify an award 
of child support past the age of 18. 
Fourth, it abated the husband's child support obligation by 
only $100.00 per month per child when the children were with the 
husband — even if that were on a full-time basis. 
Fifth, it required the husband to pay all transportation 
costs related to visitation. 
Sixth, it required the husband to pay all of the student 
loans incurred in connection with securing his education. 
Seventh, it gave the husband no credit for his inheritance 
from his mother which was received during the marriage. 
Each of the seven items set forth above are actions not 
normally taken by a trial court in a divorce cases, and represent 
a conscientious effort by the trial court to fashion a remedy 
which would be fair to both parties, considering the fact that 
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the Defendant was the primary provider during the marriage (Tr. 
53) , while the Plaintiff worked part time for three years and 
contributed no more than $200.00 per month to living expenses 
(Mrs. Martinez's Brief, Court of Appeals, p. 5); that the 
Defendant's education was paid for by his G. I. Bill benefits and 
his inheritance (Tr. 53); that while working and going to school, 
he was also able to acquire a substantial equity in a home (Tr. 
57) , furniture and furnishings; that the Plaintiff could secure 
her own education at no cost to her through her employment (T.r 
48); that the parties had been separated for three years prior to 
trial and that the Plaintiff had been receiving substantial 
support from the Defendant during that period; that the 
Defendant had completed his internship and a portion of his 
residency without any assistance, encouragement or companionship 
from his wife (Tr. 14, 57); and that Plaintiff's employer would 
pay the costs of her education if she chose to go to school (Tr. 
48) . 
Under the circumstances of this case, the remedy fashioned 
by the trial court was fair and equitable. It was not arbitrary 
or capricious and, consequently, should be upheld. As this Court 
stated in Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 190 (1967): 
It would lead to intolerable instability of 
judgments if this court should assume the 
prerogative and accept the responsibility of 
merely second guessing a trial judge who has 
done a conscientious job of attempting to 
make just and equitable allocation of the 
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property and income of the parties in regard 
to alimony and support monies as the trial 
judge appears to have done here. It is due 
to this fact, taking into consideration the 
nature of the trial judge's authority and 
duty, and his advantaged position, that in 
such matters he is allowed a comparatively 
wide latitude of discretion which will not be 
disturbed in the absence of clear abuse . • . 
Id. at 151. 
In Martinez, the Court of Appeals panel accepted some 
portions of the trial judge's decision, rejected others and 
created a new remedy never argued, urged, or even mentioned by 
Mrs. Martinez. What the Court of Appeals failed to recognize 
was that each aspect of the trial judge's ruling was interrelated 
with the other aspects in order to arrive at an overall fair and 
just decision to both parties. 
Rather than analyzing the parties' entire financial 
situation and balancing all of the equities, as did the trial 
court, the Court of Appeals changed on a piecemeal basis certain 
portions of the trial court's decisions. Use of this approach is 
entirely incorrect inasmuch as in this case, as in most divorce 
cases, the support, property, and debt awards are necessarily 
interrelated. To readjust those awards as the Court of Appeals 
did also then requires a readjustment of other awards made by the 
trial court. That is to say, if the support awards were changed 
by the Court of Appeals, then in order to continue to be fair, 
the debt distribution may have to be reallocated. If the debt 
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distribution is reallocated, then the benefit of having the 
dependency exemptions may have to be reconsidered and so on, ad 
infinitum. To sanction this approach in connection with an 
appellate court's review necessarily goes against the well-
established principle that appellate courts should not attempt 
to "second guess11 a trial court's support and property awards 
(Bader, supra). In this case, the Court of Appeals' decision 
related to equitable restitution vis-a-vis the manner it dealt 
with the support awards does just that, and it is unfair. The 
reasoning of the trial court related to how Mrs. Martinez should 
be compensated for any effort expended by her while Defendant was 
attending school is well-documented in the very specific findings 
(see pages 9, 10 and 11, infra), and Judge Page's decision should 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah law, a medical degree or, for that matter, any 
educational achievement or job training, obtained by a party 
during a marriage is not "property" as that term is used in 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953). Instead, if the education 
or training so obtained enhances or increases earning potential, 
that may be considered by the trial court in awarding support. 
The trial court in this case acted consistently with this 
approach, which mirrors the decisions of all but a very few 
states. The trial court properly and correctly fashioned an 
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equitable and adequate remedy for Mrs. Martinez under the 
specific facts of this case which reimburses her for any efforts 
she expended in connection with the Defendant's education. 
On the other hand, the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
Martinez v. Martinez, supra, is contrary to these principles and 
contrary to Utah law, as set out in the Petersen, Rayburn and 
Gardner cases. An award of equitable restitution, as created by 
the Court of Appeals is, for all practical purposes, the same as 
treating a professional degree as a marital asset subject to 
division upon divorce. The determination of such an award is 
subject to the same difficulties, speculation and inequities as 
an award of an interest in a degree as marital property. The 
impropriety of such a remedy is especially evident under the 
facts of the Martinez case because the court began by awarding 
Mrs. Martinez an increased amount of permanent alimony based upon 
Dr. Martinez's increased earning capacity. It then also awarded 
her an amount of equitable restitution, a remedy expressly 
distinguished from traditional alimony or other spousal support 
and based on the increased earning capacity of a spouse as a 
result of that spouse's professional degree. 
As a result, the Martinez decision is in conflict with 
previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and of this Court on 
an important question of state law. It represents a drastic 
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departure from this law and is a theory never raised by the 
Plaintiff in the court below. Simply and succinctly put, the 
Martinez decision is wrong. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred and that portion of 
its opinion which deals with the creation and application of the 
doctrine of equitable restitution should be vacated. The 
decision of the trial court related to support, property and debt 
distribution should be affirmed. The Defendant/Petitioner should 
be awarded his costs related to the proceedings he has been 
required to file in this Court and to correct the error of the 
Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *j2j<^ day of December, 1988. 
DART, ADAMSQN & KASTING 
By 
^ N T M. KAST 
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/PETITIONER were duly hand 
delivered, addressed to: 
Neil B. Crist, Esq. 
Nelda Bishop, Esq. 
HANSEN & CRIST 
110 West Center 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
DATED this *2j day of December, 1988 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN C. MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESS M. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 34354 
The above matter came on for trial on Friday, the 31st day 
of May, 1985, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge 
presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and represented by 
counsel of record, Neil B. Crist, Esq. Defendant appeared in 
person and represented by counsel of record, Paul H. Liapis, Esq. 
The court heard testimony of each of the parties, and of two 
expert witnesses in support of Plaintiff's Complaint and 
Defendant's Counterclaim for Divorce. Defendant's objections to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were heard before the 
Court on Thursday, the 29th day August, 1985, again before the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge. Both Plaintiff and 
Defendant appeared through counsel for that hearing. On the 
basis of that testimony, and the record before the court, the 
court being duly advised in the premises now makes and enters the 
following: 
*V V* & 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, State of Utah, 
and was such for a period in excess of three months prior to the 
filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband having been 
married in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah on June 22, 
1968. 
3. The following three children have been born as issue of 
the marriage, and none other are expected: 
BRENT P. MARTINEZ (d.o.b. October 1, 19 70) 
RYAN S. MARTINEZ (d.o.b. August 31, 1971) 
HEATHER MARTINEZ (d.o.b. May 29, 1975) 
4. During the course of the marriage Defendant treated 
Plaintiff cruelly causing her great mental suffering and distress 
by consorting with an adult female other than Plaintiff. 
5. The parties acquired certain real property during the 
marriage, which real property is located at 745 West 2125 South, 
Woods Cross, Utah 84087 and is otherwise described as: 
All of Lot 221, Sorrento Estates Subdivision 
#2, Davis County, Utah. 
.6. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
certain personal property, which personal property has been 
allocated on an equitable basis prior to the hearing hereon; the 
court finds such division to be equal. 
7. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
certain debts and obligations. Those debts and obligations 
should be allocated as follows: 
A. Plaintiff should be awarded the following debts and 
obligations; all incurred after the separation of the parties: 
(1) First Interstate VISA, approximately $706.73; 
(2) ZCMI, apprixmately $537.00; 
(3) Granite Furniture, approximately $96.00; 
(4) Levitz Furniture, approximately $250.00 
(5) J.C. Penney1s, approximately $214.00; 
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(6) Mt. America Credit Union, approximately 
$376.00; and 
(7) Her attor- ley's fees (excluding award from 
Defendant), of approximately $6,000. 
B. The Defendant should be awarded the following debts 
and obligations: 
(1) National Direct Student Loan, approximately 
$10,000; 
(2) Utah Higher Education Assistance Authority 
Loan, approximately $5,739.04; 
(3) Health Profession Student Loan, approximately 
$3,230; 
(4) Geisinger Credit Union (his moving expenses 
after separation of parties), approximately 
$1,800; 
(5) AVCO Financial Service, approximately $1,200, 
(incurred after separation of parties); 
(6) North Central Bank (incurred after separation 
of parties), approximately $900; 
(7) MASTERCARD (incurred after separation of 
parties), approximately $800.00; and 
(8) His attorney's fees of approximately $2,500. 
8. During the course of the marriage, the parties lived 
together as husband and wife for approximately 14 years, having 
separated during March, 1982, and having lived separate and apart 
since that time. 
9. During the marriage, the parties jointly participated in 
the attainment of a Bachelor's Degree by Defendant. While 
achieving this degree, Defendant worked and supplied the majority 
of the income to the family, while Plaintiff attended to the 
child care and care of the home. 
10. During the period 1977 through 1982, the parties 
experienced a particularly stressful period while Defendant was 
engaged in medical school. During that time Defendant did not 
work, and the family obligations were met by a series of student 
loans, a bequest from the estate of Defendant's mother and income 
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earned by Plaintiff during her employment. During the 14 years 
that the parties lived together, Plaintiff assisted extensively 
in Defendant's obtaining a college education, medical degree and 
internship. In addition, Plaintiff made substantial sacrifices 
in order to facilitate the completion of Defendant's medical 
schooling and internship. 
11. The parties are both fit and proper parents to be 
awarded the care, custody and control of the parties1 three minor 
children, but it is in the best interest of those children that 
custody be awarded to Plaintiff. 
12. Defendant's gross income is $100,000 per year as a 
result of his contract with Canonsburg Diversified Services, Inc. 
dba Canonsburg General Hospital, Canonsburg, Pennsylvania 15317. 
Defendant's annual expenses associated with that employment are 
approximately $7,000, leaving a gross income before taxes of 
approximately $93,000 per year or $7,750 per month. 
13. Plaintiff is presently employed with a gross income of 
approximately $1,033 per month, and expects a 25% reduction in 
that salary during the next few months as a result of a voluntary 
transfer to a less stressful position within the company. 
14. On the basis of Plaintiff's historical monthly 
expenditures of approximately $2,050 per month, she is in need of 
financial assistance from Defendant by way of child support and 
should be awarded child support in the sum of $30 0 per month per 
child. To assist the children in maintaining a standard of 
living more comparable to that enjoyed by their father, such 
child support should be ordered to continue through age 21 if the 
children are full-time students and not married. 
15. Defendant has available through his employment health, 
accident and dental insurance which should be carried on the 
parties' children. Defendant should further be responsible for 
all medical expenses over and above that covered by the 
insurance, other than the deductible amounts associated with 
routine office calls and prescriptions. 
16. Defendant presently has insurance on his life in the 
amount of $110,000, that being Policy No. 130566 with National 
4 
A-5 
Public Service for $10,000 and a group policy with the American 
Medical Association for $100,000, which insurance should be 
maintained with the parties' children as beneficiaries during 
their minority. However, in the event that Defendant should 
father additional children from a subsequent marriage, those 
children may be equally included as beneficiaries under such 
policy, 
17. In light of the distance between Plaintiff's residence 
and Defendant's residence, Defendant should be awarded reasonable 
visitation with the children, to include up to eight weeks 
visitation during the summer months, and during the children's 
Christmas vacation from December 26 until the day prior to the 
commencement of school activities at the close of that vacation 
period. The children should spend Christmas Eve and Christmas 
Day with their mother each year. Defendant should be awarded 
other visitation as is feasible on 24-hour notice to Plaintiff. 
18. As a result of the distance between the parties 
residences, there will be a substantial cost of transportation to 
facilitate Defendant's visitation. As a result, during the 
extended summer visitation, or during periods that a child or 
children live with Defendant, the child support provided herein 
should be reduced by the sum of $100 per month per child for the 
actual time the children are living with Defendant. The Court 
further finds that there are on-going expenses which will be 
incurred by Plaintiff even during periods of time that the 
children are physically with Defendant. 
19. Plaintiff should be awarded the exclusive use and 
occupancy of the parties' residence subject to a lien in favor of 
Defendant for the sum of $17,528.00, payable upon the youngest 
child reaching the age of 18 years or the age of 21 years if she 
is still a student and living at home after attaining the age of 
18 years, or upon the sale of the home, whichever occurs first. 
The lien in favor of Defendant is specifically ordered not to be 
payable on the remarriage of Plaintiff but shall be payable in 
the event that Plaintiff cohabitates with an adult male without 
the benefit of marriage. 
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20. There presently exists a large disparity between the 
parties1 present and potential incomes, 
21. The court finds that alimony is designed not only to 
meet the needs of Plaintiff in this case, and is not solely based 
upon her ability to support herself and Defendant's ability to 
contribute to that support, but also a means of repayment to 
Plaintiff for her years spent caring for the household, helping 
the husband in his educational pursuits and support of the 
family, and for her involvement through the extensive educational 
process utilized to obtain the medical training. 
22. Plaintiff's income and resources being inadequate to 
meet her needs for support and maintenance, she should be awarded 
the sum of $400 per month for a period of five years as and for 
alimony. Such alimony should not terminate in the event that she 
remarries within three years of the Decree of Divorce becoming 
final, but should terminate under the normal condition of 
remarriage if such takes place more than three years after the 
Decree herein becomes final. Cohabitation with an adult male 
shall terminate alimony, as provided by law at any time during 
the five year period. 
23. The court further finds that the medical degree and 
training are not specifically a property right subject to 
distribution by this court under the current lav/ of this state. 
Such degree and training are applicable only to the determination 
of alimony and child support. The court has considered the 
medical training and license to practice only as it impacts 
income and Defendant's present ability to pay appropriate alimony 
and child support. Such income will also be taken into account 
"in future years as it raises in stability (sic) the rate of 
child support". (T.T. Page 135, Line 10) 
24. As a result of the substantial contribution by 
Defendant to the support and maintenance of the parties1 
children, it is fair and equitable that Defendant be awarded the 
two oldest children for tax deduction purposes, and that 
Plaintiff be directed to file the necessary documents in order to 
allow Defendant to claim them as deductions during each December 
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starting 1985. Plaintiff should be awarded the deductions for 
the youngest child. 
25. Plaintiff's resources are inadequate to allow her to 
pay her attorney's fees incurred herein, a sum of $7,800 plus the 
cost of the trial. As a result, Plaintiff should be awarded a 
judgment against Defendant for attorney's fees in the sum of 
$2,500. However, Defendant has paid that sum prior to the execu-
tion of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce; therefore, no award of attorney's fees or costs should 
be made in the Decree. 
26. The parties having been separated for a period of 
approximately three years, the Decree of Divorce herein should 
become final upon entry. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, v/ith such Decree to 
become final upon entry. 
B. The care, custody and control of the parties' minor 
children should be awarded to Plaintiff, subject to reasonable 
visitation as set forth in the Findings above. 
C. In order to make the distribution of that property which 
qualifies for distribution by this court as equal as possible, 
Plaintiff should be awarded the real property set forth in 
Paragraph 5 of the Findings above subject to a lien in favor of 
Defendant for one-half of the present equity therein, that being 
for the sum of $17,678. Such lien should be payable upon the 
youngest child reaching the age of 18 years, or upon that 
youngest child reaching the age of 21 years if she remains 
unmarried and a full-time student after the age of 18 years. 
Such lien should further be payable upon the sale of the home, or 
upon Plaintiff's cohabitation with an adult male without 
remarriage, but should specifically not be made payable upon 
Plaintiff's remarriage. 
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D. The personal property of the marriage has been divided 
equally between the parties, and such award should be confirmed 
by this court. 
E. The medical degree and training acquired by Defendant 
during the marriage is not a property asset properly allocable 
and distributable by this court. As a result, the court has 
equally allocated the remaining property assets without 
consideration of this item. The court has considered the medical 
training and license to practice only as it impacts income and 
Defendant's present ability to pay appropriate alimony and child 
support. Such income will also be taken into account "in future 
years as it raises in stability (sic) the rate of child support". 
(T.T. Page 135, Line 10) 
F. The debts and obligations of the marriage should be 
allocated as set forth in Paragraph 7 of the Findings above, such 
allocation being fair and equitable. 
G. Plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $300 per month 
per child as and for support of the minor children, with such 
support to be continued until age 21 if each child is a full-time 
student and not married after attaining the age of 18 years. 
H. Defendant should be ordered to provide health, accident 
and dental insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor 
children, and to be responsible for any deductible expenses not 
covered by that insurance, with the exception of deductibles 
associated with routine office calls and prescriptions. 
I. Defendant should be ordered to maintain in full force 
and effect the policies of life insurance presently existing upon 
his life, payable to the benefit of the parties1 minor children. 
However, any subsequent children fathered by Defendant should be 
included on an equal basis under that policy. 
J. As a result of the substantial cost of transportation 
incurred by Defendant, in the on-going expenses attributable to 
Plaintiff during the children's absences, the child support 
provided herein should be abated by the sum of $100 per month per 
child for actual time that the children are living with 
Defendant. 
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K. Plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $400 per month as 
and for alimony for a period of five years. Such alimony should 
not terminate in the event that she remarries within three years 
of the Decree of Divorce herein becoming final but should termin-
ate under the normal condition of remarriage if that remarriage 
takes place more than three years after the Decree becomes final. 
Such alimony should terminate by law in the event that there is 
cohabitation during the alimony period. 
L. No further award of attorney's fees should be made as a 
result of this action. Q A fl 
DATED this 7*ft*» day of Stepfeeirlicr, 19 85. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY SJ PAGE * 
District Judge 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
this third amended proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to Paul H. Liapis, Attorney for Defendant, via first class 
mail, postage prepaid on this
 rS-Q daY of September, 1985. 
y ^ < ^ ^ 
NEIL B. CRIST 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
NEIL B. CRIST #0759 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 295-2391 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN C. MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESS M. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 34354 
U-3 iOi 
The above matter came on for trial on Friday, the 31st day 
of May, 1985, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge 
presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and represented by 
counsel of record, Neil B. Crist, Esq. Defendant appeared in 
person and represented by counsel of record, Paul H. Liapis, Esq. 
The court heard testimony of each of the parties, and of two 
expert witnesses in support of Plaintiff's Complaint and 
Defendant's Counterclaim for Divorce. In addition, the Court 
heard Defendant's objections to the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law on Thursday, the ?9th day of August, 1985, with 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge presiding. 
Plaintiff and Defendant appeared through counsel at that hearing. 
On the basis of the testimony, and the record before the court, 
the court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following: 
FILMED 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. DIVORCE GRANTED: Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from Defendant, thereby severing the bonds of matrimony 
previously existing between the parties. Such Decree will be 
final upon entry in the records of the court without the need for 
further action on the part of the parties. 
2. CUSTODY; Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the following children born as issue of this marriage, 
subject to reasonable visitation retained by Defendant as set 
forth herein: 
BRENT P. MARTINEZ (d.o.b. October 1, 1970) 
RYAN S. MARTINEZ (d.o.b. August 31, 1971) 
HEATHER MARTINEZ (d.o.b. May 29, 1975) 
3. VISITATION; Defendant is awarded reasonable visitation 
with the children, to include up to eight weeks visitation during 
the summer months, and during the children's Christmas vacation 
from December 26 until the day prior to the commencement of 
school activities at the close of that vacation. In carrying out 
this visitation, the court orders that children spend Christmas 
Eve and Christmas Day with their mother each year. Defendant 
should be awarded other reasonable rights of visitation as is 
feasible so long as he provides not less than 24 hours advance 
notice to Plaintiff of his intention to exercise that visitation. 
4. CHILD SUPPORT; Plaintiff is awarded from Defendant 
child support in the amount of $300 per month per child. Such 
child support is specifically ordered to continue past the age of 
18 years until each child reaches the age of 21 years so long as 
the child is a full-time student and not married. 
5. CHILD SUPPORT ABATEMENT; During periods that the child-
ren live with Defendant for extended periods, the child support 
provided herein is ordered to be reduced by the sum of $100 per 
month per child for the actual time that the children are in the 
primary care of Defendant. 
6. TAX DEDUCTIONS; Defendant is awarded the parties' two 
oldest children as and for state and federal income tax deduction 
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purposes, and Plaintiff is awarded the parties1 youngest child 
for such tax deduction purposes. Plaintiff is further ordered to 
file any necessary documents in order to allow Defendant to claim 
the two oldest children for each commencing 1985. 
7. MEDICAL INSURANCE: Defendant is ordered to provide 
health, accident, medical and/or dental insurance on the parties1 
children and to be responsible for all medical expenses not 
covered by that insurance, other than deductible amounts 
associated with routine office calls and prescriptions. 
8. LIFE INSURANCE: Defendant is ordered to maintain in 
full force and effect the policies insuring his life in the 
amount of $110,000 payable to the parties1 children as 
beneficiaries during their minority. In the event that Defendant 
fathers additional children in any subsequent marriage, those 
children may equally share as beneficiaries under such policies. 
9. ALIMONY: Plaintiff is awarded alimony in the sum of 
$400 per month for a period of five years after the Decree of 
Divorce herein is made final. Such alimony is ordered not to 
terminate in the event that she remarries with an adult male 
within three years of the Decree of Divorce becoming final, but 
such alimony is ordered to terminate under the normal conditions 
of remarriage if such takes place more than three years after the 
Decree herein becomes final. Cohabitation shall terminate 
alimony as per the statute at any time. 
10. REAL PROPERTY; Plaintiff is awarded the exclusive use 
and occupancy of the real property acquired during the marriage, 
which property is located at 745 West 2125 South, Woods Cross, 
ULtah 84087, and is otherwise more specifically described as: 
All of Lot 221, Sorrento Estates Subdivision 
#2, Davis County, Utah. 
Such award is made subject to a lien in favor of Defendant for 
the sum of $17,528, payable upon the occurence of the first of 
the following conditions to take place. 
A. The youngest child reaching the age of 18 years or 
the age of 21 years if he or she is still a student and living at 
home after attaining the age of 18 years; 
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B. Upon the sale of the home; and 
C. Upon Plaintiff's cohabitation with an adult male 
which is not issue of the parties. 
Defendant's lien is specifically not payable in the event of 
Plaintiff's remarriage. 
11. PERSONAL PROPERTY; The personal property acquired 
during the marriage is awarded to that person having possession 
of the property as of the date of the hearing hereon. 
12, DEBTS: The debts and obligations of the marriage are 
allocated as follows: 
A. Plaintiff is av/arded the following debts and 
all incurred after the separation of the parties: obligations; 
B, 
obligations: 
(1) First Interstate VISA, approximately $706.73; 
(2) ZCMI, apprixmately $537.00; 
(3) Granite Furniture, approximately $96.00; 
(4) Levitz Furniture, approximately $250.00 
(5) J.C. Penney1s, approximately $214.00; 
(6) Mt. America Credit Union, approximately 
$376.00; and 
(7) Her attorney's fees (excluding award from 
Defendant), of approximately $6,000. 
The Defendant is awarded the following debts and 
(1) National Direct Student Loan, approximately 
$10,000; 
(2) Utah Higher Education Assistance Authority 
Loan, approximately $5,739.04; 
(3) Health Profession Student Loan, approximately 
$3,230; 
(4) Geisinger Credit Union (his moving expenses 
after separation of parties), approximately 
$1,800; 
(5) AVCO Financial Service, approximately $1,200, 
(incurred after separation of parties); 
(6) North Central Bank (incurred after separation 
of parties), approximately $900; 
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(7) MASTERCARD (incurred after separation of 
parties), approximately $800,00; and 
(8) His attorney's fees of approximately $2,500. 
ATTORNEYf S FEES: No costs or attorney's fees are 
awarded beyond those previously paid by Defendant. 
13. 
DATED this rn day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
District 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
this third amended proposed Decree of Divorce to Paul H. Liapis, 
Attorney for Defendant.via first class mail, postage prepaid on 
this rSO daY of Septofefrer7, 1985. If no objection is received 
prior to September 14, 1985, I request that the same be signed 
and entered. 
^ ^ > < ^ ^ 
NEIL B. CRJST 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Karen C. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
r. 
Jess M. MARTINEZ, Defendant 
and Respondent 
MARTINEZ v, MARTINEZ Utah 69 
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have federal income tax deductions for the 
two children, court could not award tax 
exemptions for the children to the father 
while awarding custody to the mother in 
1986 divorce decree where mother's amend-
ed complaint in 1985 had put the distribu-
tion of tax exemptions at issue. 26 U.S.C. 
A. § 152(eX4XB). . 
No. 860159-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 19, 1988. 
Wife appealed from order of the Sec-
ond District Court, Rodney S. Page, J., 
which divorced parties, awarded custody, 
awarded child support and alimony, and 
divided property. The Court of Appeals, 
Davidson, J., held that: (1) federal income 
tax exemptions could not be awarded to 
husband where custody was awarded to 
wife; (2) awards of child support and alimo-
ny were inadequate; (3) husband's medical 
degree was not subject to valuation distri-
bution; but (4) wife was entitled to eq-
uitable distribution to recognize her contri-
butions and sacrifices while husband ob-
tained medical degree. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
and remanded. 
Jackson, J., dissented and filed an opin-
ion. 
1. Husband and Wife «=>279<1) 
Prior to entry of divorce decree, father 
was entitled to exemptions for two children 
as stipulated by the parties in separation 
agreement in 1983. 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 152{eX4XB). 
2. Divorce <*=»297 
Although parties had stipulated in sep-
aration agreement in 1983 that father could 
3. Divorce <3=*227(2) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding wife only $2,500 in attorney 
fees, even though she had asked for over 
$7,800, where extensive fees were generat-
ed by interest and preparation of expert 
testimony offered to support valuation of 
husband's medical degree which was reject-
ed by the lower court. 
4. Divorce <s=»308 
Award of child support in the amount 
of $300 per child was inadequate to the 
extent that it was less than $600 per month 
per child in view of father's annual income 
of $100,000. 
5. Divorce «=>312.6(9) 
Although trial court's findings of fact 
did not fully address child support factors, 
that was not reversible error where the 
totality of the factual evidence in the 
record made the need for child support 
clear. 
6. Divorce <3=3247 
Award of alimony in the amount of 
$400 per month for a period of five years 
was inadequate to the extent that it was 
less than $750 per month and to the extent 
that it was not continuing, in view of hus-
band's income of $100,000 per year. 
7. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
Medical degree is not subject to valua-
tion and distribution in a divorce. 
A - 1 6 
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8. Divorce <s=»252.3(l) 
Where wife had provided some income 
and had provided care of children while 
husband obtained medical degree, wife was 
entitled to an award of "equitable restitu-
tion/' in addition to traditional alimony, to 
allow her to share the newly obtained earn-
ing capacity of her husband, who had 
achieved that capacity through the signifi-
cant efforts and sacrifices which the wife 
had made and which were detrimental to 
the wife's development 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
9. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
Equitable restitution to spouse for sac-
rifices made while then spouse obtains edu-
cation which leads to greatly increased in-
come is not to be awarded in case where 
marriage has lasted for many years after 
the professional degree has been attained 
as, in such a case, sufficient assets will 
have been accumulated and appropriate dis-
tribution to the requesting spouse will en-
able that spouse to share in the economic 
benefits earned as a result of the profes-
sional degree. 
10. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
Factors to be analyzed in determining 
an award of equitable restitution to spouse 
who has made significant efforts and sacri-
fices to enable other spouse to obtain pro-
fessional degree are the length of the mar-
riage, the financial contributions and per-
sonal development sacrifices made by the 
requesting spouse, the duration of those 
contributions and sacrifices during the 
marriage, resulting disparity in earning ca-
pacity between the requesting spouse and 
the spouse benefited thereby, and the 
amount of property accumulated during 
the marriage. 
11. Divorce e=»252.3(l) 
Award of equitable restitution to one 
spouse to recognize contributions and sacri-
fices made to enable the other spouse to 
obtain a professional degree will not termi-
nate upon the requesting spouse's remar-
riage and may be payable in lump sum or 
periodically over time, depending on the 
circumstances of each case. 
Neil C. Crist (argued), for Hansen, Crist 
& Spratley, Bountiful, for plaintiff and ap-
pellant 
Yasemin M. Salahor, Paul H. Liapis, 
Kent M. Kasting (argued), Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and respondent 
Before JACKSON, BILLINGS and 
DAVIDSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a decree of divorce 
entered by the Second District Court We 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on June 22, 
1968; subsequently, three children were 
born. At the time of marriage, both plain-
tiff and defendant were high school gradu-
ates and defendant was serving as an en-
listed man in the U.S. Army. After defend-
ant's discharge from the service, he accept-
ed employment at Hill Air Force Base, 
Utah where he worked as an instrument 
repair mechanic with an annual gross sala-
ry of approximately $10,000.00. Defendant 
began his higher education in 1970. De-
fendant testified the parties discussed his 
pursuit of a degree and that plaintiff 
thought it was a "good idea" but that she 
"wasn't terribly in favor of it" because it 
would be time consuming. Plaintiff testi-
fied she was in favor of the decision be-
cause the family would "have a better fu-
ture." Defendant completed his under-
graduate program five and one-half years 
later. During this phase of his education, 
defendant supported the family on his 
wages and G.L BUI benefits. Plaintiff 
gave birth to children in 1970, 1971, and 
1975. 
While an undergraduate, defendant de 
cided to apply to medical school. The par6 
ties agree that defendant's application to 
medical school threatened their marriage! 
Plaintiff was concerned that defendant's 
lack of employment during four years 
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would be financially detrimental to the 
family and that medical school would se-
verely limit defendant's ability to "spend 
much time" with the children and plaintiff. 
Seeing that defendant was adamant, plain-
tiff agreed to "stick by him" during the 
next four years believing that, as a result 
of their mutual sacrifices, the family would 
eventually enjoy a higher standard of liv-
ing. 
Defendant entered medical school in 1977 
and graduated in 1981. Family support 
was derived from student loans, savings, 
the remainder of defendant's G.I. Bill en-
titlement, $7,000.00 from defendant's moth-
er's estate, and income from plaintiffs 
part-time employment. 
Upon completion of medical school, de-
fendant accepted an internship in Pennsyl-
vania. Plaintiff reluctantly left Utah. The 
family's first residence in Pennsylvania 
was in an isolated location with no tele-
phone and no playmates for the children. 
The family then rented a home in a larger 
town and plaintiff sought employment to 
supplement defendant's salary as an intern. 
Plaintiff testified that she found a position 
at a fast food restaurant but defendant did 
not want her to work there because it 
would be embarrassing. Because of the 
friction between the parties and defend-
ant's admitted relationship with another 
woman, plaintiff requested they seek mari-
tal counseling but defendant refused. Be-
cause of plaintiffs lack of prospects for 
suitable employment in Pennsylvania and 
the marital discord, plaintiff and the chil-
dren returned to the family home in Utah 
to wait for defendant to finish his medical 
training. Although plaintiff understood 
defendant intended to practice medicine in 
Utah, defendant completed his training and 
accepted employment in Pennsylvania. 
Plaintiff filed a verified complaint for 
divorce on February 15,1983. In a stipula-
tion and separation agreement, signed by 
the parties and filed with the court on July 
29, 1983, plaintiff agreed defendant could 
claim federal tax exemptions for two of the 
children while she retained the exemption 
for the third child. The settlement agree-
ment also recognized the need to "make 
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appropriate adjustments" in the support 
agreement in the event of future changes 
in financial circumstances. 
After plaintiff hired new counsel, she 
filed a verified amended complaint in No-
vember 1983, in which the distribution of 
the tax exemptions remained the same. On 
May 9, 1985, however, plaintiff filed a mo-
tion for leave to amend the complaint 
which was subsequently granted. This 
amendment listed defendant's salary as 
$100,000.00 per annum and requested that 
the child support and alimony awards re-
flect the significant increase in defendant's 
income. Plaintiff requested attorney fees 
and costs which would reflect the current 
state of the litigation as opposed to that 
anticipated in 1983. Plaintiff also request-
ed the trial court to strike the previously 
proposed distribution of federal tax exemp-
tions for the children. 
Trial to the court was held on May 31, 
1985. The decree of divorce awarded cus-
tody of the children to plaintiff subject to 
reasonable visitation. Plaintiff received 
$300.00 per month per child in child support 
subject to an abatement of $100.00 per 
month per child in the event that a child 
should live with defendant for an extended 
period. The distribution of tax exemptions 
was as initially agreed in the stipulation 
and separation settlement Alimony was 
awarded in the amount of $400.00 per 
month for a period of five years being 
nonterminable for a period of three years 
even if plaintiff remarried. Plaintiff was 
awarded attorney fees in the amount of 
$2,500.00. Plaintiff was also awarded the 
home subject to a mortgage and an eq-
uitable lien in favor of defendant for the 
sum of $17,528.00 payable upon the occur-
rence of enumerated, future contingencies. 
The award of the home to plaintiff necessi-
tated that she continue to make monthly 
mortgage payments of $309.00. 
Plaintiff presents the following issues 
for review: (1) did the award to defendant 
of the two tax exemptions violate federal 
law; (2) were the awards of attorney fees, 
child support, and alimony so inadequate as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion; and (3) 
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is defendant's medical degree marital prop-
erty subject to division? 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTIONS 
Plaintiff contends the distribution of 
state and federal income tax exemptions 
for two of the children to defendant vio-
lates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution in light of the 1984 Tax Re-
form Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(e) (1988).1 
Subsection 152(eXl) describes the normal 
situation where a custodial parent claims 
the tax exemption for a child. An excep-
tion is provided in subsection 152(eX4XA). 
The noncustodial parent may claim the ex-
emption when there is a qualified pre-1985 
instrument between the parents which 
states that the noncustodial parent shall be 
entitled to the exemption for the child and 
that parent provides at least $600.00 yearly 
for the child's support The definition of a 
qualified pre-1985 instrument is stated in 
subsection 152(eX4XB) as: 
For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
"qualified pre-1985 instrument" means 
any decree of divorce or separate mainte-
nance or written agreement— 
(i) which is executed before January 1, 
1985, 
(ii) which on such date contains the pro-
vision described in subparagraph (AXO, 
and 
(iii) which is not modified on or after 
such date in a modification which ex-
pressly provides that this paragraph 
shall not apply to such decree or agree-
ment 
[1] The parties stipulated to the distri-
bution of-the tax exemptions for the chil-
dren in a separation agreement filed with 
the court in 1983. The distribution was 
incorporated in the verified amended com-
plaint also filed that year. Subparagraphs 
(i) and (ii) of subsection 152(eX4XB) are 
satisfied by the 1983 filings. There was no 
written modification prior to January 1, 
1985, which expressly revoked the distribu-
1. The decree of divorce utilizes the term "deduc-
tion" and the United States Code utilizes "ex-
emption" when referring to the individual al-
tion of tax exemptions during the perkx 
the stipulation and separation agreemen 
was in effect Therefore, defendant wai 
entitled to the two exemptions as stipulate* 
prior to the entry of the decree of divorce 
[2] However, plaintiffs amended com 
plaint in 1985 put the distribution of ta: 
exemptions at issue in the divorce proceed 
ing. The provisions of the separatioi 
agreement were no longer effective. Plain 
tiff requested the tax exemptions formal 
three children but the trial court's order dk 
not honor that request This result is con 
trary to the general provisions of section 
152(e). Any argument that the stipulatioi 
and separation agreement qualifies as^ 
pre-1985 instrument, where plaintiff w&J 
ingly relinquishes her right to the exemp 
tions under federal law, neglects plaintifft 
rejection of its terms in the post-divorct 
period. By amending her complaint, plain 
tiff modified and affirmatively rejected tK 
pre-divorce distribution. Plaintiff is eriti 
tied to the tax exemptions for all of th< 
children in view of the award of custody tx 
her and the failure of defendant to estab 
lish any exception to the general rule stat 
ed above. 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
[3] Plaintiff argues the trial couri 
abused its discretion in awarding attorney 
fees of only $2,500.00 when she asked foi 
$7,871.00. Plaintiff clearly demonstrated I 
need for assistance. The court recognizee 
that need by making the award- However, 
the court considered a written statement oi 
attorney fees as a basis for the award 
Extensive fees were generated by interest 
and preparation of the expert testimony 
offered to support the valuation of the 
medical degree. That argument waa-rej 
jected by the lower court We find nc 
abuse of discretion in the award 
Because defendant did not cross appea 
on this issue, we do not consider whetha 
there was sufficient evidence presented tt 
the trial court to justify any award of atto? 
lowance subtracted from income when comput 
ing tax owed. 
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ney fees. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987). 
AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT 
[4] Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3,-4 
(1987) establish the obligation of both par-
ents to support their children and "[a] 
child's right to that support is paramount" 
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court con-
tinued "The trial court may fashion such 
equitable orders in relation to the children 
and their support as is reasonable and nec-
essary, considering not only the needs of 
the children, but also the ability of the 
parent to pay." Id. Plaintiff contends the 
award of $300.00 per month per chfld was 
so inordinately low that it constituted an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court We 
agree. 
The trial court found defendant's gross 
income was $100,000.00 per annum or 
$8,333.00 per month, at the time of the 
divorce, while it determined plaintiffs 
gross income was $1,033.00 per month.2 
The court found that plaintiff had monthly 
expenditures of $2,050.00 and was in need 
of financial assistance from defendant to 
assist the children "in maintaining a stan-
dard of living more comparable to that 
enjoyed by their father." 
Assuming the three children spend the 
majority of the year with plaintiff, her 
gross monthly income, including awarded 
child support and alimony, is $2,333.00. 
After taxes have been deducted from the 
portions of income subject to taxation, 
plaintiffs net monthly income approxi-
mates her meager monthly expenses leav-
ing no leeway for emergencies, presently 
necessary replacement expenditures, or 
any amenities of life. Under such grim 
2. The lower court also found that plaintiff ex-
pected a 25% reduction in her salary because of 
a voluntary transfer to a less stressful position 
within her employment 
3. Section 78-45-7(2) lists the following factors 
to be considered in awarding prospective sup-
port: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the par-
ties; 
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economic reality, the children who reside 
with their mother will not enjoy a standard 
of living remotely comparable to that of 
their father. 
The award established by the trial court 
cannot be justified when applying the 
factors listed in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7&-45-7(2) (1987).3 We find plaintiff and 
her children are left in a precariously bal-
anced financial existence while defendant is 
relatively affluent Plaintiff and the chil-
dren are in great need of assistance. The 
defendant has no responsibility for the sup-
port of anyone other than plaintiff, the 
children, and himself. 
At the present time the courts of this 
state do not have uniform guidelines to 
employ in determining an award of child 
support4 Many other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have established child support guide-
lines or schedules, based upon current eco-
nomic data as to the cost of rearing chil-
dren, to be used by trial courts. Although 
we do not use the numbers or approaches 
in fashioning the award in this case, a 
general comparison illustrates the inade-
quacy of the award. Because these formu-
las are based upon adjusted incomes, we 
cannot directly compare the numbers. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that under each, 
the support would be much higher. For 
example, in Colorado, an income shares 
guideline state, the award would be approx-
imately $1,535.00. Under Wisconsin's 
Child Support Guidelines, which were re-
cently adopted by our neighboring states of 
Idaho and Nevada, where only the noncus-
todial parent's income is considered and 
where 29% of gross income is the presump-
tive award, the child support for the three 
children would be $2,320.00. 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
4. This Court notes, however, that a Task Force 
established by the Judicial Council is presently 
investigating the propriety of adopting Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines for Utah based upon 
current economic data. 
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[5] Under the economic circumstances 
of this case, the award of child support is 
inequitable and must be modified. The dis-
sent argues the case must be remanded to 
determine the children's need and the abili-
ty of each party to pay child support We 
note the findings of fact do not fully ad-
dress the child support factors. However, 
we believe this not to be reversible error 
because the totality of the factual evidence 
in the record is "clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment" of the need for 
child support. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987); Marchant v. Mar-
chant, 743 P.2d 199, 202 (Utah App.1987). 
The record is also replete with the financial 
needs of the children and the relative abili-
ties of plaintiff and defendant to meet 
those needs. Nothing could be gained by a 
remand for this purpose except a delay of 
the increased award. Basal upon the 
above reasoning, we award the sum of 
$€00M per month per child, support to 
continue to age 21 if the child is a full time 
student and not married.5 On remand, the 
trial court shall enter its order for child 
support in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5.1 (1987). 
AWARD OF ALIMONY 
[61 The standard of review relating to 
alimony requires that we not disturb the 
trial court's award unless "such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). The Utah 
Supreme Court in that often quoted case 
states that "the most important function of 
alimony is to provide support for the wife 
as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public 
charge/' J(L at 411, The Court continued 
that a trial court should consider "the fi-
nancial conditions and needs of the wife, 
the ability of the wife to produce a suffi-
5. The award to age 21 was made by the trial 
court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 
(1986). 
6. A review of plaintiffs expenses shows them to 
be extremely low and based upon what she 
cient income for herself; and the ability <rf 
the husband to provide support" Id at 
411-12. 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985), the Court conducted an extensive 
analysis of these three factors. Although 
the trial judge carefully considered the 
factors outlined in Jones, because plaintiff 
and the children were living in an artificial-
ly depressed standard of living, the award 
of only $400.00 per month of terminable 
alimony is inadequate. We refuse to penal-
ize plaintiff for trying to live within her 
means and failing to show higher necesh 
sary expenses.* 
An application of one of the English 
standards could justify the award made In 
this case. Plaintiff endured a poor stan-
dard of living during the marriage. She 
had little money to spend then so she 
should have little now. That result will 
preserve "the standard of living she en-
joyed during marriage." But such a result 
is unfair. A divorce court is a court of 
equity. It is not equitable to preserve the 
status of limited income for one party and 
affluence for the other when the one sacri-
ficed to help the other achieve such afflu-
ence. When the totality of the English 
standards are applied the award is clearly 
inadequate. 
The court below also abused its discre-
tion in limiting the award of alimony to a 
period of five years; being nonterminable 
by reason of remarriage for three years. 
In Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court analyzed a 
similar fact situation wherein the plaintiff 
wife was a high school graduate and had 
spent the majority of the marriage bearing 
and rearing the parties' six children. De-
fendant husband was a well paid consul-
tant who provided his services to govern-
mental agencies on a contract basis. While 
affirming the award of alimony in the 
amount of $1,600.00 per month, the Court 
modified the award by striking its two-year 
actually spent rather than estimates of what she 
needed to sustain herself and her children at a 
reasonable standard of living based upon the 
total family income. 
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limitation and making the alimony perma-
nent subject to future changed circum-
stances. In support of its modification, the 
Court pointed to the wife's limited edu-
cation, her lack of work experience, and 
that she had "no reasonable expectation of 
obtaining employment two years hence that 
will enable her to support herself at a 
standard of living even approaching that 
which she had during the marriage." Id. 
at 567. See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 103 (Utah 1986). 
For the reasons stated previously and 
based upon the facts in the record, we hold 
that plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
alimony on a continuing basis and we 
award permanent alimony in the sum of 
$750.00 per month subject to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987). 
THE MEDICAL DEGREE AND 
AWARD OF EQUITABLE 
RESTITUTION 
[7] We next must determine whether 
defendant's medical degree is marital prop-
erty subject to division. In the recent case 
of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court dis-
cussed this problem and noted that there is 
authority from other jurisdictions on both 
sides of the issue. However, this Court, in 
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239-42 
(Utah App.1987) and Ray burn v. Ray burn, 
738 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah App.1987), ana-
lyzed the issue and held that a medical 
degree is not marital property subject to 
division in a divorce decree. We agree 
with the Utah Supreme Court "that an 
educational or professional degree is diffi-
cult to value and that such a valuation does 
not easily fit the common understanding of 
the character of property." Gardner, 748 
P.2d at 1081. The Court in Gardner was 
not required to address the issue because 
there was significant other property accu-
mulated during the marriage resulting 
7. It is argued that estimating the value of a 
medical degree is no more speculative than 
measuring damages in a wrongful death case. 
However, in wrongful death, the measurement 
begins at death and is subject to no future 
variables introduced by the decedent. Here, we 
must guess at the future course of defendant's 
career. Will he continue to practice in the same 
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from the increased earning capacity afford-
ed by the medical degree and the numerous 
years the Gardners enjoyed the standard of 
living afforded by the medical degree. 
That is not the case here. The Court not-
ed, "The cases which have refused to hold 
that professional degrees and practice con-
stitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless as-
sessed and divided the value of the degree 
or practice on the basis of other legal and 
equitable remedies." Id. at 1080-81. The 
Court described the common fact pattern 
applicable to this acknowledgment of the 
degree's equitable worth as a situation 
where "the husband is supported through-
out a long graduate or professional pro-
gram by the working wife, and the couple 
is divorced soon after graduation. In such 
cases, there are few marital assets to dis-
tribute, and the courts have considered oth-
er ways of compensating the spouse." Id. 
at 1081. This is essentially the situation 
presented here. While this marriage has 
continued for many years the only assets 
are the home and the enhanced earning 
capacity of defendant The earning capaci-
ty must be recognized in fashioning those 
"legal and equitable remedies" necessary 
to assist plaintiff to readjust her life. The 
valuation and distribution of the medical 
degree in this case is not a viable alterna-
tive. Valuation would be speculative in the 
extreme, and distribution ignores the fact 
that the degree is personal to defendant7 
We prefer to follow the majority rule, up-
held in Petersen and Rayburn, that a medi-
cal degree is not subject to valuation and 
distribution in a divorce. However, this 
case is a striking example of a highly paid 
professional disposing of his wife with a 
minimum amount of support just as that 
professional is reaching a level of income 
for which both the professional and his 
wife have striven. This prevents the wife 
specialty in the same locale? A future decision 
or happenstance could totally change or even 
terminate the value of the medical degree. Can 
defendant then return to court to change the 
valuation and distribution based upon the more 
certain circumstances? Could plaintiff prevent 
defendant from making decisions which could 
impact the value of the degree? 
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from enjoying the benefit of her labor and 
sacrifice in support of her husband's goals. 
See generally L. Weitzman, The Divorce 
Revolution, ch. 5, 124-35 (1985). 
From the time of the marriage in 1968 
until their separation in 1982, the parties 
enjoyed few of the material pleasures of 
life. The court found that 'During the 14 
years that the parties lived together, plain-
tiff assisted extensively in Defendant's ob-
taining a college education, medical degree 
and internship. In addition, plaintiff made 
substantial sacrifices in order to facilitate 
the completion of Defendant's medical 
schooling and internship."8 Plaintiff ac-
cepted the sacrifices necessary to support 
defendant's aspirations in anticipation of 
future benefits. The trial record shows the 
following exchange: 
Q. Okay. Was there any discussion of 
future benefits that would be obtained 
through this? 
A. Yes. He [defendant] told me that if 
I would sacrifice, and if I would see it 
through, that someday he would make it 
up to me and we would have material 
items that we had gone without. And 
his hours would be flexible and he would 
have more time to spend with himself 
and the children. If we would just be 
patient. 
Defendant offered no rebuttal to the ex-
change. 
This Court in Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242, 
foresaw the situation now at issue. Writ-
ing for the Court, Judge Orme recognized 
that an occasion might arise whereby one 
spouse was reaching a high level of income 
just at the time of divorce rather than the 
more frequent situation in which the par-
ties had enjoyed the benefits of the hus-
band's medical education for a number of 
years. Judge Orme wrote: 
In cases like the instant one, life pat-
terns have largely been set, the earning 
potential of both parties can be predicted 
with some reliability, and the contribu-
8. We must wonder whether defendant could 
have or would have entered and completed 
medical school had plaintiff obtained a divorce 
earlier. Defendant likely would have been obli-
gated to pay alimony mod child support. He 
would probably not have had the benefit of the 
tions and sacrifices of the one spouse in 
enabling the other to attain a degree 
have been compensated by many years 
of the comfortable lifestyle which the 
degree permitted. Traditional alimony 
analysis works nicely to assure equity in 
such cases. 
In another kind of recurring case, typi-
fied by Graham [In re Marriage ofGra 
ham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978JV 
where divorce occurs shortly after the. 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony 
analysis would often work hardship be-
cause, while both spouses have modest 
incomes at the time of divorce, the one is 
on the [threshold] of a significant in-
crease in earnings. Moreover, the 
spouse who sacrificed so the other could 
attain a degree is precluded from enjoy* 
ing the anticipated dividends the degree 
will ordinarily provide In such 
cases, alimony analysis must become 
more creative to achieve fairness, and an 
award of "rehabilitative" or "reimburse-' 
ment" alimony, not terminable upon re-
marriage, may be appropriate. See, e.g^ 
Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 
N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Maho-
ney, 91 N J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
Id at n. 4. This is the situation where our 
analysis "must become more creative to 
achieve fairness." Id. Equity demands a 
recognition of the sacrifices and contribu-
tions made by plaintiff in support of de-
fendant's medical education. The defend-
ant has been enriched by plaintiffs efforts 
and, therefore, plaintiff has earned an 
award of some permanent financial benefit, 
in her own right, that will allow her to 
share in the economic benefits achieved 
through their joint efforts. The modified 
award of traditional alimony merely main-
tains plaintiff on a plane modestly above 
that experienced by the parties during the 
marriage. Even this modest award may be 
lost through the happening of some future 
circumstance.* The dissent would restrict 
family home and surely would not have had the 
benefit of plaintiffs part-time work. : \ 
9. Traditional alimony forces the recipient,to 
make future choices with the understanding 
that such choices may result in the loss of all-, 
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plaintiff to an award of traditional alimony 
based upon defendant's newly acquired lev-
el of income. Because there has been little 
property accumulated and because the in-
come was acquired after separation, plain-
tiff is entitled to a more permanent reme-
dy. 
This issue has engendered much case 
law. Many courts have held that a profes-
sional degree is not marital property sub-
ject to distribution but nevertheless believe 
some remedy must be created for the 
spouse who supported the attainment of 
that degree. A threshold factor is the 
meaning of "support" when the term is 
applied to the efforts of the non-profession-
al spouse. Must "support" equate to direct 
financial assistance provided through full 
time employment while the student spouse 
devotes his or her full time efforts to 
course work? Is "support" rendered by a 
spouse whose full time activities are devot-
ed to providing a home environment for the 
student spouse and family? Here, plaintiff 
bore the children, was the principal in pro-
viding child care and maintaining the do-
mestic setting, and was also employed part-
time for several years whUe defendant at-
tended medical school. To hold that plain-
tiffs only value is the income she gener-
ates ignores the value of her contributions 
in every other aspect of family life. The 
logical conclusion is that motherhood and 
nurturing of children is valueless; that pre-
serving and maintaining a home is worth-
less; that the functions of mother, home-
maker, and helpmate contribute nothing of 
value to a family. We refuse to so limit 
our definition of support Certainly, our 
Supreme Court in analyzing traditional 
property distributions has never limited a 
wife to recovering only what she monetari-
ly contributed to the marriage. Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986). We hold 
in accordance with the court's finding that 
mony. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-5(5) and 
(6) (1987). No one should be forced into mak-
ing such choices, particularly when the other 
party, who enjoys his position through the joint 
efforts of both parties, is under no similar re-
frictions on behavior. We note what the Okla-
homa Supreme Court wrote in Hubbard v. Hub 
°*rd, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979). when respond-
ing to the argument that the wife's recovery 
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plaintiff contributed to and supported de-
fendant's educational achievements. 
The case law remedies in this situation 
establish a spectrum, from those narrowly 
focusing on financial support provided to 
the professional spouse, while he or she 
was a student, to those which consider the 
totality of the non-professional spouse's ef-
forts in the family venture to obtain eco-
nomic stability through education. For ex-
ample, in Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 747, the 
wife was allowed to recover from her phy-
sician husband contributions to his direct 
support, school and professional training 
expenses, plus reasonable interest and ad-
justments for inflation. 
A case recognizing more than strict fi-
nancial contributions is Saint-Pierre v. 
Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984), 
in which the Supreme Court of South Dako-
ta held, "in a proper case," the trial court 
should consider "all relevant factors" in 
awarding "reimbursement or rehabilitative 
alimony." These included "the amount of 
the supporting spouse's contributions, his 
or her foregone opportunities to enhance or 
improve professional or vocational skills, 
and the duration of the marriage following 
completion of the nonsupporting spouse's 
professional education." Id. at 262. 
In Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash.2d 
168, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (Wash.1984), the 
Supreme Court of Washington listed and 
analyzed several factors the trial court 
must consider "in determining the proper 
amount of compensation for the supporting 
spouse." These include the supporting 
spouse's contributions for direct education-
al costs, no more than one-half what the 
couple would have earned had "the efforts 
of the student spouse not been directed 
towards his or her studies," "[a]ny edu-
cational or career opportunities which the 
supporting spouse gave up in order to ob-
from her physician husband, whom she helped 
through medical school, be limited to alimony 
for support and maintenance. The per curiam 
decision reasoned T o do so would force her to 
forego remarriage and perhaps even be celibate 
for many years simply to realize a return on her 
investments and sacrifices of the past twelve 
years." Id at 752 (footnote omitted). 
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tain sufficiently lucrative employment, or 
to move to the city where the student 
spouse wished to attend school[,]" and 
"[t]he future earning prospects of each 
spouse, including the earning potential of 
the student spouse with the professional 
degree." 
Wisconsin statutes allow a trial court to 
grant an order requiring maintenance pay. 
ments to either party after considering sev-
eral factors. Among these are: 
(4) The educational level of each party at 
the time of marriage and at the time 
the action is commenced. 
(5) The earning capacity of the party 
seeking maintenance, including edu-
cational background, training, employ-
ment skills, work experience, length of 
absence from the job market, custodial 
responsibilities for children and the 
time and expense necessary to acquire 
sufficient education or training to en-
able the party to find appropriate em-
ployment 
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking 
maintenance can become self-support-
ing at a standard of living reasonably 
comparable to that enjoyed during th$ 
marriage, and, if so, the length of tim$ 
necessary to achieve this goal. 
(8) Any mutual agreement made by th$ 
parties before or during the marriage, 
according to the terms of which on$ 
party has made financial or service 
contributions to the other with the ex-
pectation of reciprocation or other com^ 
pensation in the future, where such 
repayment has not been made, or any 
mutual agreement made by the parties 
before or during the marriage concerns 
ing any arrangement for the financial 
support of the parties. 
10. We emphasize the specific nature of the fact$ 
presented in this case and stress that equitable 
restitution would not be awarded in the more; 
frequent case where the marriage lasted for 
many years after the professional degree had; 
been granted. There; sufficient assets would 
have been accumulated and an appropriate dis-
tribution to the requesting spouse would enable; 
(9) The contribution by one party to the 
education, training or increased earn* 
ing power of the other. 
Wis.Stat. § 767.26 (1982), See also Haugan 
v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 
796, 800-01 n. 4 (Wis.1984). 
[8,9] Clearly, some jurisdictions which 
require courts to examine and value the 
contributions to a marriage partner's devel-
opment. This appears to be the fair and 
equitable approach. Therefore, we hold 
that plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
"equitable restitution" in addition to tradi-
tional alimony. We use the term equitable 
restitution to describe the award in order to 
establish a clear distinction between it and 
traditional alimony or any other form .of 
spousal maintenance or support The func-
tion of equitable restitution is to enables 
spouse to share the newly obtained earn-
ing capacity of a former spouse who has 
achieved that capacity through the signifi-
cant efforts and sacrifices of the request-
ing spouse which were detrimental to that 
spouse's development It is nothing more 
than an equitable sharing of the rewards of 
both parties' common efforts and expecta-
tions.10 
[10,11] Factors to be analyzed in deter-
mining an award of equitable restitution 
include, but are not limited to: (1) the 
length of the marriage; (2) the financial 
contributions and personal development 
sacrifices made by the requesting spouse; 
(3) the duration of these contributions and 
sacrifices during the marriage; (4) the re-
sulting disparity in earning capacity be-
tween the requesting spouse and the 
spouse benefited thereby, and (5) the 
amount of property accumulated during 
the marriage.11 An award of equitable res-
titution will not terminate upon plaintiffs 
remarriage, and may be payable in lump 
that spouse to share in the economic benefits 
earned as a result of the degree. 
11. Because this case establishes a new form of 
spousal award, we hesitate to state that the 
enumerated factors in determining equitable 
restitution are all inclusive as of the writing of 
this opinion. See Biswell v. Duncan, 742 ?J2d 
80, 86 n. 5 (Utah App.1987). 
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sum or periodically over time depending on 
the circumstances of each case.12 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed in part and reversed in part. The 
case is remanded to the trial court for the 
purpose of taking any further evidence 
that may be necessary to determine the 
amount of equitable restitution to be 
awarded to plaintiff and its manner of pay-
ment and for entry of judgment pursuant 
to this opinion. Costs against defendant 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully and loyally dissent. 
Loyal to the majority, but not to their 
opinion, I flag their decision as being at the 
forefront of judicial activism. I regret that 
I could not dissuade my colleagues from 
breaking new ground with the invention of 
"equitable restitution." The opinion manu-
factures a divorce remedy that is (1) out-
side our statutory scheme;l (2) without 
precedent in the pronouncements of the 
Utah Supreme Court; (3) not requested by 
the appellant;2 (4) forced on the trial 
courts for further development; (5) not 
needed to do justice to the parties in this 
case and may, in fact, work inequity. 
EQUITABLE RESTITUTION 
OR SUPPORT 
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 
(Utah App.1987), this court held that an 
advanced degree is not marital property 
12. For example, in following the Utah Supreme 
Court's admonishment against unnecessarily ty-
ing a couple together after divorce as stated in 
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079, defendant's lien on 
the family home might be extinguished and the 
amount credited against the overall award of 
equitable restitution. We recognize that this 
would probably be only a fraction of the total 
amount of equitable restitution awarded. 
!• The majority acknowledges the existence of 
our divorce statutes in remanding the child sup-
port and alimony issues. The majority states: 
(•) "On remand, the trial court shall enter its 
order for child support in accordance with Utah 
Code Aim. § 30-3-5.1 (1987)," i.c, raise the total 
•mount of child support from $900 to $1,800 
Per month; (b) *[W]e award permanent alimo-
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subject to division upon divorce, even 
where this achievement has been made pos-
sible through the assistance of the other 
spouse. We have, nonetheless, acknowl-
edged that there may be situations where 
equity demands an extraordinary award of 
nonterminable rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony in order to compensate a 
spouse who "endure[s] substantial financial 
sacrifices or defeifs] her own education to 
help" the other spouse in obtaining an ad-
vanced degree. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 
P.2d 238, 241 (Utah App.1987). This might 
occur where: (a) the parties mutually en-
deavor to increase one spouse's earning 
capacity, but at the time of trial the spouse 
who has benefitted from the parties' en-
deavors is merely on the threshold of a 
substantial increase in earnings, Petersen, 
737 P.2d at 242 n* 4; or (b) there is insuffi-
cient marital property from which to make 
a compensatory award to the contributing 
spouse. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988). In such 
cases, the spouse who has made substantial 
financial sacrifices and contributions to in-
crease the earning capacity of the other 
spouse is entitled to recompense for those 
contributions that are beyond the duty of 
support normally associated with marriage, 
less any benefits received. See, e.g., Ro-
berto v. Brown, 107 Wis.2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 
358 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 
488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
Decisions from other jurisdictions involv-
ing compensation of the spouse who has 
contributed to the attainment of an ad-
ny in the sum of $750 per month subject to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987)," 
Lc, increase alimony from the $400 awarded by 
the trial court. However, no statute is cited as 
the basis for equitable restitution. Our divorce 
statutes and case law authorize only the distri-
bution of property and an award of support for 
the benefit of the spouse and children. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 to -10.6 (1987). 
2. Mrs. Martinez argued both at trial and on 
appeal that a professional degree is a property 
interest subject to division upon divorce. Since 
equitable restitution was not a part of Utah law 
until this majority opinion was crafted, the trial 
was not conducted and the evidence was not 
presented under that theory. 
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vanced degree have generally involved four 
factors: 
[F]irst, they share the loss of the hus-
band's foregone earnings during the peri-
od of investment; second, the wife pro-
vides the financial capital to enable her 
husband to forego those earnings; third, 
she may forego opportunities to further 
the development of her own earning ca-
pacity; fourth, and most significantly, 
they both expect to gain a return on the 
full costs of the investment through con-
tinuation of the marriage. Thus, the 
working spouse predicates her sacrifice 
of income and personal educational ad-
vancement on the expectation of future 
returns to her from sharing in her hus-
band's enhanced earning capacity. 
Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing 
Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for 
the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 
28 Kan.L.Rev. 379, 380 (1980). 
The extraordinary award fashioned by 
the majority in this case is inappropriate 
for several reasons. First, Mrs. Martinez 
did not provide the financial capital that 
enabled her husband to attain his college 
and advanced degree. Instead, Dr. Mar-
tinez provided the bulk of the family's fi-
nancial support, in addition to paying for 
his education. This is not the classic 
"working spouse/student spouse" situation 
necessitating an extraordinary award. 
See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 
747 (Okla.1979); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 
Wis.2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796, 799-800 
(1984); Roberto, 318 N.W.2d 358. 
Second, no evidence was presented that 
Mrs. Martinez deferred her own career or 
education in order to advance the education 
of her husband. Both parties had only 
high school educations at the time of mar-
riage. Mrs. Martinez testified at trial that 
she wanted to continue her own education 
someday but had not yet begun doing so, 
even though her employer would pay three-
fourths of her school costs and would allow 
her to continue working. 
While Mrs. Martinez raised the children 
and performed the household responsibili-
ties, Dr. Martinez provided the family's pri-
mary financial support in the form of his 
inheritance monies, funds from student 
loans (which the trial court required him to 
repay), and proceeds from his G.I. Bill. 
Mrs. Martinez worked part-time during 
three of the seventeen years of their mar-
riage. Her nominal total earnings of ap-
proximately $2,300 were applied to family 
living expenses. During the marriage, the 
family took modest vacations, purchased 
two homes, furniture and furnishings, and 
two automobiles. Equity simply does not 
demand an extraordinary remedy in this 
case because no extraordinary injustice is 
present 
Even if Mrs. Martinez had made substan-
tial financial contributions or educational 
sacrifices in order to further her husband's 
education and career, there are other rea-
sons why the creation of a new hybrid 
award of equitable restitution is not war-
ranted in this case. Unlike the hypotheti-
cal case contemplated by this court in Pet-
ersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4, in which the 
spouse with an advanced degree is only on 
the threshold of reaping an enhanced in-
come at the time of the parties' divorce, Dr. 
Martinez was already earning a gross an-
nual income of $100,000. He is not merely 
at the threshold of significant earnings; he 
is already standing in the parlor. In addi-
tion, the parties here accumulated real and 
personal property from which a compensa-
tory property award could be made: $34,-
561 equity in a home; three vehicles worth 
$3,995; an IRA account valued at $2,000; 
stocks of unknown value; and household 
furnishings valued at $6,500. The presence 
of both substantial earnings and accumu-
lated property at the time of the divorce 
provides an adequate basis for rendering 
an extraordinary remedy, if Mrs. Martinez 
is entitled to recompense. 
On the facts presented in this case, there 
are additional reasons why I believe the 
majority's disposition of this appeal is mis-
guided: (1) equity can be achieved under 
current alimony and property distribution 
statutes and case law; (2) an award of 
equitable restitution coupled with the ma-
jority's generous alimony and child support 
awards is double-dipping; and (3) an award 
of equitable restitution, in effect, treats the 
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professional education as "property" sub-
ject to division upon dissolution of a mar-
riage. 
First, in fashioning an award of alimony, 
the trial court must consider the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse,3 the ability of that spouse to be 
self-supporting, and the ability of the other 
spouse to pay. Paffel v. PaffeU 732 P.2d 
96,100-01 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
Dr. and Mrs. Martinez were married for 
approximately seventeen years. The trial 
court found that Dr. Martinez incurs ex-
penses associated with his employment of 
approximately $7,000 per year, leaving ap-
proximately $93,000 annually or $7,750 per 
month. Mrs. Martinez earned approxi-
mately $1,033 per month and estimated 
that she required $2,050 per month to meet 
the expenses for herself and the three chil-
dren. Under the temporary support order, 
she had been receiving $1,100 per month in 
child support. She sought additional mo-
nies to make up the difference between her 
net earnings and expenses and to provide 
her with the means to make major house 
repairs. In the event that a professional 
degree was not viewed as a marital asset, 
she sought an alimony award not subject to 
termination upon remarriage. 
The trial court stated that it considered 
the large disparity between the parties' 
respective earning abilities and the fact 
that the wife's resources were inadequate 
to meet her needs. However, I agree with 
Mrs. Martinez that the trial court failed to 
apply these factors correctly in that the 
award of $400 per month alimony, nonter-
3. In determining the "need" of the recipient 
nonstudent spouse, the trial court is not limited 
to considering only the low living expenses in-
curred during the time that the other spouse 
studied to obtain an advanced degree. The 
Utah Supreme Court recently stated in Gardner, 
a case also involving an advanced degree, that 
alimony should "equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them at a level 
as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage." Gardner, 748 
P.2d at 1081; accord Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 
669, 671 (Utah App.1987); Petersen, 737 ?2d at 
239; Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 
1985); Higley v. Higley, 676 PJZd 379, 381 (Utah 
1983). Although Gardner involved a marriage 
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minable for three years and continuing for 
a period of five years, is so low as to 
constitute a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Mrs. Martinez earns $1,033 
gross income per month. The alimony 
awarded by the trial court, plus her net 
monthly earnings of $846, provides her 
with approximately $1,246 with which to 
meet her monthly expenses, excluding 
sums awarded for child support. In con-
trast, Dr. Martinez enjoys approximately 
$7,750 gross monthly income. Considering 
the disparate earning capacities, the trial 
court's alimony award was insufficient and 
inequitable in that it failed to provide the 
parties with a comparable standard of liv-
ing. 
Second, based on Dr. Martinez's earnings 
at the time of trial, the majority has in-
creased total child support from $900 to 
$1,800 and increased the duration and 
amount of alimony to a permanent award 
of $750 per month. An award of equitable 
restitution on top of the already generous 
awards of alimony and child support fash-
ioned by the majority is duplicative and not 
necessary to achieve equity. 
Finally, an advanced degree is the memo-
rialization of an individual's "attainment of 
the skill, qualification and educational 
background which is the prerequisite of the 
enhanced earning capacity." Wehrkamp 
v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D. 
1984); cf. Petersen, 737 P.2d at 240 (quot-
ing In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 
429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (en banc)). The 
value of an advanced degree lies in the 
potential for increased earnings made pos-
sible by the degree and by other factors 
in which the parties enjoyed a high standard of 
living for many years prior to the divorce, the 
language of Gardner was clearly aimed at pre-
venting the divorced spouse of a high income 
earner from suffering a major decline in stan-
dard of living following a divorce. This lan-
guage should not be construed as prohibiting a 
trial court from making an award that raises the 
recipient spouse's standard of living from what 
it was during the marriage where, as here, the 
student spouse experiences a major increase in 
earnings just prior to the marriage's termi-
nation. In other words, the "need" of the recipi-
ent spouse in this situation is not necessarily 
what he or she managed to live on during the 
lean school years. 
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and conditions of employment If the ad-
vanced degree itself does not fall within 
the classification of marital "property" sub-
ject to distribution upon divorce, then nei-
ther should an individual's enhanced earn-
ing capacity. Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa.Su-
per.Ct 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984); Wehrk-
amp, 357 N.W.2d at 266; Stern v. Stern, 
66 NJ . 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975). 
The majority declares that: 
The function of equitable restitution is to 
enable a spouse to share the newly ob-
tained earning capacity of a former 
spouse who has achieved that capacity 
through the significant efforts and sacri-
fices of the requesting spouse which 
were detrimental to that spouse's devel-
opment. It is nothing more than an eq-
uitable sharing of the rewards of both 
parties' common efforts and expecta-
tions. 
By creating a divisible interest in Dr. Mar-
tinez's enhanced earning capacity, this 
court has awarded a nonterminable proper-
ty interest in a medical degree which goes 
beyond the compensation approved in Pet-
ersen. The majority has not limited its 
award to Mrs. Martinez's contributions to-
ward her husband's medical education 
costs; it has taken the further step of 
providing financial recompense for lost ex-
pectations. I would reject any compensa-
tion formula based on future earning ca-
pacity. The factors and variables involved 
in the valuation of an enhanced earning 
capacity are as speculative as those in-
volved in an attempt to value an advanced 
degree; such speculation can only lead to 
inequity. 
Provision for Mrs. Martinez's needs is 
best dealt with through a generous but fair 
distribution of property and award of ali-
4. Unlike the majority's award of equitable resti-
tution, an alimony award can be modified* in 
appropriate circumstances, under the court's ex-
ercise of continuing jurisdiction- Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1987). This is particularly 
important in the situation presented here, where 
Dr. Martinez is working under a contract of 
limited duration. 
5. The majority opinion interchanges the terms 
"adjusted gross income" and "gross income" in 
comparing the amount of child support award-
mony,4 not through the creation of a dis-
tinctly new form of cleverly disguised mari-
tal property for which there is no prece-
dent. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
Both husband and wife have a duty to 
support their children. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-45-3, -4 (1987). "Child support 
awards should approximate actual need,' 
and, when possible, assure the children a 
standard of living comparable to that which 
they would have experienced if no divorce 
had occurred." Peterson v. Peterson, 748 
P.2d 593, 596 (Utah App.1988). 
The trial court found that Dr. Martinez 
earned approximately $7,750 gross income 
per month. Dr. Martinez testified that his 
earnings were established under a two-year1 
employment contract, that he was in the 
50% tax bracket, and that he had no tax 
shelter. The trial court also found that 
Mrs. Martinez earned approximately $1,033 
gross income per month. Mrs. Martinez 
testified to net monthly earnings of $846 
plus nominal royalties from an oil well 
She anticipated a reduction in her earnings 
as a result of her voluntary cutback in 
working hours. Mrs. Martinez calculated 
monthly living expenses for herself and the 
three children at $2,050. This was the only' 
evidence of the dollar amount of the chil-
dren's monthly need for support The ma-
jority has elected to disregard that evi 
dence because they think the figure was 
too low. Having rejected the only evidence 
of the children's need, the majority makes 
its own independent estimate. 
Using their own estimate of need and the 
parties' gross monthly incomes, the majori-
ty has awarded $600 per month per child 
for a total of $1,800.5 Their action fails tc 
ed by the trial court with an award calculated 
under guidelines from Colorado and Wisconsin, 
even though the terms have markedly different 
meanings. Although the majority disclaims re-
liance on the child support guidelines from oth-
er jurisdictions, they do, in fact, rely upon the 
potentially greater amounts available in other-
jurisdictions in order to justify an award of $600 
per month per child. cJ 
The problem with this analysis is that the 
guidelines adopted by other jurisdictions arei 
irrelevant for purposes of an award in UftahJ~ 
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account for the effects on each party of: 
(1) tax rate changes under the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act;6 (2) their award of the tax 
exemptions for all the children to Mrs. Mar-
tinez; (3) the disposition of the home mort-
gage debt as discussed below; (4) their 
increase of alimony from $400 to $750 per 
month; and (5) their equitable restitution 
award in an amount to be determined by 
the trial court. 
I would remand this case on the child 
support issue for the taking of further 
evidence and a current determination of the 
children's need and the ability of both par-
ents to pay child support, to be considered 
with the other appropriate adjustments in 
the parties' incomes and liabilities. 
HOME MORTGAGE 
The parties stipulated at trial that their 
jointly-acquired home had a current market 
value of $63,000 and an equity of $34,561. 
The stipulated figures reveal the existence 
of a home mortgage obligation in the sum 
of $28,439. However, neither the trial 
court nor counsel identified this sizeable 
debt in the distribution of debts and proper-
ty. Nor do the trial court's written Find-
ings of Fact specify who must assume the 
$28,439 mortgage obligation and make the 
payments. The record reveals that Mrs. 
Martinez had been making a $309 monthly 
mortgage payment and the court stated 
that each party was to assume and dis-
Child support guidelines utilize different ap-
proaches to allocate economic responsibility for 
children of divorced parents depending upon 
varying public policy. See generally Cassetty, 
"Emerging Issues in Child Support Policy and 
Practice," in The Parental Child Support Obli-
gation: Research, Practice and Policy 3 (J. Cas-
setty ed. 1983). 
As the majority opinion demonstrates, the rec-
ommended amount of child support under oth-
er jurisdictions' guidelines may radically differ 
because of differences in the underlying policy 
goals adopted by a given state. The guidelines 
of some states, such as Wisconsin, do not adjust 
for the income of the custodial parent. This is 
obviously inconsistent with Utah's adoption of a 
public policy which holds both parents respon-
sible for the support of their children. For 
these reasons, whether the support guidelines in 
other states would afford a higher level of sup-
port should not be a factor in making an eq-
uitable award in Utah. 
MARTINEZ Utah 8 3 
(UuhApp. 1988) 
charge those debts that they have been 
paying. 
Paragraph 19 of the written Findings of 
Fact states that the "[p]laintiff [Mrs. Mar-
tbez] should be awarded the exclusive use 
and occupancy of the parties' residence 
subject to a lien in favor of Defendant for 
the sum of $17,528.00 . . . " The Decree of 
Divorce reiterates this language and 
awards plaintiff "exclusive use and occu-
pancy," subject to a lien in defendant's 
favor. The court's oral ruling was: "[Qhe 
Court will award to the the [sic] Plaintiff 
the home of the parties, subject to a lien 
for defendant's share of the equity in the 
amount of one-half of the net equity." 
The court's allocation of the parties' fi-
nancial obligations includes no reference to 
$28,439 of mortgage debt Mrs. Martinez 
was required to pay specified debts and 
obligations totalling $8,179.73. The $28,-
439 was not specified and does not appear 
in the record. Dr. Martinez was required 
to pay specified debts and obligations total-
ling $26,169.04. If Mrs. Martinez must as-
sume and pay the house mortgage, her 
post-divorce debt responsibility is $36,-
618.73, $10,449.69 more than his. 
Conclusion of Law C provides that, "[fjn 
order to make the distribution . . . [of mari-
tal property] as equal as possible, Plaintiff 
should be awarded the real property . . . 
subject to a lien in favor of Defendant for 
one-half of the present equity therein, that 
being for the sum of $17,678." Although 
6. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 will have a signif-
icant impact on Dr. Martinez's disposable in-
come, assuming ongoing gross income in the 
$100,000 range. He testified at trial that he had 
to set aside one-half of his income to pay taxes. 
For 1988 and later tax years, there are two basic 
tax rates for individuals, 15% and 28%. In 
addition, the law effectively creates a third rate 
of 33% on income above certain levels. Thus, 
portions of Dr. Martinez's income will be taxed 
at 15%, 28%, and 33% rather than all at 50%. 
Moreover, Utah income tax laws have changed 
in the interim. Counsel in divorce actions 
would be well advised to provide the trial court 
with complete information regarding the tax 
implications of the property distribution, alimo-
ny, child support and dependency exemption 
arrangements being proposed. The combined 
disposable income available to the severed fami-
ly can often be increased by prudent tax plan-
ning during a divorce. 
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the stated objective is equality of distribu-
tion, the requirement that Mrs. Martinez 
assume and pay the mortgage would bur-
den her by an additional $14,219.50 (V2 of 
$28,439), despite the parties' widely dispar-
ate disposable income and the fact that 
Mrs. Martinez must support herself and 
the children on less than $2,200 per month. 
Since the court failed to specifically iden-
tify the home mortgage, the court also 
failed to include the amount of $28,439 in 
the equity calculation. Thus Mrs. Martinez 
became personally responsible to pay the 
major debt of the parties. 
The trial court's inclusion of the home 
mortgage in Mrs. Martinez's debt burden 
as part of the property and debt distribu-
tion is an abuse of discretion, even without 
looking at the gross disparity of income. 
The home mortgage matter alone justifies 
a remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority has fixed the amount of 
alimony and child support to be pakL This 
action deprives the trial court, on remand, 
of any flexibility to adjust the debts, prop-
erty, alimony, and support awards and to 
fashion an overall award package that har-
monizes all the variables. The trial court's 
discretion will be so restricted that an eq-
uitable outcome will be impossible. This 
case should instead be remanded for retrial 
on the alimony, child support and property 
distribution issues. 
David A. MAXWELL, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Angeline B. MAXWELL, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860267-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 6, 1988. 
Former wife began proceeding for ali-
mony and property distribution of former 
husband's military retirement. The Third 
District Court, Tooele County, John A. Ro-
kich, J., awarded former wife alimony and 
divided former husband's military retire-
ment fund and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that (1) 
former husband's special appearance in 
proceeding was ineffective, and (2) failure 
of trial court to make specific findings re-
garding agreement to waive alimony and in 
support of distribution of military retire-
ment benefits required remand. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Divorce e=202 
Trial court had jurisdiction over wife's 
claims for alimony and property distribu-
tion of former husband's military retire-
ment notwithstanding former husband's 
entry of special appearance attacking state 
court's jurisdiction and claiming that Japa-
nese divorce had settled all matters be-
tween parties; former husband's special 
appearance was ineffective as when former 
husband made special appearance he sub-
mitted relevant documents expressly by his 
general appearance, he asked for affirma-
tive relief, thus waving special appearance, 
and trial court maintained continuing juris-
diction over former husband. 
2. Husband and Wife <s=>281 
Trial court may refuse to enforce prop-
erty settlement agreement upon specific 
finding as to why agreement should not be 
followed. 
3. Divorce «=>287 
Failure of trial court to articulate spe-
cific reasons for disregarding former wife's 
waiver of alimony or monetary claims 
signed in Japan required remand. 
4. Divorce <S=>287 
Failure of trial court to make finding 
as to actual number of years former hus-
band served in military, a finding that was 
necessary to determine amount of retire-
ment that was subject to distribution, re-
quired remand. 
PETERSEN 
Cite M 737 ?2d 
Gary V. PETERSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Julie A. PETERSEN, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860007-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the 
Second District Court, Weber County, Cal-
vin Gould, J., and husband appealed from 
court's division of marital property. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) 
medical degree that husband earned during 
marriage while wife was principal wage 
earner did not constitute "property" sub-
ject to division in connection with parties' 
divorce, but (2) award of $1,000 per month 
to wife, to compensate her for her "share" 
in husband's advanced degree, could be 
sustained Dy recharacterizing it as provi-
sion for additional alimony. 
Affirmed and remanded with di-
rections. 
1. Divorce <3=184(4) 
Generally, trial court is permitted con-
siderable discretion in adjusting financial 
and property interests of parties to divorce 
action, and its determinations are entitled 
to presumption of validity. 
2. Divorce <*=>252.3<1) 
Medical degree that husband earned 
while wife was principal wage earner was 
not "property" subject to division in con-
nection with parties' divorce. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Divorce <*=»252.3(1) 
Advanced degree is or confers intangi-
ble right which cannot properly be charac-
terized as "property," subject to division 
between spouses in connection with their 
divorce; declining to follow Daniels v. 
Daniels, 20 Ohio Op.2d 458,185 N.E.2d 773. 
v. PETERSEN Utah 237 
37 (Uuh App. 1987) 
4. Divorce <S=>237 
Traditional alimony analysis is appro-
priate and adequate method for making 
adjustments between spouses, one of whom 
has helped finance the other's advanced 
education, where divorce does not take 
place until several years after second 
spouse has earned his/her degree. 
5. Divorce <&=»247 
"Rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" 
alimony not terminable upon remarriage 
may be appropriate, to compensate one 
spouse for sacrifice of helping to finance 
other spouse's advanced degree, where di-
vorce takes place shortly after degree is 
obtained, before first spouse has had 
chance to enjoy comfortable life-style 
which degree will permit. 
6. Divorce <£=>240(2) 
Award of $1,000 per month to doctor's 
wife, to compensate wife for her "share" in 
husband's medical degree, could be sus-
tained bv recharacterizing 'nnt a? property 
settlement but as provision for additional 
alimony, to extent such additional alimony 
was warranted under circumstances. 
7. Divorce <^237 
Criteria considered in determining rea-
sonable award of support must include fi-
nancial conditions and needs of spouse in 
need of support, ability of that spouse to 
produce sufficient income for his or her 
own support, and ability of other spouse to 
provide support. 
8. Divorce «=»24<X2) 
Alimony of $2,000 per month was not 
unreasonable, where wife had substantially 
financed husband's medical education, sub-
sequently became accustomed to comforta-
ble life style that medical degree made 
possible, and enjoyed much different earn-
ing potential than that of husband, to 
tfhom all of income-Droducing assets had 
been awarded. 
Paul M. Belnap, Strong & Hanni, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Pete N. Vlahos, Vlahos & Sharp, Ogden, 
for plaintiff and appellant 
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Before ORME, JACKSON and 
BENCH. JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME. Judge: 
The appellant seeks a reversal or read-
justment of the property division and ali-
mony awarded to his former wife upon 
their divorce. His challenge focuses on a 
$120,000 property settlement given to his 
ex-wife to reflect her interest in his medical 
degree. We affirm the trial court's basic 
disposition, but require amendment of the 
decree insofar as the $120,000 award is 
concerned. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties were married in September 
1963 when they were both entering their 
senior year of college. Both graduated 
with Bachelor's degrees. Dr. Petersen con-
tinued his cJucatiun and obtained a Mas-
ter's degree, while Mrs. Petersen worked 
as an elementary school teacher to help 
finance her husband's education. After re-
ceiving his Master's degree, Dr. Petersen 
entered medical school. During medical 
school, Dr. Petersen earned approximately 
$1,000 per year in income. The couple also 
took out a student loan and received some 
money from Mrs. Petersen's parents. 
While her husband was in medical school, 
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a full 
time basis and three years part time. 
When Dr. Petersen began his internship, 
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at 
home with their child. During the next 
fifteen years, Mrs. Petersen was not em-
ployed outside the home and her teaching 
certification expired. 
By the time of their divorce, the parties 
had been married twenty years and had six 
children under the age of 18. The decree 
gave Mrs. Petersen custody of the six mi-
nor children, the family residence subject 
to the first mortgage, most of the family 
furniture, and two automobiles. She was 
awarded $300 per month per child as child 
support, $1,000 per month alimony, and the 
cash property settlement of $120,000, 
which Dr. Petersen was to pay in install-
ments of $1,000 per month without inter-
est 
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received 
his professional corporation, the total inter-
est in his pension and profit sharing plan, 
two condominiums, a boat, an undivided 
one-seventh interest in a cabin near Bear 
Lake, and other rental property. He also 
was given the right to claim all six children 
as dependents for income tax purposes. 
The trial court explained the $120,000 
cash settlement as follows: 
The Court believes that this case is clas-
sic, in that defendant is entitled to a 
property award reflecting an ownership 
interest of the defendant in plaintiffs 
medical degree. It is abundantly clear 
that defendant helped plaintiff earn that 
degree during their marriage, and that 
plaintiffs ability to earn is based upon 
that degree. Further, that folio win er the 
earning of the degree and the entry into 
the medical practice, by mutual agree-
ment, defendant undertook the raising 
and nurturing of the children as her re-
sponsibility to the marital partnership, 
while plaintiff practiced medicine. It is 
difficult to find in the evidence presented 
any system for the measurement of the 
value of the degree, and the Court must 
therefore deal with the case mostly upon 
an alimony basis. To deal with the case 
fully upon an alimony basis is not fair to 
the defendant, inasmuch as any effort to 
restructure her life by seeking to better 
her employment opportunities or to re-
marry will operate against her alimony 
rights. Defendant is therefore awarded 
$1,000 per month permanent alimony and 
a lump sum property award in respect to 
the medical degree in the amount of 
$120,000, payable in installments of 
$1,000 per month from the date of the 
decree. 
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the 
division of marital property was ineq-
uitable, particularly the $120,000 property 
settlement given to his wife. Dr. Petersen 
argues that it was error to characterize 
"his" medical degree as marital property 
and require him to cash out Mrs. Peter-
A _ ^ ^ 
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sen's interest therein over a 10-year peri-
od. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRE-
LIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
[1] Generally, the trial court is permit-
ted considerable discretion in adjusting the 
financial and property interests of the par-
ies to a divorce action, and its determina-
tions are entitled to a presumption of validi-
ty. E.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 
781, 782 (Utah 1986). And although appel-
ate courts may weigh the evidence and 
mbstitute their judgment for that of the 
rial court in divorce actions, as the Su-
)reme Court stated in Turner v. Turner, 
>49 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), "this court will not 
io so lightly and merely because its judg-
nent may differ from that of the trial 
udge. A trial court's apportionment of 
>roperty will not be disturbed unless it 
vorks such a manifest injustice or inequity 
is to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 
•49 P.2d at 8. 
In the present case, the trial court appro-
priately attempted to equalize ihe parties' 
respective standards of living. See Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). 
Dr. Petersen was found capable of earning 
$100,000 per year while Mrs. Petersen's 
ability to obtain recertification and secure a 
teaching contract was found to be specula-
tive at best. Even if she succeeded, she 
would earn only one-fourth to one-fifth of 
what Dr. Petersen would earn annually. 
The trial court spoke of the difficulty of 
measuring the value of Dr. Petersen's de-
gree. The court chose to balance the ine-
qualities between the parties partly with 
the alimony award. However, the trial 
court did not want Mrs. Petersen to lose all 
of her entitlement upon remarriage, so the 
trial court provided for an additional $120,-
I. In Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). 
the Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valua-
tion of a professional corporation. In Dogu, the 
husband was awarded his professional corpora-
tion, and his wife was awarded property to 
offset its value. 652 P.2d at 1309. Although the 
proper characterization of a medical degree, as 
in the present case, and the valuation of a pro-
fessional medical corporation, as in Dogu, may 
Involve related questions, the legal issues re-
garding the two are distinct. 
000 as a property award, payable in $1,000 
monthly installments. Characterization of 
these payments as a property award cre-
ated the main issue for appeal. 
DEGREES AS PROPERTY 
[2] The question of whether an ad-
vanced degree is a property interest sub-
ject to division upon divorce is one of first 
impression at the appellate level in Utah.1 
However, the majority of jurisdictions that 
have considered the issue have held that 
advanced degrees or professional licenses 
*re* not property. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 
Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz.App.1981) 
(husband's medical license and board certif-
icate are not property subject to division, 
but education is a factor to be considered in 
arriving at equitable property division, 
maintenance, and child support); In re 
Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 
152 Cal.Rptr. m, 677 (1979) (legal edu-
cation not a property right); In re Mar-
riage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 
75, 77 (1978) (MBA degree not marital 
property subject to division): In re Mar-
riage of Hortsman, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 
(Iowa 1978) (law degree is not a distributa-
ble asset upon divorce; future earnings 
are); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich.App. 404, 354 
N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich.App. 1984) (medical 
degree not property or marital asset); Ma-
honey i\ Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488, 453 A.2d 
527, 536 (1982) (courts may not make any 
permanent distribution of the value of pro-
fessional degrees and licenses, whether 
based on estimated worth or cost); Ruben 
v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733, 735 
(1983) (graduate degree acquired by one 
spouse during the marriage is not an asset 
subject to division upon divorce); Muckler-
oy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 
1357, 1358 (1972) (medical license is not 
In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Ulah 483. 211 
P.2d 452 (1949). the Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's property division and award of ali-
mony to the wife, referring to the wife's work-
ing to help her husband through school; the 
fact that, with the divorce, the wife was de-
prived of the benefits of his increased earnings; 
and the discrepancy in their earning capacities. 
Tremayne docs not address the issue of whether 
an advanced degree or license is marital proper-
ty* 
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community property); Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 603 P.2d 747, 750-51 (Okl.1979) 
(medical license not property but wife enti-
tled to compensation for her investment).2 
^hese cases and others are-consistent 
with our understanding of what "property" 
island what an - educational degree is. 
Property can be bought, sold, and devised. 
Bona fide degrees cannot be bought; they 
are earned. They cannot be sold; they are 
personal to the named recipient Upon the 
death of the named recipient, the certificate 
commemorating award of the degree might 
be passed along and treasured as a family 
heirloom, but the recipient may not, on the 
strength of that degree, practice law or 
medicine. In this case, the court awarded 
the parties' home to Mrs. Peterson. But it 
might have awarded the home to Dr. Peter-
sen or it might have ordered the home sold 
and the net proceeds divided. The court 
had no such alternatives with the medical 
degree, precisely because the degree is not 
property. Consideration of some of the 
cases cited above and others supports our 
fundamental conclusion and demonstrates 
the range of related problems. 
In Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 
498 P.2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued 
that the husband's education was the prod-
uct of the joint labor and industry of both 
parties, so that after their marriage it was 
community property. The New Mexico Su-
preme Court rejected this argument and 
concluded: 
A medical license is only a permit issued 
by the controlling authority of the State, 
authorizing the individual licensee to en-
gage in the practice of medicine. The 
medical license may be used and enjoyed 
by the licensee as a means of earning a 
livelihood, but it is not community prop-
erty because it cannot be the subject of 
joint ownership. 
84 N.M. at 15, 498 P.2d at 1358. 
The same issue arose as to an M.B.A. 
degree earned by the husband in In re 
2. The question of whether an advanced degree 
or professional license is marital property sub-
ject to division upon divorce has attracted con-
siderable attention from legal scholars. For 
one of the better reasoned discussions, see Note. 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 
P.2d 75 (1978). Again, the concept of an 
advanced degree being property was reject-
ed: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of the holder and is not inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it hoc none cf the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
194 Colo, at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. 
The wife in Graham had worked full 
time throughout the couple's six-year mar-
riage, and had contributed 70 percent of 
the family income in addition to most of the 
household work while her husband was ac-
quiring his degree. The trial court found 
that the degree was jointly owned property 
and had determined that the future earning 
value of the M.B.A. degree to Mr. Graham 
was $82,836.00. Mrs. Graham was award-
ed $33,134.00 of that amount On appeal, 
the state supreme court affirmed the rever-
sal of the trial court by the court of ap-
peals. 574 P.2d at 76. The fact that the 
decision left Mrs. Graham with nothing to 
show for her six years of labor prompted a 
three judge dissent which strongly urged 
that the husband's increased earning power 
represented by the degree should be con-
sidered marital property, where there was 
no accumulated property and the spouse 
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: 
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees 
and Professional Licenses from the Marital Es-
tate, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1327 (1983). 
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who subsidized the degree was ineligible 
for maintenance.3 574 P.2d at 78-79. 
The equitable concerns addressed in the 
Graham -dissent are reflected in the few 
cases that have found an advanced degree 
or-professional license to be marital proper-
d -
in Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773 
(Ohio 1961), the court held that the right to 
practice medicine was in the nature of a 
franchise and constituted property which 
the trial court had a right to consider in 
making an award of alimony. In Daniels, 
the parties to the action were married while 
students at a university. During the time 
of their marriage the wife received her 
degree in business administration and the 
husband received a degree in medicine one 
year later. Each contributed toward his or 
her own maintenance and education, the 
balance in financial support for the family 
coming from the wife's father, who contrib-
uted sizable sums to the marriage. At the 
time of their divorce, neither party had 
much in the way of tangible assets. The 
court awarded $24,000 in lump sum alimo-
ny, but did not actually divide the value of 
the medical degree. 185 N.E.2d at 776. 
Recently, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 
743 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's holding that a 
license to practice medicine acquired during 
the marriage is marital property subject to 
division. In O'Brien, the wife was held 
entitled to a 40 percent interest in her 
husband's medical license. The wife had 
contributed approximately 76 percent of 
the couples' total income while the husband 
obtained his license. The breakdown of the 
marriage occurred shortly after the hus-
band completed his schooling, and the only 
tangible asset existing after their nine-year 
marriage was the husband's medical li-
cense. 
The New York court distinguished its 
analysis in O'Brien from that of other jur-
isdictions which have found a license or 
advanced degree not to be marital proper-
ty. As the O'Brien court explained: 
3- In Graham, the wife did not request alimony 
because a Colorado statute. Coio.Rev.Siat. § 14-
10-114 (1973). restricted the court's power to 
Plaintiff does not contend that his license 
is excluded from distribution because it 
is separate property; rather, he claims 
that it is not property at all but repre-
sents a personal attainment in acquiring 
knowledge. He rests his argument on 
decisions in similar cases from other jur-
isdictions and on his view that a license 
does not satisfy common-law concepts of 
property. Neither contention is control-
ling because decisions in other States 
rely principally on their own statutes, 
and the legislative history underlying 
them, and because the New York Legis-
lature deliberately went beyond tradition-
al property concepts when it formulated 
the Equitable Distribution Law. 
66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 
N.Y.S.2d at 746. New York's highest court 
acknowledged in O'Brien that their statute 
creates a new species of property previous-
ly unknown at common law or under prior 
statutes. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 
719. 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Critical portions 
of the New York Equitable Distribution 
Law provide that in making an equitable 
distribution of marital property, the court 
shall consider the efforts one spouse made 
to the other spouse's career or career po-
tential and the difficulty of evaluating an 
interest in a profession. 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 
489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 
746-47. Thus, the analysis in O'Brien, al-
though illustrative of the equitable con-
cerns for the working spouse who supports 
the other through an advanced degree, 66 
N.Y.2d at 585-88, 489 N.E.2d at 716-18, 
498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-48, is limited in appli-
cation because of the pivotal role of the 
unusual and expansive distribution statute 
enacted in New York. 
(3-5] We agree with the majority opin-
ion in Graham that an advanced degree is 
or confers an intangible right which, be-
cause of its character, cannot properly be 
characterized as property subject to divi-
sion between the spouses. No special stat-
ute, as in New York, permits us to treat 
the degree as though it were property. On 
award maintenance to cases where the spouse 
seeking it was unable to support himself or 
herself. 574 P.2d at 79. 
242 Utah 737 PACIFJC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
the other hand, criteria for an award of 
support in Utah are not so rigid as in 
Colorado, preventing the harsh result of 
Graham. ^tf thfe^te; traditional alimony 
^malysia is the appropriate and adequate 
method for making adjustments between 
the parties in cases of this type.4 * 
AWARD IN THIS CASE 
[6] As indicated, the trial court was in 
error when it awarded Mrs. Petersen the 
$120,000 cash settlement to reflect her 
share of the value of her husband's medical 
degree. Nonetheless, the court's basic dis-
position was fair and can be sustained if 
the $1,000 monthly payments which Dr. 
Petersen was to make in satisfaction of 
that obligation are recharacterized as addi-
tional alimony, a result which is readily 
supported by the trial court's findings. 
In reviewing the court'c findings, *ve find 
ample evidence to affirm the property divi-
sion aside from the $120,000 cash settle-
ment. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Fletcher u. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
1980), ,4[t]here is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of properties, 
it is a prerogative of the court to make 
whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for 
the protection and welfare of the parties." 
615 P.2d at 1222. Although Dr. Petersen 
was awarded a smaller percentage of the 
marital assets, he received all but one of 
the income producing assets: his profes-
sional corporation, his pension and profit 
sharing plan, two condominiums, and other 
business interests. The parties were to 
share evenly in a $10,000 investment corpo-
4. In cases like the instant one, life patterns have 
largely been set. the earning potential of both 
parties can be predicted with some reliability, 
and the contributions and sacrifices of the one 
spouse in enabling the other to attain a degree 
have been compensated by many years of the 
comfortable lifestyle which the degree permit-
ted. Traditional alimony analysis works nicely 
to assure equity in such cases. 
In another kind of recurring case, typified by 
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis 
would often work hardship because, while both 
spouses have modest incomes at the time of 
divorce, the one is on the threshhold of a signifi-
cant increase in earnings. Moreover, the 
ration. We find the basic property division 
equitable. 
[7] As for the cash settlement payable 
in monthly installments of $1,000, it is 
properly affirmed as alimony, making Mrs. 
Petersen's entire alimony award $2,000 per 
month. Criteria considered in determining 
a reasonable award of support must in-
clude the financial conditions and needs of 
the spouse in need of support, the ability of 
that spouse to produce sufficient income 
for his or her own support, and the ability 
of the other spouse to provide support. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
[8] In this case, then, the first factor to 
be considered is the financial condition and 
needs of Mrs. Petersen. For over ten 
years, Mrs. Petersen and her family en-
joyed a very comfortable lifestyle. She 
now must make mortgage payments on tne 
home and pay for the ordinary expenses of 
food, clothing and transportation. Other 
than the one-half interest in the investment 
corporation, Mrs. Petersen was awarded 
none of the income-producing assets. She 
has no outside income. 
The second factor to be considered is 
Mrs. Petersen's ability to produce a suffi-
cient income for herself. Although Mrs. 
Petersen is a college graduate with a Bach-
elor's degree and is trained as a school 
teacher, she is not currently certified. She 
would require additional training to become 
certified and, even if certified, her ability to 
produce income would be one-fourth to one-
fifth of what Dr. Petersen's income has 
provided the family. The trial court found 
spouse who sacrificed so the other could attain 
a degree is precluded from enjoying the antici-
pated dividends the degree will ordinarily pro-
vide. Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically 
not remote in time from his or her previous 
education and is otherwise better able to adjust 
and to acquire comparable skills, given the op-
portunity and the funding. In such cases, ali-
mony analysis must become more creative to 
achieve fairness, and an award of "rehabilita-
tive" or "reimbursement" alimony, not termina-
ble upon remarriage, may be appropriate. Sec, 
e.g.t Haugan v. Haugan. 117 Wis.2d 200. 343 
N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney. 91 
NJ . 488. 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
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that the chance of her being able to secure 
a teaching contract was "speculative." 
During most of the marriage, Mrs. Peter-
sen was not employed outside the home. 
She stopped working, primarily at the urg-
ing of her husband, and devoted her time 
to raising their six children. It is unrea-
sonable to assume that she will be able 
immediately to enter the job market and 
support herself in the style in which she 
had been living before the divorce. See 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). 
The final factor to be considered is the 
ability of Dr. Petersen to provide support. 
This is the proper realm in which to consid-
er advanced degrees or professional licens-
es. An advanced degree is ordinarily an 
indicator of potential future earnings. In 
addition, the attainment of a degree by one 
spouse often results in a disparity of in-
come thct iz likely tc last for 2 great time, 
particularly in cases like the present one. 
Dr. Petersen has a history of earning more 
than $100,000 a year and Mrs. Petersen has 
not worked for the past fifteen. But it is 
the discrepancy in their earning power 
which is the basis for alimony, not the 
discrepancy in their educations. There is 
no logical reason, for example, for treating 
differently a self-trained artist without for-
mal education who earns and will earn 
$100,000 a year and a doctor with a medical 
degree who earns and will earn $100,000 a 
year. Other things being equal, if such an 
artist divorces his or her spouse, he or she 
should pay alimony comparable to that paid 
by such a doctor. Whether a spouse's abili-
3. It is clear the court viewed the payments to 
Mrs. Petersen, both those it specifically called 
alimony and the additional $1,000 monthly pay-
ments, as appropriate for her support. It uti-
lized the "property" label in characterizing some 
of the monthly total as a means to preclude 
termination of the payments to Mrs. Petersen 
upon her remarriage. Although the court pro-
vided that the $1,000 per month payments not 
called alimony would terminate in ten years, 
nothing in the court's findings establishes any 
particular significance to that point in time. 
We accordingly see no basis, now that the entire 
' monthly payment is properly characterized as 
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000 
monthly total automatically and arbitrarily ter-
minate at the end of ten years. Cf. Olson v. 
OUon, 704 P.2d 564. 567 (Utah 1985) (court 
ty to provide support is the result of an 
advanced degree or professional license is 
irrelevant to the analysis. The key is the 
spouse's ability. 
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1983), the Supreme Court explained: 
Where a marriage is of long duration and 
the earning capacity of one spouse great-
ly exceeds that of the other, as here, it is 
appropriate to order alimony and child 
support at a level which will insure that 
the supported spouse and children may 
maintain a standard of living not unduly 
disproportionate to that which they 
would have enjoyed had the marriage 
continued. 
658 P.2d at 1205. See Jeppson v. Jeppson, 
684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). 
In Savage, the parties had enjoyed a high 
standard of living during the marriage and 
the court upheld an award of $2,000 per 
month alimony and child support ot $500 
per month per child. 658 P.2d at 1205. In 
Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983), the Supreme Court upheld an 
alimony award of $2,500 per month as not 
excessive. 669 P.2d at 409. We agree that 
$2,000 per month alimony to Mrs. Petersen 
is sufficient to help her maintain a stan-
dard of living not unduly disproportionate 
to that which she would have enjoyed if the 
marriage had continued.4 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to 
District Court to amend the decree to pro-
vide that Mrs. Petersen receive $2,000 per 
month alimony and, correspondingly, to de-
lete the $120,000 cash award. The decree 
modified divorce decree to delete provision that 
alimony would terminate after two years where 
monthly amount was reasonable but two-year 
limit was not). Of course, it would be proper 
for the district court to readjust the amount of 
alimony award*:J to Mrs, Petersen if at any 
point in time there develops a material change 
of circumstances, such as Mrs. Petersen secur-
ing gainful employment or if Dr. Petersen's sala-
ry drops dramatically through no fault of his 
own. See, eg., Naylor v. Naylor. 700 P.2d 707, 
710 (Utah 1985); Haslam v. Haslam. 657 P.2d 
757, 758 (Utah 1982). The district court retains 
continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions to 
amend alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-5 
(1986). In addition, the alimony awarded to 
Mrs. Petersen automatically terminates under 
certain circumstances. Id. 
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall 
bear his or her own costs of appeal. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ„ concur. 
Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 86006O-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 18, 1987. 
The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc 
pro tunc order distributing property inci-
dent to previously granted divorce. Ex-
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute commit-
ting broad discretion to trial courts in 
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic 
relations matters was not limited in scope 
to cases involving marital status of the 
parties; (2) statute eliminated the common-
law requirement of previously made final 
order, and (3) good cause did not exist for 
entry of the order nunc pro tunc. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Courts «=114 
The court has the power to act nunc 
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and 
make it effective as of prior date; the 
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows 
the court to correct errors or supply omis-
sions to permit the record to accurately 
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C. 
A.1953, 3(Ma-l. 
2. Statutes <*=>189 
In construing legislative enactments, 
the reviewing court assumes that each 
term in the statute was used advisedly, and 
thus, interprets and applies the statute ac-
cording to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
3. Divorce «=»254(1) 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations was not limited 
in scope to cases involving marital status of 
the parties, but could also apply to proper-
ty division problems; by its wording, the 
statute applies to any and all matters relat-
ing to divorce proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 
30-4a-l. 
4. Statutes «=»222, 239 
Statutes are not to be construed as 
effecting any change in the common law 
beyond that which is clearly indicated; 
however, where statute is in derogation of 
the common law, and is also remedial in 
nature, the remedial application should be 
construed so as to give effect to its pur-
pose. 
5. Divorce «=»162 
Statute committing broad discretion to 
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc or-
ders in domestic relations matters eliminat-
ed the common-law nunc pro tunc require-
ment of previously made final order; literal 
reading of statute indicated legislative in-
tent to change standard for entry of nunc 
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings 
from requiring previously made final order 
as delineated by common law to requiring 
finding of "good cause," and legislative 
history indicated that statute was remedial 
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298 
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A.1953, 
3(Ma-l . 
6. Divorce <s=*254(l) 
"Good cause" did not exist to enter 
nunc pro tunc order distributing property 
incident to previously granted divorce; 
agreement between parties expressly stat-
ed that property was to be transferred to 
equalize the marital assets in order to in-
sure that the transfer of property would 
not be taxable event, and in entering order 
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 and without the essential and 
A - 3 9 
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ry intent is clearly revealed in the words he 
wrote. Since every required statutory ele-
ment was expressed in his handwriting, no 
sound purpose or policy was served by 
invalidating Fitzgerald's holographic will. 
See Estate of Black, 30 Cal.3d 880, 889, 641 
P.2d 754, 759, 181 Cal.Rptr. 222, 227 (1982). 
The will with two dates is facially ambigu-
ous about whether it was executed before 
or on the same date as the single-dated 
will. However, the terms of the twice-dat-
ed will do not conflict with the other will's 
terms. These consistent provisions must 
be considered valid. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-2-503 (1978). 
The holographic wills should have been 
admitted to probate. The order of the trial 
court appointing Kenneth Fitzgerald as the 
personal representative of decedent is va-
cated, and the case is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this decision. No 
costs are awarded. 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
Catherine RAYBURN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
rary alimony, and (2) award to wife of 
one-half interest in husband's retirement 
fund was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed as modified. 
1. Divorce <s=»237. 252.3(1) 
Advanced degree or professional li-
cense is not marital property subject to 
division upon divorce, but an advanced de-
gree often accompanies disparity in earning 
potential that is appropriately considered 
as factor in alimony analysis. 
2. Divorce <s=*247, 252.3(1) 
Cash settlement of $45,000, payable in 
monthly installments of $750, could not be 
sustained as property settlement, in that 
value represented compensation for hus-
band's professional degree, but payments 
could be properly affirmed as temporary 
alimony, given wife's needs and husband's 
ability to provide support. 
3. Divorce <3^ 247 
Award to wife of one-half interpst in 
present value of husband's retirement 
fund, payable over five years with interest, 
was not abuse of discretion, in that fund 
was asset accumulated during marriage, 
and especially where court permitted pay-
ments to be treated as "alimony" for tax 
purposes. 
Robert L. RAYBURN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 860022-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 29, 1987. 
Action was brought for divorce. The 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered di-
vorce decree, and husband appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) 
installment payments to account for hus-
band's medical degree could not be sus-
tained as property settlement, but pay-
ments could be properly affirmed as tempo-
Gaylen S. Young, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
B.L. Dart, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
Before ORME, BENCH and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
In this divorce action, defendant Robert 
L. Rayburn appeals the valuation and dis-
tribution of a retirement plan and an award 
of a $45,000 property settlement to offset 
his medical degree. We affirm the trial 
court's basic disposition, but require 
amendment of the decree insofar as the 
$45,000 award is concerr.ee. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Catherine Rayburn and Dr. 
Rayburn were married in Florida on June 
50, 1972. Earlier that same day, Dr. Ray-
)um had obtained his medical degree from 
he University of Florida. At the time, 
£rs. Rayburn had a masters degree in 
ifiplogy and was employed as a research 
associate at the University of Florida. The 
auple moved to Houston, Texas where Dr. 
laybum completed a one year internship 
it Baylor University. Dr. Rayburn earned 
18,000 to $9,000 during the internship, 
irs. Rayburn also worked during that 
'ear. earning approximately $7,200. The 
ouple returned to Florida where Dr. Ray-
>urn completed a three-year residency, 
arning approximately 511,000 to $13,500 
er year. Mrs. Rayburn worked for a 
hort time in Florida, but upon the birth of 
heir first child, she stopped working full-
line and worked only occasionally, and on 
part-time basis, throughout the rest of 
he marriage. 
After the residency, the family moved to 
an Antonio, where Dr. Rayburn completed 
wo years of military service. During the 
ive-year period of the internship, the resi-
ency, and his military service. Dr. Ray-
urn acted as the primary financial provid-
r for the family. Mrs. Rayburn stayed at 
ome, for the most part, to raise their 
rentual three children. 
'After military service, the family moved 
>vSalt Lake City where Dr. Rayburn joined 
*e staff of the Primary Children's Medical 
enter as a pediatric-anesthesiologist. In 
October 1982, Mrs. Rayburn filed for a 
ivorce. 
$Vial was held on July 18 and 19, 1983. 
X the time of trial, Dr. Rayburn was earn-
ig approximately $125,000 a year. After 
ie two day trial, the court issued a memo-
l&dum decision. In the decision, the court 
Btermined to award custody of the three 
ahor children, ages 9, 5, and 2, to Mrs. 
*yburn and to order Dr. Rayburn to pay 
ifld support in the amount of $400 per 
}fld per month. Apparently overlooking 
fef exact sequence of events on the Ray-
ttrns' wedding day, the court found the 
Hsband's medical deirree to h«» :i marifnl 
RAYBURN v. RAYBURN Utah 2 3 9 
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asset and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay Mrs. 
Rayburn $45,000, payable at $750 a month, 
as her share of the asset and to "maintain 
her lifestyle for a period of adjustment." 
The decision would have awarded Dr. Ray-
burn all of his retirement fund. 
About two weeks later, the court issued 
a supplemental decision in which the court 
altered its earlier decision on the retire-
ment plan. The court, "in order to make a 
more equitable division of property," or-
dered Dr. Rayburn to pay one-half the net 
present value of the retirement plan, $56,-
850, to Mrs. Rayburn in five annual install-
ments of $11,370 plus interest. The court 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and a decree on September 15, 1983. 
The decree expressly awarded no alimony 
and set December 15, 1983. as the effective 
date of the divorce. 
Dr. Rayburn promptly filed a motion for 
relief from judgment or for a new trial. 
Dr. Rayburn claimed the trial court failed 
to consider the drastic tax consequences of 
placing a present value on the retirement 
plan and awarding half of that to his wife. 
The court took Dr. Rayburn's motion under 
advisement. On December 9, 1983, the 
court issued another memorandum deci-
sion. This decision provided for amend-
ment of the decree in such terms as would 
permit the five retirement plan payments 
to be treated as alimony for tax purposes. 
The court entered a second set of findings, 
conclusions, and decree on February 28, 
1984. The second decree again awarded no 
alimony as such, made the embellishment 
for tax purposes, and set February 28 as 
the effective date of the divorce. Dr. Ray-
burn retained new counsel, who filed a 
motion for relief from the new judgment or 
a new trial. The court denied the motion 
and Dr. Rayburn appealed. 
On appeal, Dr. Rayburn claims the court 
erroneously placed a high value on the 
retirement plan without considering the tax 
consequences. Dr. Rayburn also claims 
the court erred in finding the medical de-
gree to be a marital asset and placing a 
value on it without any supporting evi-
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RECORD ON APPEAL 
Dr. Raybum ordered a transcript on ap-
peal of only 30 pages, representing a tiny 
fraction of the testimony offered at trial. 
Under Rule ll(eX2) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and the predecessor 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "If the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or 
is contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion." Since the transcript provided 
by the appellant is insufficient to allow a 
review of the evidence to determine the 
propriety of the findings, this court accepts 
the trial court's Findings of Fact as true l 
and only evaluates the legal correctness of 
the two disputed dispositions.2 As indi-
cated, the disputes concern the $45,000 
property settlement reflecting Mrs. Kay-
bum's "share" of her husband's medical 
degree and the payments for Mrs. Ray-
burn's one-half interest in the present val-
ue of the doctor's retirement plan.3 
THE MEDICAL DEGREE 
[I] Recently this court held that an ad-
vanced degree or professional license is not 
marital property subject to division upon 
1. See Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607. 608 
(Utah 1976) ("Appellate review of factual mat-
ters can be meaningful, orderly, and intelligent 
only in juxtaposition to a record by which lower 
courts' ruling and decisions on disputes can be 
measured."). In Sawyers, the Supreme Court 
presumed the findings of the trial court to have 
been supported by admissible, competent, sub-
stantial evidence. Id. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
527 P.2d 1359. 1360-61 (Utah 1974). 
2. At oral argument. Dr. Rayburn advised he did 
not really intend to question the findings in 
view of the evidence, only the propriety of the 
disposition in view of the findings. 
3. On appeal. Dr. Rayburn also argues that the 
trial court erred in filing two separate Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and two sepa-
rate decrees with different effective dates. In 
this regard he relies heavily on the failure of the 
second batch of documents to employ the term 
"amended," contending confusion will result 
about which decree controls. The second set of 
findings, conclusions, and decree was oi course 
prompted by Dr. Rayburn's motion for relief 
from judgment. Although not expressly labeled 
as "amended." the second set of finHim»< mn. 
divorce. Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 
237 (Utah App.1987). ^However, an ad-
vanced degree often accompanies a dispari-
ty in earning potential that is appropriately 
considered as a factor in alimony analysis. 
See id, 243. ^e.reaffirni our holdingJn 
{Petersen* and ^analyze<-th^fistant^appeal 
*Smd£rthe same anal^is'employed in that 
case. 
[2] The cash settlement of $45,000 pay-
able in monthly installments of $750 cannot 
be sustained under Petersen as a property 
settlement, but payments of $750 per 
month for a five-year period are properly 
affirmed as alimony.4 Criteria considered 
in determining a reasonable award of sup-
port must include the financial conditions 
and needs of the spouse in need of support, 
the ability of thai spvuae tu produce suffi-
cient income for his or her own support, 
and the ability of the other spouse to pro-
vide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). See Paffei v. Pa/-
/el, 732 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 1986) (fail-
ure to consider these three factors consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion). Although 
characterizing the monthly payments as a 
property settlement, the trial court ex-
clusions, and decree clearly supercedes the first 
set and arc the direct subject of this appeal. 
4. The trial court quite clearly viewed those pay-
ments as necessary for support but utilized the 
properly settlement label as a means to preclude 
their termination should Mrs. Rayburn remar-
ry. While il is true that with alimony the re-
ceiving spouse may lose some of his or her 
award through certain changed circumstances, 
like remarriage. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1986), it is noted that with installments on a 
property award, the receiving spouse might lose 
some of the award if the paying spouse obtained 
a discharge in bankruptcy. By contrast, an ali-
mony obligation would survive bankruptcy. H 
U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Supp.1987). Charac-
terization of required future payments as in 
satisfaction of a marital property disposition, 
rather than as alimony, is not always in the best 
interest of the receiving spouse. Cf. Beckmann 
v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045. 1050 (Utah 1984) 
(The fact that an instrument is labeled "property 
settlement agreement" docs not necessarily de-
termine whether debt is dischargeable. Court 
will look at underlying nature of the debt, in-
cluding whether spouse would be inadequately 
c i . r » ~ » ^ t - ^ . . M i i » - . . . •*— « • "* 
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pressly found factors that readily meet the his medical degree before the parties were 
criteria listed in Jones. 
As for Mrs. Rayburn's need for support 
gnd her ability to produce sufficient in-
come, the trial court found that Mrs. Ray-
burn was presently unemployed, but that 
she had been employed and was well-edu-
cated, having acquired bachelor's and mas-
ter's degrees. However, with minor chil-
dren residing at home and not yet in school, 
Mrs. Rayburn was reluctant to return im-
mediately to the full-time workforce. In 
addition, the court accepted Mrs. Rayburn's 
testimony that in order to bring her em-
ployment skills to a satisfactory level, she 
needed to return to school and obtain fur-
ther education "to complement her current 
education."5 As for Dr. Rayburn's ability 
to provide support, the trial court found 
that Dr. Rayburn was well-educated, hav-
ing obtained an M.D degree, and that he 
had a successful practice as a pediatnc-an-
esthesiologist, earning a projected $125,000 
for 1983. 
In its first memorandum decision, the 
trial court characterized the monthly pay-
ments for Mrs. Rayburn as necessary "to 
maintain her life style for a period of ad-
justment" The 5-year period correspond-
ed to the amount of time it would take for 
Mrs. Raybuni to complete her additional 
education on a part-time basis and until the 
parties' youngest child was in school all 
day/ 
We acknowledge that there will be situa-
boos where an award of non-terminable 
rdobflitative or reimbursement alimony 
*J0aW be appropriate. See Petersen v. Pet-
*T9*n, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4. However, this 
» W)t such a case. Dr. Rayburn acquired 
**^Jhi$ additional education was apparently in 
w ^ field of computer science No doubt com-
£ puicnzation has mushroomed in importance in 
« ^ j ^ ' ** m n c a f ly c v c rY a r c a °f scientific 
^ • ^ v o r , during the decade Mrs. Rayburn was 
^ e m p l o y e d Computer literacy would greatl> 
^*™ace Mrs. Rayburn's ability to obtain suit-
**** employment. 
I'Taii rational basis for limiting the payments 
Anve~year period of adjustment distinguishes 
from Petersen, where we declined to 
it a ten-year cap on alimony otherwise 
where there was no articulated basis for 
ucally diminishing the award upon the 
married. Although Mrs. Rayburn worked 
periodically during the marriage, she did 
ffot endure substantial financial sacrifices' 
or defer her own education to help him 
obtain the degree. In addition, Mrs. Ray-
burn shared the financial rewards permit-
ted-by her husband's advanced degree for 
several years. Those rewards also resulted 
in the accumulation of considerable real 
and personal property during their mar-
riage, which was equitably divided upon 
their divorce. The award of temporary ali-
mony, at $750 per month for a maximum of 
five years,7 adequately meets Mrs. Ray-
burn's support needs and is readily sustain-
able under the criteria outlined in Jones. 
THE RETIREMENT PLAN 
[31 Dr Rayburn's retirement fund was 
one of the valuable assets accumulated 
during the marriage and was of course 
subject to equitable division upon divorce 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P 2d 431, 433 
tutah 1982; Stv Enyitrl v Enyltrl, 576 
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978) We accept 
the trial court's finding that the retirement 
fund's present value was SI 13,700 In its 
second memorandum decision, the trial 
court explained that it had considered sev-
eral ways to distribute the life's share of 
the retirement fund and found fixing a sum 
equal to one-half of the present value and 
distributing that to Mrs Ravburn as a cash 
award to be the most equitable By requir-
ing Mrs. Rayburn's share in the retirement 
fund to be cashed out following divorce, 
the court avoided leaving the parties in a 
"financial entanglement that would contin-
ue for approximately twenty or thirty 
years and would probably result in further 
elapse of ten years See Petersen v Petersen, 
737 P 2d at 243 n. 5. See also Olson v. Olson. 
704 P.2d 564. 567 (Utah 1985) 
7. The alimony obligation could terminate earli-
er under certain circumstances Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986) In addition, the district 
court has "continuing jurisdiction' to change 
the alimony award "as is reasonable and neces-
sary," id. (3). provided there develops a substan-
tial change in the parties' circumstances See. 
eg. Naylor v. Navlor. 700 P 2d 707. 710 (Utah 
1985) 
A-43 
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court hearings and cause future animosity 
between the parties." 
However, the court went on to explain 
that "to require the defendant to pay the 
full sum at one time would have been an 
extra burden." By allowing Dr. Rayburn 
to make five annual payments, the court 
left him the option of paying his obligation 
out of current income or on some other 
basis, rather than having to liquidate the 
fund or sell other assets. The court addi-
tionally softened the impact by ultimately 
allowing the payments to be characterized 
in such terms as would permit them to be 
treated as "alimony" for tax purposes.8 
There is admittedly some potential for 
confusion because of the measures taken 
by the trial court to massage the tax treat-
ment of the payments to Mrs. Rayburn. 
However, these measures were the trial 
court's response to Dr. Raybum's very 
own argument that the payments worked a 
financial hardship on him. The trial court 
allowed the payments to be considered "ali-
mony" for tax purposes in order to give Dr. 
Rayburn the tax break of the alimony de-
duction while at the same time permitting 
Mrs. Rayburn to be cashed out within a 
few years. On appellate review, the trial 
court's apportionment of property will not 
be disturbed unless it works such a mani-
fest injustice or inequity as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion. E.g., Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). We 
find no abuse of discretion in the court's 
awarding Mrs. Rayburn a one-half interest 
in the retirement fund, payable over five 
years with interest On the contrary, and 
especially with the refinements which were 
made to address Dr. Raybum's concerns 
about taxes, the trial court's approach was 
clearly fair and equitable. 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the 
district court to amend the decree to pro-
vide that Mrs. Rayburn receive $750 per 
month alimony for five years and, corre-
8. The trial court did not stop here in tailoring 
the provision to make it as painless to Dr. Ray-
burn as possible under the circumstances. The 
court stated in its Conclusions of Law: "In the 
event that the payments under this paragraph 
do not qualify as 'alimony' for tax purposes, this 
would constitute a change of circumstances cn-
spondingly, to delete the $45,000 cash 
award. The decree is otherwise affirmed. 
Each party shall bear his or her own costs 
of appeal. 
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
o i KCTHUMW* SYSTEM 
SCIENTIFIC ACADEMY OF HAIR DE-
SIGN, INC., a Utah corporation, dba 
Mediterranean Hair Academy, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Robert 0 . BOWEN, in his official capaci-
ty as director of the Division of Regis-
tration within the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation, a Department of the 
Government of the State of Utah, De-
fendant and Respondent. 
No. 860035-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 8, 1987. 
Administrative suspension of license to 
operate a cosmetology/barbering school 
was affirmed by order of the District 
Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, James S. Sawaya, J., and school 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings. 
J., held that: (1) the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but (2) the 
findings in support of the suspension were 
not contrary to a clear preponderance of 
the evidence, even assuming such standard 
rather than the "arbitrary and capricious' 
standard was applicable. 
Affirmed. 
titling the defendant to come back before th<: 
Court and obtain a modification reducing this 
payment to the extent of the income tax which 
he is required to pay because of an inability to 
take a deduction of these payments as 'alimo-
ny'." 
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a somewhat similar instruction was harm-
less error. Furthermore, the property sto-
len was not fungible property which de-
fendant might have legitimately possessed. 
Rather, the checks were identified as prop-
erty belonging to others were shown to 
have been forged and would not legitimate-
ly have been in his possession under any 
circumstances. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ.f concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice (concurring 
separately): 
I concur in the majority opinion, but 
write separately to emphasize the obli-
gation of defense counsel to notify judges 
who have ruled on pretrial suppression is-
sues that defendants' objections to chal-
lenged evidence are ic»erved and not with-
drawn, thus alerting those judges to the 
possibility that trial evidence may affect 
the validity of earlier rulings. I agree that 
in this case there was an extensive hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress, and it is 
quite clear from the record that defense 
counsel did not intend to waive any related 
evidentiary objections at trial. In fact, sev-
eral ambiguous references during trial to a 
"prior motion" may have referred to de-
fendant's pretrial motion to suppress. It is 
important, however, that trial judges be 
given the opportunity to review pretrial 
suppression rulings when and if there is 
any likelihood that they were erroneous. 
When the pretrial judge is also the trial 
judge, unlike the circumstance in State v. 
Lesley, G72 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), this is 
easily accomplished by indicating on the 
record, either at the end of the pretrial 
hearing or at the trial outside the presence 
of the jury, that there is a continuing objec-
tion to the evidence challenged in the mo-
tion to suppress. 
HOWE, and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur in the concurring opinion of 
DURHAM, J. 
Betty M. GARDNER, Plaintif 
and Appellant, 
V. 
William James GARDNER, Defends*, 
and Respondent 
No. 19246. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 4, 1988. 
Divorce decree was entered by the Sec-
ond District Court, Weber County, Ronald 
0. Hyde, J., and wife appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held 
that: (1) trial court was required to value 
husbands tetii errant account; (2) wi'? wac 
entitled to findings ir. support of denial of 
her request for portion of husband's medi-
cal assets; (3) regardless of whether evalu-
ation and distribution of a professional de-
gree or professional practice is ever appro-
priate, it was inappropriate in the present 
case where marriage was of long duration 
and present earnings and business assets 
provided a more accurate measure of the 
true worth of wife's investment in hus-
band's degree; and (4) alimony award was 
insufficient and inequitable. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., filed opinion concurring and 
dissenting. 
1. Divorce e=>286<5) 
Though the Supreme Court may modi-
fy decisions of trial court, trial court's ap-
portionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Divorce €=252.3(4) 
Marital property includes pension fund 
or insurance, but dividing retirement or 
pension funds is not necessarily consistent 
u , i f K
 "»-i'n/Mnl»*«5 of euuitable distribution in 
GARDNER v. GARDNER 
Q | « M 7 4 S PJUI 107* (Utah |*M) 
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payout begins should be employed only in 
rare instances. 
3. Divorce «=»252.3(4) 
Trial court, in apportioning marital 
property upon divorce, was required to at 
least consider the value of the husband's 
retirement account, and alternatives avail-
able for taking that value into account 
would include requiring husband to pay 
half of net present value to wife in annual 
installments, or reapportioning property 
distribution to offset that value. 
4. Divorce «=»253(4) 
Wife was entitled to finding in support 
of denial of her request for a portion of the 
assets of husband's medical assets, and it 
was error to refuse to place present value 
thereon on the ground that the assets were 
"futuristic." 
5. Divorce <s=252.3(l) 
Goodwill is properly subject to eq-
uitable distribution upon divorce. 
6. Divorce <S=>252.3<1) 
Regardless of whether professional de-
gree and professional practice may in ap-
propriate cases constitute marital property 
subject to evaluation and distribution upon 
divorce, wife's request for property inter-
est in husband's medical degree was inap-
propriate where the marriage was of long 
duration and present earnings and business 
assets provided a more accurate measure 
of the true worth of the wife's investment 
in her husband's degree. 
7. Divorce <s=>237 
Alimony award should, after marriage 
of long duration and to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards 
of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
8. Divorce C=»240<2) 
Alimony award of $1,200 per month 
until husband's retirement and $600 per 
month thereafter was an abuse of discre-
tion where husband was a physician with 
earnings of $6,000 per month, wife had not 
been employed for 30 years, husband had 
substantial retirement assets, and wife 
would qualify for social security payments 
only as an "ex-wife married over 20 years." 
9. Divorce «=>225 
There was no error in divorce case in 
failing to award attorney fees to wife, 
where portion of property award was for 
purpose of assisting wife to pay attorney 
and no showing was made in trial as to the 
nature and amount of fees. 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
C. Gerald Parker, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Betty Gardner appeals from a 
decree awarding alimony and attorney fees 
in a divorce action she brought against her 
former husband, William Gardner. We re-
verse and remand for further considera-
tion. 
Mr. and Mrs. Gardner were married at 
Steels Tavern, Virginia, on April 17, 1950. 
No children were born to them, but the 
couple adopted two children who are now 
both adults. Early in the marriage, Mrs. 
Gardner worked full-time as a secretary 
while Mr. Gardner completed his medical 
training. Mr. Gardner also worked various 
jobs, and his parents provided support in 
the form of medical school tuition. Mrs. 
Gardner has not worked since 1958, when 
Mr. Gardner completed his medical train-
ing. Mr. Gardner is now employed as a 
general surgeon, earning $6,000 per month. 
While married, Mr. and Mrs. Gardner 
acquired substantial real and personal 
property. Their major asset was a farm, 
including a home and equipment located 
near Eden, Utah, worth between $246,000 
and $280,000. Other assets included Mr. 
Gardner's medical assets and retirement 
funds with an uncertain valuation of be-
tween $73,000 and $177,000; a contract for 
the sale of stock in the Ogden Clinic Invest-
ment Company; a certificate of deposit; 
household furniture, furnishings and fix-
tures; boats and automobiles; sporting 
equipment; and two horses and associated 
equipment. At the time of divorce, the 
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couple's only outstanding debts were a 
first mortgage on the family home and a 
loan for the purchase of one automobile. 
The trial court ordered that the farm, 
home, and equipment be sold and the pro-
ceeds be divided equally. Until the farm 
was sold, Mrs. Gardner was en tided to its 
use, although she had to pay the mortgage, 
taxes, and insurance. The court also or-
dered that the motor vehicles and boats be 
sold and the proceeds divided equally, with 
the exception of one personal automobile 
for each party. The household furnishings 
and other items of personal property were 
divided roughly equally, according to per-
sonal need. Mr. Gardner was awarded his 
medical and business assets, including re-
tirement funds, except Mrs. Gardner was 
awarded one-third of the proceeds from the 
sale of the Old Ogden Clinic building to pay 
her attorney fees. They were to share 
equally a money market certificate. The 
w>urt granted Mrs. Gardner $1,200 pt;r 
month alimony, to be reduced to $600 per 
month following Mr. Gardner's retirement. 
Mrs. Gardner was also to have a claim for 
$50,000 against Mr. Gardner's estate in the 
event that he predeceased her. 
Mrs. Gardner asks this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the lower court. She cites 
Woodward r. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982), for the proposition that she 
has a spousal right to an equitable distribu-
tion of Mr. Gardner's retirement funds. 
She also asserts a property interest in his 
medical degree and business and claims 
that the alimony award was insufficient. 
Finally, she asks this Court for an award of 
attorney fec<>. 
| I | In a divorce proceeding, the trial 
court should make a distribution o( proper-
ty and income so that the parties may 
readjust their lives to their new circum-
stances as well as possible. Turnrr r. 
Turner. 619 l\2d 6 (Utah 11*82): Mac-
Donald r. MacDonatd. 120 Utah 573. 236 
P.2d 1066 (1951). Although this Court may 
modify decisions of the trial court, its ap-
portionment of marital property will not be 
disturbed unless it is clearly unjust ur a 
clear abuse of discretion. Turner. 649 
P.2d at K. 
The trial court awarded Mr, GattfSnTTff 
retirement account and medical^^^S 
without placing a present value O n ^ p S 
those assets. The trial court' cEffisrawg 
those types of assets Mfuturistk" WroStt 
cated that their value would be'utiQ&KM 
retirement The court did not attemB^k 
resolve the differing valuations of'fh#$to 
sets and provided little explanation fbr?{& 
award to Mr. Gardner. ' $Mu#(i 
Recently, in Acton v. Deliran, 737* Kjjf 
996, 999 (Utah 1987), we noted: x<*<* 
Failure of the trial court to make fin<£ 
ings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable pf 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment" Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 
P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). . . . The find-
ings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree "follows logically 
from, and is supported by, the evidence." 
Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986). The findings "should be suffi-
ciently detailed and include enough sub-
sidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." Rucker [v. 
Dal ton). 598 P.2d [1336] at 1338 [Utah 
1979]. See also Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981). 
The trial court's statement in its findings 
that the retirement account and Mr. Gard-
ner's medical assets are "futuristic" was 
apparently intended to mean that they 
could not be given a present value or 
should not for other reasons be taken into, 
account. That, however, does not follow 
from the evidence presented at trial, nor is 
it supported by our cases. Regardless of 
how remote the full value of an asset is, it 
still has present value. The testimony ad-
duced at trial devoted to differing valua-
tions by the parlies merited more precise 
findings. 
(2 | In Woodward r. Woodward. 656 
P.2d at 432, we recognized that retirement 
benefits, whether vested or not. are a form 
of deferred cnni|*?n:»ation which a court 
should at least consider when dividing mar-
ital assets. A right to deferred compensa-
GARDNER 
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tion acquired during marriage, or that por-
tion of one's right to deferred compensa-
tion acquired during marriage, should not 
be entirely ignored in dividing assets, irre-
spective of when the vested funds are pay-
able Thus, marital property "encompass-
es all of the assets of every nature pos-
sessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
this includes any such pension fund or in-
surance " Englert i\ Englert, 576 P 2d 
1274 (UUih 1978) 
However, an award of a part of a 
spouse's retirement funds may create sig-
nificant problems. In some instances, mar-
ital assets are sparse, income is low, and an 
award of an equitable share of retirement 
assets might work a substantial hardship 
Courts have, however, awarded the value 
of the assets on a periodic payment plan 
%and, in some instances, have provided for 
payments when payout begins This alter 
native should be employed only in rare 
instances In Woodward, the Court stated 
Long term <uiu ueferreu snaring o\ finan-
cial interests are obviously too suscepti-
ble to continued strife and hostility, cir 
cumstances which our courts traditional 
ly strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible 
[WJhere other assets for equitable 
distribution are inadequate or lacking al-
together, or where no present value can 
be established and the parties are unable 
to reach agreement, resort must be had 
to a form of deferred distribution based 
upon fixed percentages 
656 P2d at 433 (quoting Kxkkert v Kik-
kerU 177 N J Super 471, 478, 427 A 2d 76, 
79-80 (1981)). 
Obviously, dividing retirement or pension 
funds is not necessarily consistent with 
principles of equitable distribution in all 
cases. The purpose of divorce is to end 
marriage and allow the parties to make as 
much of a clean break from each other as 
ia reasonably possible An award of de-
ferred compensation which ties a couple 
,together long after divorce can frustrate 
that objective. 
13J Nevertheless, the division of retire-
ment funds between two persons can be 
t. GARDNER Utah 1079 
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accomplished when necessary For exam-
ple, in Raybum v Raybum, 738 P.2d 238 
(Utah App 1987). a physician was required 
to pay one-half the net present value of his 
retirement plan, $.^ 6,850. to his former wife 
in five annual installments The court 
awarded present value of the share to be 
paid within five years to avoid "leaving the 
parties in a 'financial entanglement that 
would continue for approximately twenty 
or thirty years and would probably result 
in further court hearings and cause future 
animosity between the parties ' " Id. at 
241-42 Raybum provides a possible al-
ternative for dealing with the value of the 
retirement account in this case Because 
of the sizeable assets m this case, another 
alternative would be reapportionment of 
the property distribution to offset the value 
of the retirement account 
In any event, it *ill be necessary on 
remand to determine the \alue of the re 
tirement account The account has a 
present value of between $73 0W> and 
$177,000, and the Court should at least 
consider the value of the account in making 
the property distribution 
Another alternative for the apportion 
ment of property lies in the trial court's 
discretion to award the entire value of a 
solely owned professional corporation to 
the husband Dogu v Dogu% 6.72 P 2d 1308 
(Utah 1982) In Dogu, the earning power 
of the corporation resulted entirely from 
Dr Dogu's continuing ability to work; 
however, there were questions as to his 
ability to do so The trial court awarded 
the wife savings certificates, bank ac-
counts, and stock to offset the present liq-
uid assets of the corporation (accounts re-
ceivable and bank accounts) The trial 
court did not attempt to value the future 
earnings potential of the corporation, pre 
sumably because of questions regarding 
the ability of Dr Dogu to continue to gen 
erate income for the corporation 
14,5] The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr 
Gardner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization It is not likely to be highly sus 
ceptible to earnings interruptions because 
A-48 
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of the ill health of one of its members. 
The Ogden Clinic is not entirely valueless. 
Mr. Gardner's share, using his own figures, 
is worth at least $3,826 (partnership $3,726, 
corporation $100). Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher. Nei-
ther gave consideration to the good will 
inherent in the professional clinic.1 Mrs. 
Gardner was entitled to findings in support 
of the denial of her request for a portion of 
those assets. Instead, the trial court dis-
posed of the medical assets in the same 
sentence in which it disposed of the retire-
ment account. 
The medical assets at issue here were not 
included in the retirement account, but the 
trial court seems to have assumed that 
they were one and the same. In any event, 
no findings of fact were made as to the 
value of the medical assets. The award to 
Mr. Gardner of his retirement funds and 
medical assets may be proper and eq-
uitable. However, we cannot adequately 
review the trial court's determinations on 
the basis of the sparse findings before us. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a 
valuation of the medical assets and retire-
ment accounts and reconsideration of the 
distribution of the marital property on the 
basis of those findings. 
In addition, Mrs. Gardner assets an eq-
uitable and legal property interest in the 
medical degree of her former spouse. 
Whether professional degrees and profes-
sional practice constitute marital property 
subject to valuation and distribution upon 
the dissolution of a marriage has been the 
subject of much debate in recent years, 
especially in the wake of decisions where 
such a valuation has been made. See, <*.(/.. 
Inman v. In man, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 
1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N..I. 488. 
1. A marr iage mav In* analogized to a partner-
ship. Upon dissolution <»t the marital 'p.wtner 
ship." an equi table distribution should IK- based 
on considera t ion of all assets, not just those- th.«t 
sur \ ive the tr ip to the lx>ttom ol the balance 
sheet. Where appropriate , value may be given 
to that "something in business which gives rea 
sonable expectancy <>( preference in the race of 
competi t ion," commonly known as good will. 
Jackson v. Caldwell. 18 Utah 2d HI. 85. 415 l\2d 
6<S7. 670 (1966). 
The ability of a business to generate income 
from its cont inued patronage is commonly re 
i 453 A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'BrieM 
i 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 Nj£ 
;. 2d 712 (1985). It has similarly been tfa 
>, subject of discussion in our Court of Apt 
peals. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 PjJd 
i- 238 (Utah App.1987); Petersen v. Petersen; 
II 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.1987). ^ 
One authority has argued that education-
al achievements are susceptible to valua-
tion,2 but there is judicial authority for the 
proposition that the value of an education 
does not fall within the common under-
standing of the concept of property: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
"property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is 
, personal to the holder. It terminates on 
death of tbn hol<W and is nor inheritable. 
It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, 
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced de-
gree is a cumulative product of many 
years of previous education, combined 
with diligence and hard work. It may 
not be acquired by the mere expenditure 
of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist 
in the future acquisition of property. In 
our view, it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term. 
/// re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 
432, 574 P.2d 7f>, 77 (1978). See also Maho-
ney, 91 N J . 488 at 496, 453 A.2d 527 at 
531. 
The cases which have refused to hold 
that professional degrees-and practice con-
stitute marital property subject to valua-
tion and distribution have nonetheless as-
sessed and divided the value of the degree 
terred lo as ^«MK1 uill. (MMKJ will is proper I v 
subjei t to equitable distribution upon J i x o u e . 
See. e.K.. IhtKan i. Dufian. 92 N.J. 423. 4S7 A.2d 
! ( 1981); Matter <>f Marriage of /7.vee. 91 W.ish 
2d 324. SH8 J* 2d l P h (1979) Hut see Hie 
J reai/nenf of (,'<**/ Will in Divorce l*riKeedtne,s. 
18 Fain .1 .0 . 213 (1984) 
2. See F i t /patnek & Doueettc. Can (he i.cotujrmc 
Value of an l.Jucatmn Really He Measured?, 7 1 
J.Fain.I.. SI (1983) 
or practice on the basis of other legal and 
equitable remedies. These cases follow a 
common fact pattern. Typically, the hus-
band is supported throughout a long gradu-
ate or professional program by the working 
wife, and the couple is divorced soon after 
graduation. In such cases, there are few 
marital assets to distribute, and the courts 
have considered other ways of compensat-
ing the spouse, in a limited number of 
cases, the courts focus on the educational 
degree or professional practice. See gener-
ally In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney, 91 N.J. 
488, 453 A.2d 527; Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847; 
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
489 N.E.2d 712; and Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979), for various theo-
ries of valuation. 
GARDNER v. GARDNER 
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(6) We agree that an educational or 
professional degree is difficult to value and 
that such a valuation does not easily fit the 
common understanding of the character of 
property. However, at least in the present 
instance, we need not reach the question of 
whether such s valuation may ever take 
place. Sufficient assets distinguish this 
case from others in which equity and fair-
ness required another solution. Where, as 
here, the marriage is of long duration, 
present earnings and business assets pro-
vide a more accurate measure of the true 
worth of the wife's investment in her hus-
band's degree. The home, farm, automo-
biles, and other assets of approximately 
$500,000 allow for a divisible award be-
tween the Gardners. In a sense, Mrs. 
Gardner has realized benefits from the 
medical degree in the form of a greater 
property settlement and higher alimony. 
We find Mrs. Gardner's request for a prop-
erty interest in Mr. Gardner's medical de-
gree inappropriate under these facts and 
affirm the findings of the trial court in this 
regard. 
[7, 8) Mrs. Gardner also claims the trial 
rourt's award of alimony was insufficient 
md inequitable. We agree. An alimony 
iward should, after a marriage such as this 
md to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living and 
naintain them at a level as close as possi-
ble to that standard of living enjoyed dur-
S ™ ^ •*'»«• «•• Jones. 700 P.2d 
m p.2d 379.381 « i l a h 1 9 8 3 ) . I n /0J; 
we enumerated thre, factors important in 
fixing an ahmony award: (1) the financial 
cond.fons and needs „f
 t h e wife; (2) the 
ab.lity of the wife to
 p r o d u c e s u f f i c j e n t 
»"«»"« for herself; and (3) the ability of 
the husband to provide support. Jones. 
r r l / ' 1 0 ? 5- * » al*0 **9li* ft 
English. 565 P.2d 409. 412 (Utah 1977). 
Mrs Gardner has not been gainfully em-
ployed s.nce 1958. Though testimony indi-
cated that she was skilled as an executive 
secretary, it will be difficult for her to 
rega.n these skills and become reemployed 
after a thirty-year absence. Mr. Gardner 
by contrast, retains his career as a phvsi' 
cian with earnings of $6,000 per month. 
The trial court awarded Mrs C , r d - e r 
$1,200 per month as alimony, to be reduced 
to $600 per month following Mr. Gardner's 
retirement. The court provided no expla-
nation of the basis for t h e ^retirement 
award and stated that the reduction in ah-
mony following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
reflected a drop in h,s
 e a r n i n g p o t e n t i a l 
Mrs. Gardners eligibility for social securi-
ty and the fact that the house would be 
sold providing Mrs. Gardner with liquid 
assets. We think that this award was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Mrs Gardner executed an affidavit prior 
£ Z ' , S t , n * J e r ™ « * l y expenses at 
$1,700 per month. The trial court appar-
ently rehed on testimony at the hearing 
and on a prior affidavit which set her 
monthly needs at $1,200. Mrs. Gardner is 
not employed and has | i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f 
be.ng reemployed. Viewing her future 
earning potential and current monthly ex-
pens*,, however arrived at. against that of 
Mr. Gardners, we think it is dear that the 
award ,s insufficient to ^ u a ) i 2 e t h e 
ties standards of living. 
Similarly, the trial court'., award of $600 
monthly alimony following
 M r . Gardner's 
retirement « also unreasonably low. Mr 
^ T M U V U b S U n t , a l r * t i r e ™'" assets.' bhould Mr. Gardner rpark v-mruner reach retirement are 
these assets will have incre^H .nhoL* 
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tially. Mrs. Gardner, however, has no pen-
sion and will qualify for social security 
payments only as an "ex-wife married over 
20 years." She will not qualify for regular 
social security benefits until she has 
worked another thirty-nine quarters. Be-
cause the likelihood of her providing for 
her own retirement is small, we find that 
the trial court's award is insufficient to 
equalize the parties' standards of living 
following Mr. Gardner's retirement 
We reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings in light of the above and in light 
of the factors enumerated in Jones, 700 
P.2d at 1075. On remand, the trial court 
must evaluate the wife's ability to support 
herself based on findings and conclusions 
under the standards stated in Acton v. 
Dcliran, 737 P.2d 996. It is not clear from 
the record before us that Mrs. Gardner will 
be able to meet her monthly needs either 
before or after Mr. Gardner's retirement, 
and this is the focus of our concern. Our 
review of the record therefore indicates 
that the alimony award may have to be 
increased. However, explicit findings 
based on the factors in Jones are needed to 
support that conclusion. 
191 Finally, Mrs. Gardner asks this 
Court to make an award of attorney fees. 
The trial court made no specific award of 
attorney fees. However, in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, the trial court 
made clear that an award of a one-third 
interest in the Old Ogden Clinic building 
account and the division of the money mar-
ket certificate was for the purpose of as-
sisting the wife to pay her attorney. Mr. 
Gardner correctly notes that a request for 
attorney fees must be accompanied by evi-
dence at trial as to the nature and amount 
of such fees. See Warren v. Warren, 655 
P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1982). No such show-
ing was made at trial, and the findings do 
not support Mrs. Gardner's request. Inso-
far as we have approved the property set-
tlement of the lower court, the award of 
attorney fees made part of that settlement 
is affirmed. 
HALL, CJ. , and DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in the majority opinion except 
that part dealing with alimony. As tcthiti 
part, I dissent for the following reason^ 
First, in reversing and remanding forU 
valuation of the medical and retiremeS 
assets and a redistribution of marital projh 
erty on the basis of those findings, Mrs. 
Gardner's financial position will undoubted-
ly improve and her income increase. This 
increase will have a direct bearing on the 
amount of alimony which she should be 
awarded. It is premature for us to now 
hold that the $1,200 per month or the $600 
per month awarded by the trial court is 
inadequate. It may well be that after the 
redistribution of property is made, the 
amounts awarded will be entirely fair and 
could even be excessive. This is esj>ecially 
true as to $600 alimony after Mr. Gardner's 
retirement Any amount of his retirement 
awarded to her on remand decreases her 
need for alimony and his ability to pay i t 
Tiie U ial judge recognised Una reality when 
he wrote in his memorandum decision: 
Upon his retirement, the alimony shall 
reduce to $600 per month. The reasons 
for this reduction are: by the time of 
retirement, the home should be sold and 
the plaintiff should have liquid assets; 
defendant's income will materially de-
crease; plaintiff will also receive some 
social security benefits. It is my intent 
in awarding to the defendant his medical 
assets and retirement assets that alimo-
ny shall be paid therefrom and that the 
plaintiff shall have a claim thereon as 
against the defendant's estate if he 
should predecease her. This claim shall 
be in the amount of $50,000. 
Second, the $l,700-per-month alimony re-
quested by Mrs. Gardner was based on her 
affidavit which listed her monthly needs at 
that amount, but based on her assumption 
that the court would allow her to continue 
to live on the twenty-one-acre country es-
tate of the parties on which is a six-bed-
room home with garages for four cars, a 
barn, and other outbuildings. Consequent-
ly, in arriving at her $l,700-per-month r e 
quest, she included the monthly mortgage 
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payment, the property taxes, insurance pre-
miums on that property, monthly utilities 
on that proj>erty, and amounts for the care 
of the farm animals and for farm, garden, 
and house maintenance and repairs. How-
ever, the trial court did not award her the 
country estate or allow her to i>ermanently 
stay there, but ordered that the parties sell 
the property as soon as possible. The ma-
jority opinion does not assail this determi-
nation. The sale of the property ordered 
by the court necessarily eliminated many of 
the monthly expenses which formed a basis 
for the $1,700 alimony request The trial 
court, therefore, acted properly in exclud-
ing those items of expense in determining a 
reasonable amount of monthly alimony and 
presumably included instead the cost of 
Mrs. Gardner's living in smaller and less 
expensive quarters. On cross-examination. 
Mrs. Gardner admitted that her cost of 
living would be less if she did not live on 
the estate. Thus, the $1,200 awarded by 
the trial court was clearly within the range 
of the evidence before the court The ma-
jority *!%*:> «»ui claim mat $1,200 was 
"clearly erroneous" as rule 52, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, requires us to conclude 
before we may upset findings of fact by 
the trial court. 
We have always accorded trial courts 
considerable latitude in fixing alimony. 
Yet here, the majority sweeps aside the 
trial court's judgment because is only one-
fifth of Mr. Gardner's monthly income and 
is insufficient to "equalize the parties' stan-
dard of living." Insofar as this writer 
knows, reasonable and fair alimony has 
never been expressed as a percentage of 
the husband's monthly income. This is a 
.new concept, completely foreign to the test 
frecognized in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), for determining an alimony 
•award. Since the monthly income of di-
vorced husbands is not all the same, the 
Snonthly needs and financial conditions of 
[divorced wives vary widely, and debts and 
Either factors have to be considered, per-
ybentages should not be employed or relied 
P" Finally, I strongly dissent from the re-
ated references in the majority opinion 
at alimony is to "equalize" the financial 
position of the parties after their divorce. 
Again, this concept is contrary to the three 
factors to be considered which we enumer-
ated in Jones v. Jones, supra: (1) the finan-
cial condition and needs of the wife, (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself, and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide supj>ort. We have said 
that the wife is entitled to enjoy as near as 
possible the same standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and she 
should be prevented from becoming a pub-
lic charge. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409. 411 (Utah 1977). But this is not the 
same as "equalizing" their incomes. The 
instant case is a good example. Mr. Gard-
ner is a highly skilled surgeon earning 
$6,000 per month. Mrs. Gardner was not 
employed at the time of the divorce. She 
thought she could maintain the standard of 
living to which she had become accustomed 
if she received $1,700 per month alimony. 
If their financial positions after divorce are 
to be equal, she presumably should have 
$3,000 ptrr month aiimony. 1 do not think 
the majority intends that result. 
The object of divorce is to set the parties 
free of each other after an equitabie divi-
sion of property is made and, if needed, an 
award of alimony is made which will enable 
both parties to maintain as near as possible 
the standard of living they enjoyed during 
the marriage. The parties then go their 
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their 
lives. But because of the disparity in their 
earning ability, the wife here, who has 
training as a secretary but has not been 
employed for thirty-three years, will never 
earn as much as her husband-surgeon. 
Our cases do not suggest that the divorce 
decree should attempt to cure this disparity 
by "equalizing" their future incomes. 
A-52 
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The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and the case is remanded. 
In re the MARRIAGE OF Sally K. 
OLAR, Petitioner, 
and 
Terry T. Olar, Respondent 
No. 85SC487. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
Dec. 21, 1987. 
Wife brought dissolution of marriage 
action. The trial court failed to award wife 
maintenance. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed. Certiorari was granted. The Su-
preme Court, Vollack, J., held that (1) 
educational degree did not constitute mari-
tal property subject to division upon disso-
lution, and (2) in determining maintenance, 
trial court should have considered any un-
fairness which resulted when wife sacri-
ficed her own educational goals to support 
her spouse through school 
Affirmed in part, and reversed and re-
manded in part with directions. 
1. Divorce «=>252.3(1) 
An educational degree is not "marital 
property" subject to division upon dissolu-
tion of marriage. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Divorce «=»252.3<1) 
Contribution of one spouse to edu-
cation of other spouse may be taken into 
consideration when marital property is di-
vided upon dissolution of marriage. 
3. Divorce *=»237 
Maintenance is available only if proper-
ty is insufficient to provide for financial 
needs of spouse. CR.S. 14-10-114. 
4. Divorce «=»237 
Determination of what constitutes "ap-
propriate employment," for purposes of 
statute requiring that spouse seeking main-
tenance be unable to support himself 
through appropriate employment, requires 
that party's economic circumstances and 
reasonable expectations established during 
marriage be considered. CR.S. 14-10-
114(l)(b). 
5. Divorce <3=»237 
In determining maintenance wife was 
entitled to, trial court should have con-
sidered unfairness which may have results 
ed when wife sacrificed her own education-
al goals to support her spouse through 
school. C.R.S. 14-10-114. 
Fischer, Howard & Francis, Steven G. 
Francis, Fort Collins, for petitioner. 
Terry T. Olar, pro se. 
Robert T. Hinds, Jr. & Associates, P.C.," 
Linda Daley, Littleton, Colorado Women's 
Bar Ass'n, Linda Christenson, Denver, for; 
amici curiae Colorado Bar Ass'n and Colo-
rado Women's Bar Ass'n. 
VOLLACK, Justice. 
The issue presented in this case is whette 
er an educational degree constitutes mark 
tal property subject to division upon diss<H 
lution of marriage, overruling Graham VA 
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978)| 
or in the alternative, if an educational de | 
gree is not marital property, whether thjj 
wife was entitled to maintenance under t u | 
facts of this case, including the contrib^ 
tions made by the wife towards her hus | 
band's education. The court of appeal 
held that the trial court did not abuse ita| 
discretion by not awarding the wife mamtel 
nance, because she failed to meet tES 
threshold requirements of need set forth m 
section 14-10-114(lXa) and (b), 6B C.R | | 
(1987). In re Marriage of Olar, ^ 
64CA0S2S (ColoApp. Oct. IT, WSS> {*&$£ 
lected for publication). We affirm in part 
reverse in part and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
The petitioner, Sally K. Olar (wife), and 
the respondent, Terry T. Olar (husband), 
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were married on September 5, 1970, and 
separated on June 26, 1982. When the 
couple separated, the wife was unaware 
that she was pregnant with the couple's 
only child. By the time that the decree of 
dissolution was entered on December 23, 
1983, the child born of the marriage was 
eleven months old, and the wife was an 
unemployed, full-time student living with 
her parents in Munster, Indiana. The hus-
band was living in Copeland, Texas, earn-
ing a gross salary of $35,000 per year as a 
laboratory manager. 
At the time of their marriage, the wife 
had graduated from high school and the 
husband was in his first year of undergrad-
uate studies. During the twelve-year mar-
riage, with the exception of one year in 
which he worked full-time, the husband 
was a full-time student, acquiring under-
graduate and graduate degrees. For the 
seven years prior to their separation in 
June of 1982, the Olars resided in Fort 
Collins, Colorado, where the husband at-
tended Colorado State University (C.S.U.). 
At the time of the permanent orders hear-
ing on December 15,1983, the husband had 
completed his doctoral dissertation and was 
only required to present his work before a 
dissertation committee to obtain the doctor-
al degree in physiology and biophysics. 
Throughout the marriage, the wife worked 
full-time, and at the time of separation she 
was a bookkeeper with a gross income' of 
$1,200 per month. The wife continued her 
employment until June 15, 1983, with the 
exception of nine weeks maternity leave, 
until she moved to Indiana to commence 
her full-time studies. She moved in with 
her parents who provided her and the child 
room and board with an agreed upon value 
of $400 per month, which the parents ad-
vanced her as a loan to be paid back when 
possible. 
The husband's actual educational costs 
were financed by a combination of veter-
an's benefits for his past military service, 
tuition waivers, student loans, fellowships, 
and graduate student stipends. In the late 
1970's, the husband also received in excess 
of $8,000 as an inheritance from his father 
and this sum was co-mingled with the as-
sets of the parties, some of it going for a 
down-payment on a mobile home in which 
the couple lived until their separation. 
Throughout their marriage, the parties ac-
quired little in the way of marital assets. 
According to the wife, during the years 
1979 to 1982 her income totaled $47,398 
and the husband's income totaled $26,628. 
The marital property consisted of two mo-
tor vehicles, furniture and miscellaneous 
property, a mobile home worth approxi-
mately $10,000, and at the time of dissolu-
tion, a savings account containing $1,100. 
Both parties had debts from credit cards 
and the husband had student loan debts of 
approximately $5,400. 
The wife filed for dissolution of the mar-
riage in January of 1983 in Larimer County 
District Court At the dissolution hearing, 
the wife claimed that she was entitled to 
maintenance which would represent com-
pensation for her working full-time 
throughout the marriage to assist in pro-
viding almost a complete doctoral education 
for her husband. The wife claimed that 
she had an agreement with her husband 
whereby he would support her during her 
efforts to achieve a college education for 
herself after his education was completed. 
She had an expert testify as to the value of 
a college education for her, comparing 
what she could expect to earn as a high 
school graduate and a college graduate. 
The wife did not specifically argue that the 
husband's graduate degrees were marital 
property and did not offer testimony on the 
potential worth of his degrees if discounted 
to present value, or the amount that she 
contributed to his education. 
The husband claimed that there was no 
formal agreement between the parties that 
he would finance her education. He ar-
gued that his education was not marital 
property under Colorado law, and that the 
wife was not entitled to maintenance be-
cause she was capable of supporting her-
self. The custody of the minor child was 
not at issue and was awarded to the wife 
subject to reasonable and liberal visitation 
rights for the husband. 
The trial court held that the wife was not 
eligible for maintenance because she failed 
to establish the threshold of need neces-
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sary to justify such an award under section 
14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987). The court 
found that the wife was capable of support-
ing herself and although she had a young 
minor child to care for, nothing suggested 
that the child required her mother's full-
time presence at home. The trial court 
ordered the husband to pay to the wife 
$350 per month as child support As to the 
marital property, the court ordered that the 
proceeds of the sale of the mobile horns, 
totalling $4,914.60, and the savings account 
of $1,100 should be combined, and the wife 
should receive the sum of $5,000, with the 
balance going to the husband. The court 
noted that this was not an equal distribu-
tion, but stated that this award was in 
keeping with dictum contained in Graharn 
v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 
(1978)/ and would go towards assisting the 
wife in continuing her education while 
working part-time. The court specifically 
held that the education of the husband was 
not maritai property, and for this reason9 
found that the student loans of the hus* 
band, likewise,' were not marital obli-
gations, and ordered that the husband as-
sume those debts without contribution 
from the wife. 
The wife appealed the judgment to th$ 
court of appeals, claiming that the trial 
court erred in denying her maintenance 
because she failed to satisfy a threshold 
requirement of need. The court of appeals 
affirmed the trial court, stating that "[a] 
trial court may use an award of mainteN 
nance as a tool to balance equities and 
compensate a spouse whose work has en% 
abled the other spouse to obtain an ed^ 
cation, so long as the spouse seeking mains 
tenance meets the statutory threshold rev 
quirements of need set forth v\ 
§ 14-10-114<lXa) and (b), C.R.S." The 
court of appeals held the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the wife 
failed to establish the requisite need. 
IL 
We granted certiorari to reconsider our 
decision in Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 
1. In Graham, we stated that the contribution of 
a spouse to the education of the other spouse 
could be taken into consideration by the court 
429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), which held that an 
educational degree is not marital property. 
This reconsideration is based upon the rec-
ognition of the harsh and often unfair out-
come in a dissolution proceeding where one 
spouse has postponed his or her own career 
and educational goals to support and con-
tribute to the career and educational goals 
of the other spouse. The pursuit of ad-
vanced educational degrees and profession-
al training often results in a deferral of 
earning capacity by the spouse who re-
ceives that educational degree or advanced 
training at the expense of the current stan-
dard of living of the couple. When a cou-
ple collectively works towards the attain-
ment of an advanced educational degree or 
career goal, there is an expectation of a 
higher standard of living in the future. If 
a dissolution of the marriage occurs just as 
the graduate degree is attained, or the 
career goal achieved, or just subsequent to 
the attainment of the goal, the spouse that 
contributed to and supported the other 
spouse has his or her expectations of the 
higher standard of living frustrated, and as 
a result of the collective sacrifice and de-
ferment of acquiring other possessions, is 
left in a position where there is little mari-
tal property to divide. The contributions to 
the other spouse's education or career 
goals are often made at the expense of the 
supporting spouse's own education or ca; 
reer goal The supporting spouse is^left 
without the resources to recover fronv the 
years of deferring the acquisition of prop-? 
erty and security. It is with the recogru^ 
tion of this potential for injustice that we 
examine the status of an educational de-
gree in the context of the dissolution of a 
marriage. 
In considering the status of an education-
al degree in the dissolution of a marriage^ 
we do not work on a clean slate. In Grar 
ham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 
(1978), we held that an educational degree 
is not marital property within the meaning 
of section 14-10-113(2), 6B C.RJ3. (198TV 
which states that "[f]or purposes of this 
when dividing marital property. 194 Cola at 
433, 574 ?2d at 7S. 
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article only, 'marital property* means all 
property acquired by either spouse subse-
quent to the marriage except:" 
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, 
devise, or descent; 
(b) Property acquired in exchange for 
property acquired prior to the marriage 
or in exchange for property acquired by 
gift, bequest, devise, or descent; 
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a 
decree of legal separation; and 
(d) Property excluded by valid agree-
ment of the parties. 
In applying this definition to an edu-
cational degree, we have stated: 
An advanced degree is a cumulative 
product of many years of previous edu-
cation, combined with diligence and hard 
work. It may not be acquired by the 
mere expenditure of money. It is simply 
an intellectual achievement that may po-
tentially assist in the future acquisition 
of property. In our view, it has none of 
the attributes of property in the usual 
sense of that term. 
Graham, 194 Colo, at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. 
Our position in Graham is followed by 
the majority of jurisdictions to address this 
issue. E.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 
1145 (Alaska 1987); Wisner v. Wisner, 129 
Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (App.1981); In re 
Marriage of Sullivan, 134 CaLApp.3d 634, 
184 CaLRptr. 796 a9&)T..i^te4'-37 CaL 
3d 762, 209 CaLRptr. 354, 691 Pid 1020 
(1984) (statute amended to provide for the 
community to be reimbursed for communi-
ty contributions to education of a party); 
Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (FULApp. 
1983); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 
IlLApp.3d 234, 83 IlLDec 425, 470 N.E.2d 
551 (1984); Archer r. Archer, 803 Md. 347, 
493 A.2d 1074 (1985); Drapek v. Drapek, 
399 Mass. 240, 503 N J2.2d 946 (1987); Ru-
2. The O'Brien decision is based on portions of 
the New York Equitable Distribution Law which 
provides that a court consider the efforts one 
spouse has made to the other spouse's career. 
See N.YJ)oraJleLLaw § 236(BX5) (McKinney 
19__). The analysis in O'Brien is illustrative of 
the equitable concerns of the working spouse 
who contributes to the other spouse's career, 
however, it has a limited application beyond 
New York. 
ben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 
(1983); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N J. 488, 
453 A.2d 527 (1982); Hodge v. Hodge, 513 
Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986); Wehrkamp v. 
Wehrkampf 357 N.W.2d 264 (S.D.1984); 
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App.1987). Contra, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 
66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E. 
2d 712 (1985).* 
The doctrine of stare decisis imposes 
upon us a duty to exercise extreme care in 
overruling settled law. Creacy v. Indus-
trial Common, 148 Colo. 429, 366 P.2d 384 
(1961). On the other hand, "[a] rule direct-
ed to the disposition of property in a disso-
lution proceeding can only be as sound as 
the economic reality which it attempts to 
service." In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 
P.2d 661, -664 (Colo.1987). In Grubb, we 
reconsidered the status of pension plans as 
marital property and found that our prior 
case law, which rejected the concept of 
pension plans as marital property, did not 
adequately account for the true nature of 
retirement plans. We recognized that re-
tirement benefits were a form of deferred 
compensation for consideration for past 
services performed by an employee and 
constituted part of the compensation 
earned by the employee. Id. at 664. Edu-
cational degrees are very different in na-
ture from pension plans. While a pension 
plan is difficult to place a value upon, it is 
possible. We find that the value of an 
educational degree is too dependent upon 
the attributes and future choices of its 
possessor to be fairly valued. 
[1] Other courts have noted the differ-
ence between professional licenses or de-
grees and vested but unmatured pension 
plans. The Maryland Court of Appeals 
noted that whfle pension rights constitute a 
current asset which the individual has a 
contractual right to receive, the future en-
One commentator also argues that a spouse's 
professional degree and license should be con-
sidered a career asset to be divided, and pro-
vides a clear picture of the surprising injustice 
which resulted from the institution of the no-
fault divorce law in the United States. LWeitz-
man. The Divorce Revolution 124-29 (1985). 
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hanced income resulting from a profession-
al degree is a "mere expectancy." Archer 
v. Archer, 493 A.2d at 1079, citing Deering 
v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 
(1981) (case holding a vested but unma-
tured pension right is marital property). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that 
"[a] professional license or degree repre-
sents the opportunity to obtain an amount 
of money only upon the occurrence of high-
ly uncertain future events. By contrast, 
the vested but unmatured pension at issue 
in Kikkert [v. Kikkert, 88 N J. 4, 438 A.2d 
317 (NJ.1981)], entitled the owner to a 
definite amount of money at a certain fu-
ture date." Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 531. 
The Mahoney court further stated that 
"[v]aluing a professional degree in the 
hands of any particular individual at the 
start of his or her career would involve a 
gamut of calculations that reduces to little 
more than guesswork." Id. at 532. We 
agree with this analysis, and therefore 
reaffirm our holding in Graham, holding 
that an educational degree is not marital 
property. 
[2] In Graham we stated, "(a] spouse 
who provides financial support while the 
other spouse acquires an education is not 
without a remedy." 194 Colo, at 433, 574 
P.2d at 78. Here, it is the adequacy of the 
remedy with which we are concerned The 
contribution of one spouse to the education 
of the other spouse may be taken into 
consideration when marital property is di-
vided. Id., citing Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. 
App. 196, 510 P.2d 905 (1973). This remedy 
is effective only if sufficient marital prop-
erty has been accumulated by the parties 
during their marriage. In Graham, and 
the case at bar, the parties were divorced 
shortly after the husband acquired his de-
gree. The situation in which the dissolu-
tion of marriage occurs before the benefits 
of the advanced degree can be realized, and 
where no marital property is accumulated, 
requires us to look to another remedy for 
the inequity that results for the working 
spouse. Another option mentioned in Gra-
ham was an award of maintenance as a 
need is demonstrated The trial court 
could make an award of maintenance based 
on all relevant factors including the contri-
bution of one spouse to the education of 
the other spouse. Id. For this remedy, we 
look to section 14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987), 
which sets forth the standards for award-
ing maintenance. 
III. 
[3] Under Colorado's maintenance stat-
ute, maintenance is available only if proper-
ty is insufficient to provide for the financial 
needs of the spouse. In re Marriage of 
Jones, 627 P.2d 248 (Colo.1981). In this 
case, the accumulated marital property was 
insufficient to fairly compensate the wife 
for her contributions and expectations in 
the husband's educational degree. How-
ever, the trial court determined that the 
wife was not entitled to maintenance be-
cause she was capable of supporting her-
self, and therefore failed to establish "the 
threshold necessary to justify an award of 
maintenance." In our view, the trial 
court's holding does not adequately ad-
dress the unfairness which resu)ts when 
one spouse sacrifices his or her own edu-
cational goals to support his or her spouse. 
Such an interpretation is not required by 
section 14-10-114, 6B C.R.S. (1987). Sub-
section (1) provides that a court may grant 
maintenance to either spouse if it finds that 
the spouse seeking maintenance: 
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including 
marital property apportioned to him, to 
provide for his reasonable needs; and 
(b) Is unable to support himself through 
appropriate employment or is the custodi-
an of a child whose condition or circum-
stances make it appropriate that the cus-
todian not be required to seek employ-
ment outside the home. 
Once the court deems it just to award a 
spouse maintenance, the court considers all 
relevant factors including: the financial re-
sources of the party seeking maintenance; 
the time necessary to acquire sufficient 
education or training to enable the party 
seeking maintenance to find appropriate 
employment and that party's future earn-
ing capacity; the standard of living estab-
lished during the marriage; the duration of 
the marriage; the age and condition of the 
spouse seeking: maintenance; and the abili-
IN RE MARRIAGE OF OLAR 
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ty of the spouse paying maintenance to requirements to sustain life 
Colo. 681 
meet his or her needs. § 14-10-114(2), 6B 
C.R.S. (1987). In consideration of whether 
to award maintenance, the trial court ap-
plies a two-part test evidenced by the stat-
ute. First, the trial court must determine 
whether a spouse is entitled to maintenance 
under section 14-10-114(1). Second, the 
trial court determines the amount of main-
tenance to be awarded once entitlement has 
been established. In setting the amount of 
maintenance, the trial court considers vari-
ous factors including the standard of living 
established during the marriage. 
As interpreted by the trial court, the 
threshold of need required by section 14-
10-114(1), evidenced by the requirement 
that the spouse seeking maintenance have 
insufficient property to provide for his 
"reasonable needs" and be "unable to sup-
port himself through appropriate employ-
ment," is a high threshold requiring a 
spouse to establish that he or she lacks the 
minimum resources to sustain human life. 
The phrases "reasonable needs" and "ap-
propriate employment" need not be viewed 
so narrowly. 
In Graham, we stated that one of the 
remedies available to the working spouse, 
where no marital property was accumulat-
ed, is an award of maintenance if "a need is 
demonstrated." 194 Colo, at 433, 574 ?J2d 
at 78. In In re the Marriage of McVey, 
641 P.2d 300,301 (Colo.App.1981), the court 
of appeals stated that "a trial court may 
use an award of maintenance as a tool to 
balance equities and compensate a spouse 
whose work has enabled the other spouse 
to obtain an education; however, this tool 
is available for use only where the spouse 
seeking maintenance meets the statutory 
threshold requirements of need." (Empha-
sis added). This "threshold of need" was 
not defined in McVey, but appears to have 
incorporated the concept of the minimum 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals noted the rigidity 
of the Interpretation of the "reasonable needs" 
requirement of section 14-10-114, noting that in 
cases such as Graham, "where divorce occurs 
shortly after the degree is obtained, traditional 
alimony analysis would often work hardship 
because, while both spouses have modest In-
comes at the time of divorce, the one is on the 
threahol/f nf m demificant incr**** in earninc*. 
This interpre-
tation does not give sufficient weight to the 
word "reasonable" contained in the phrase 
"reasonable needs/'3 The determination 
of what a spouse's "reasonable needs" are, 
is dependent upon the particular facts and 
circumstances of the parties' marriage. 
See Moss v. Moss, 190 Colo. 491, 549 P.2d 
404 (1976) (in the award of alimony, each 
case depends on its own particular facts 
and circumstances and an award of alimo-
ny in gross is not unacceptable per se). 
[4] The second factor to be considered 
in deciding whether a spouse is entitled to 
maintenance is whether the spouse is able 
to find "appropriate employment" for his 
or her support § 14~10-114(l)(b). In the 
interest of fairness, the determination of 
what constitutes "appropriate employ-
ment" under subsection (b) requires that 
the party's economic circumstances and 
reasonable expectations established during 
the marriage be considered. In In re Mar-
riage of 'Angerman, 44 Colo.App. 298, 612 
P.2d 1166 (1980), the court of appeals af-
firmed the award of maintenance to the 
wife in the sum of $200 per month while 
the wife was matriculating in a master's 
degree program for music The trial court 
found that the parties had intended that 
"appropriate employment" for the wife 
meant a career in opera or in the teaching 
of music, and that the wife's employment 
as a keypunch operator was only a tempo-
rary position "dictated by the financial 
needs of the husband's education." Id. 612 
P.2d at 1167. 
[5] The word "appropriate" is defined 
as "specially suitable" or "proper." Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary 
106 (1969). The word "appropriate" limits 
the otherwise harsh results of denying a 
spouse maintenance if any kind of employ-
ment is attainable. The employment must 
be suited to the individual, including that 
Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the oth-
er could attain a degree is precluded from en-
Joying the anticipated dividends the degree will 
ordinarily provide.... In such cases, alimony 
analysis must become more creative to achieve 
fairness, and an award of 'rehabilitative' or 're-
imbursement' alimony, not terminable upon re* 
marriage, may be appropriate." Petersen v. Pet-
in P JA »t 342 n 4 
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individual's expectations and intentions as 
expressed during the marriage. The con-
sideration of the parties' reasonable expec-
tations and intentions gives full meaning to 
the phrase "appropriate employment." 
Any statement or intimation to the con-
trary in our prior decision in Graham and 
contained in the court of appeals' decision 
of McVey is hereby expressly disapproved. 
We think it appropriate for the trial court 
to reconsider the award of maintenance.4 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of ap-
peals' holding that an educational degree 
was not marital property, but reverse the 
judgment and remand the case to the court 
of appeals with directions to return the 
case to the district court for further pro-
ceedings as to the issue of maintenance. 
Richard J. QUICKER, 
Complainant-Appellant, 
v. 
COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMIS-
SION and American V Mueller, Divi-
sion of American Hospital Supply Cor-
poration, Respondents-Appellees. 
No. 86CA1070. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Dhr.II. 
July 9, 1981 
Employee fOed complaint with the Col-
orado Civil Rights Commission alleging dis-
4. Other courts have considered the problem of 
how to fairly compensate m working spouse who 
has supported the other spouse while he or she 
obtains a professional degree. One jurisdiction 
has created what is known as "reimbursement 
alimony which awards maintenance to the sup-
porting spouse in an amount to equal the mon-
ey spent by the supporting spouse towards the 
education. Aiahoney v. Aiahoney, 91 NJ. 488, 
453 JL2d 527 (1982). Another court held that 
the supporting spouse was entitled to restitution 
of the money spent towards the attainment of 
the other spouse's degree in order to prevent 
unjust enrichment of the student- spouse. See 
Hubbard v. Hubbard. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979). 
We recognize that our approach to compensat-
crimination by his employer in connection 
with his discharge. The complaint was dis-
missed by the Commission, and employee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Stern-
berg, J., held that (1) six-month limitations 
period applicable to civil rights claims be-
gan to run on date employee was notified 
of discharge, not subsequent date of his 
actual separation; (2) running of limita-
tions period would be equitably tolled by 
employer's failure to give employee proper 
notice of his rights under civil rights laws; 
and (3) allegations concerning employer's 
discriminatory refusal to transfer employee 
to another job also tolled limitations period. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Limitation of Actions <3=»58(1) 
Six-month limitations period for filing 
charge of discriminatory or unfair employ-
ment practice with Civil Rights Commission 
began to run on date employee was given 
notice of his discharge, which constituted 
allegedly discriminatory act, not date of his 
actual separation from employment C.R. 
S. 24-34-403. 
2. Limitation of Actions «==104!A 
Running of six-month limitations peri-
od applicable to employee's discriminatory 
discharge claim was equitably tolled based 
on employer's failure to give employee no: 
tice of his statutory rights under state civil 
rights statute; employer failed to furnish 
salesman who maintained office within his 
home required poster or any other notice of 
his rights as required by state civil rights 
laws. C.R.S. 24-34-403. 
ing a spouse for his or her support of the other 
spouse in the attainment of an educational de-
gree is to a certain extent limited by the statu-
tory framework contained in the Uniform Dis-
solution of a Marriage Act. Other courts, inter-' 
preting their own statutory provisions regarding 
maintenance, have held that a demonstrated 
capacity of self-support on the part of the sup* 
porting spouse is but one factor to be con-
sidered in the awarding of maintenance, recog-
nizing that a spouse who is capable of support-
ing someone through school will In most cases 
be capable of supporting him or herself after 
the marriage is dissolved. See Washburn v. 
Washburn, 101 Wash.2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 
(1984). 
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missing from his lot. Shortly thereafter, 
the petitioner DeJclef was observed in pos-
session of the vehicle. It had been painted 
black, the back seats wore missing, the 
radio had been replaced and the vehicle 
serial numbers had been removed from the 
front of the windshield. 
Delclef was charged in the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City with theft in violation of 
§ 342 of Art. 27 in the form of indictment 
prescribed by § 344(a); it was alleged that 
on April 20, 1982, Delclef 
"did unlawfully steal property and ser-
vices, of Netelers Used Cars, John En-
sweler Agent, Finksburg, Maryland, of 
the value of more than $300.00 current 
money, to wit: One 1971 Volkswagon 
bus, VlN #2212136295, in violation of 
Article 27, Section 342 of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, contrary to the form 
of the Act of Assembly, in such case 
made and provided, and against the 
peace, government and dignity of the 
State." 
Delclef moved to dismiss the indictment 
on the ground that it failed to allege the 
elements of the offense and adequately to 
inform him of the charge against him. The 
court denied the motion. Delclef there-
after filed a motion for a bill of particulars, 
demanding, among other things, that the 
State set forth "the exact way and manner 
in which the defendant was allegedly in-
volved and exactly how he actually commit-
ted such acts in . . . said indictment." The 
State refused to furnish the particulars on 
the ground that it had already provided 
Delclef with the functional equivalent of 
tne particufars througn pretn'af dYscovery. 
The trial court declined to order the State 
to furnish the particulars. On the same 
date, defense counsel agreed that he had 
received the "functional equivalent" of the 
demanded particulars through pretrial dis-
covery. Delclef was tried and convicted by 
a jury for theft. 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed 
the conviction in an unreported opinion. It 
noted that under § 342 of Art. 27 "theft" is 
a single crime, its five subsections delineat-
" ' O K T K K . iM SERIES 
injr manners or methods by which the 
crime may be committed. It reasoned 
therefore, that the effect of the indictment 
wus to charge theft by any or all of the 
five methods. It concluded that there is no 
constitutional requirement that the meajw 
by which an offense is committed be set 
forth in the indictment. With regard to the 
demanded particulars, the court noted that 
Delclef was bound by the admission of his 
attorney that, in actuality, he had received 
the "functional equivalent" of a bill of par-
ticulars and consequently the trial court's 
denial did not constitute reversible error. 
II 
In Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 493 A.2d 
J0f>2 I19S5) we found no merit in an identi-
cal constitutional challenge to the statutory 
form of charging document for the crime 
of theft, as authorized by § 344(a) of Arti-
cle 27. For reasons set forth in that opin-
ion, we affirm the judgment. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH 
COSTS. 
COLE, Judge, concurring. 
I concur in the result in this case for the 
reasons stated in my concurring opinion in 
Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 342, 493 A.2d 
1062, 1071 (1985) (Cole, J., concurring). 
O |llTNUMSt»SYSIfH> 
^-* i > A * * «*"»n^..*/ 
303 Md. 347 
Jeanne P. ARCHER 
v. 
Thomas P. ARCHER, 
No. 153, Sept Term, 1984. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
June 12, 1985. 
The Circuit Court, Prince George's 
u'nty, James Magruder Rea, J., held in 
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divorce action that a medical degree or 
license was not marital property, and the 
wife appealed. Certiorari was granted pri-
or to consideration of appeal by interme-
diate appellate court. The Court of Ap-
peals, Muq>hy, C.J., held that: (1) medical 
degree and license were not marital proper-
ty, and (2) chancellor was empowered to 
take into account such matters as hus-
band's earning capacity in making alimony 
award. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce e=252.3(l) 
A professional degree or license does 
not possess any of the basic characteristics 
of property with the ambit of marital prop-
erty as defined under § 8-201(e) of the 
Property Disposition in Divorce and Annul-
ment Law. Code, Family Law, § 8-201(e). 
2. Divorce <S=>252.3(1) 
Husband's medical degree and license 
were not marital property. Code, Family 
Law, § 8-201(e). 
3. Divorce <s=237 
Under § 11-106 of the Family Law 
article [Code, Family Law, § 11-106], chan-
cellor in divorce action was empowered to 
take into account such matters as hus-
band's earning capacity in making an ali-
mony award. 
4. Divorce <S=>237 
Any income actually earned as a result 
of one spouse's acquisition of a profession-
al degree/license, together with sacrifices 
of other spouse toward its attainment, are 
factors which may be considered by the 
court in making alimony award. 
Allen J. Kruger, Laurel (Kristen I. 
Schoeck and Goldman, Nichols, Kovelant, 
Hurtt & Kruger, Laurel, on the brief), for 
appellant. 
Paul S. Warshowsky, Columbia (Levan, 
Schimel, Richman & Belman, P.A., Colum-
bia, on the brief), for appellee. 
'•• ARCHER Md. 1 0 7 5 
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Argued before MURPHY, CJ. f SMITH, 
ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY and 
McAULIFFE, J.I., and \V\ ALBERT MEN-
CHINE, Associate Judge of the Court of 
Special Appeals (retired), Specially As-
signed. 
MURPHY. Chief Judge. 
The question presented is whether a 
medical degree and license to practice medi-
cine obtained by a spouse during marriage 
constitutes "marital property" within the 
contemplation of the Property Disposition 
in Divorce and Annulment Law (the Act), 
Maryland Code (1984), § 8-201(e) of the 
Family Law Article; that section provides: 
"(1) 'Marital property' means the prop-
erty, however titled, acquired by 1 or 
both parties during the marriage. 
(2) 'Marital property' does not include 
property: 
(i) acquired before the marriage; 
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift of a 
third party; 
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or 
(iv) directly traceable to any of these 
sources." 
I 
Jeanne (Appellant) and Thomas (Appel-
lee) Archer were married on August 6r 
1977. At that time, Thomas had just com-
pleted his first year of medical school. 
Jeanne, having completed two years to-
wards an undergraduate degree, discontin-
ued her studies to work full time. She 
continued to work after the birth of the 
Archers' two children in 1981 and 1982. 
During the marriage, Thomas attended 
medical school for three years, obtained his 
medical degree and license and completed 
two years of his residency. The United 
States Navy paid Thomas'-medical jschooL. 
expeTfses, together with a tax-free stipend 
of approximately $500 per ~ mlontK7~tTi~^ex-' 
change for Thomas' four-year commitment 
to serve the Navy upoir^faoTuation. In 
addition to the stipend,"Thomas'"earnings 
during the marriage consisted of approxi-
mately $1,500 each summer from work 
A - 6 1 
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done while in medical school and $lf>,(KK) to 
years of his residency requirement.
 m 
The Archers were temporarily separated 
for most of 11)79 and were permanently 
separated in October of 1982. They were 
divorced by decree of the Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County on July 12, 1984; 
the decree awarded Jeanne custody of the 
two children, child support of $250 per child 
per month and alimony of $100 per month 
for a period not to exceed one year. The 
decree also required Thomas to maintain 
medical and life insurance for the benefit 
of the two children. 
The question of whether Thomas' medi-
cal degree and license constituted marital 
property for purposes of making a mone-
tary award to Jeanne under § 8-205(a) of 
the Family Law Article was separately con-
sidered. That section provides that after 
the court determines "which property is 
marital property, and the value of the mari-
tal property, [it] may grant a monetary 
award as an adjustment of the equities and 
rights of the parties concerning marital 
property, whether or not alimony is award-
ed." In determining the amount and meth-
od of payment of a monetary award, the 
court is enjoined by § 8~205(a) to consider 
each of ten specified factors, including "the 
contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, 
of each party to the well-being of the fami-
ly"; "the economic circumstances of each 
party at the time the award is to be made"; 
"how and when specific marital property 
was acquired, including the effort expend-
ed by each party in accumulating the mari-
tal property"; and "any other factor that 
the court considers necessary or appropri-
ate to consider in order to arrive at a fair 
and equitable monetary award." Section 
8-205(b) permits the court to reduce to 
judgment "any monetary award made un-
der this section, to the extent that any part 
of the award is due and owing." 
The trial court (Rea, J.) held that a medi-
cal degree or license wa3 not marital prop-
erty under the Act and thus denied 
Jeanne's prayer for a monetary award. In 
so holding, the court adopted the reasoning 
of the Colorado Supreme Court in its deter-
mination of a similar issue in In re Mar-
riage, of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 
75, 77 (1978): 
"An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 
'property.' It does not have an exchange 
value or any objective transferable value 
on an open market. It is personal to the 
holder. It terminates on death of the 
holder and is not inheritable. It cannot 
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, 
or pledged. An advanced degree is a 
cumulative product of many years of pre-
vious education, combined with diligence 
and hard work. It may not be acquired 
by the mere expenditure of money. It is 
simply an intellectual achievement that 
may potentially assist in the future ac-
quisition of property. In our view, it has 
none of the attributes of property in the 
usual sense of that term." 
Jeanne appealed, contending that a medical 
degree/license is marital property under 
the Act and, as such, subject to equitable 
distribution upon divorce by a monetary 
award. We granted certiorari, 302 Md. 
409, 488 A.2d 500 (1985), prior to considera-
tion of the appeal by the intermediate ap-
pellate court to consider this issue of first 
impression in Maryland. 
II 
The provisions of the Act, together with 
its underlying history, have been extensive-
ly considered in a number of our recent 
cases. See, e.g., Schweizer v. Schweizer, 
301 Md. 626, 484 A.2d 267 (1984), and cases 
cited at 629, 484 A.2d 267. It is sufficient 
here to note that the Act indicates that 
nonmonetary contributions within a mar-
riage should be recognized in the event 
that a marriage is dissolved; that a spouse 
whose activities do not include the produc-
tion of income may nevertheless have con-
tributed toward the acquisition of property 
by either or both spouses during the mar-
riage; that when a marriage is dissolved, 
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the properly interests of the spouses but two jurisdictions have uniformly held 
should be adjusted fairly and equitably, that a professional degree or license is not 
with careful consideration given to both marital property subject to equitable divi-
monetary and nonmonetary contributions sion.1 Virtually all of these courts, consist-
made by the respective spouses; and that ent with the rationale advanced by the Col-
the accomplishment of these objectives ne- orado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of 
cessitates that there be a departure from Graham, supra, have held that an ad-
the inequity inherent in Maryland's old "ti- vanced degree or professional license lacks 
tie" system of dealing with the marital the traditional attributes of "property," be-
property of divorcing spouses. ing neither transferable, assignable, devisa-
ble, nor subject to conveyance, sale, pledge 
or inheritance. Some courts, by way of an 
additional reason for concluding that a de-
Jeanne maintains that the definition of gree/license is not marital property, have 
"marital property"—"all property, however held that such items are too speculative to 
titled, acquired . . . during the marriage"— value.2 Other courts have said that efforts 
must be liberally construed to effect its to characterize spousal contributions as an 
broad remedial purposes and that the term investment or commercial enterprise de-
therefore encompasses nontraditional serving of recompense demean the concept 
forms of "property" such as a medical de- of marriage.3 Still other courts have found 
gree or license. She recognizes, however, that the future earning capacity of a de-
that of the twenty-four jurisdictions which gree or license-holding spouse is personal, 
have considered the matter, courts in all a mere expectancy and a post-marital ef-
I. Jones v. Jones. 454 So.2d 1006 (Ala.Civ.App. 
1984); Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346. 661 P.2d 
196 (1982); Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333. 631 
P.2d 115 (1981); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal. 
App.3d 634, 184 Cal.Rptr. 796 (1982). superseded 
on other grounds, 37 Cal.3d 762. 209 Cal.Rptr. 
354. 691 P.2d 1020 (1984); Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 
89 Cal.App.3d 446. 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1979). 
overruled on other grounds. In re Marriage of 
Lucas, 27 CalJd 808. 166 Cal.Rptr. 853. 614 P.2d 
285 (1980); Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal.App.2d 786. 
78 Cal.Rptr. 131 (1969); In re Marriage of Gra-
ham, 194 Colo. 429. 574 PJd 75 (1978); Wright 
v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803 (Dcl.Fam.Ct.1983); 
Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.2d 146 (Fia.App.1983); 
Severs v. Severs, 426 So.2d 992 (Fla.App.1983); 
In rt Marriage of Weinstein, \1% lU.App.3d 234, 
83 Ill.Dcc. 425. 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984); In re 
Marriage of Goldstein, 97 IU.App.3d 1023. 53 
Ill.Dcc. 397. 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); In re Mar-
riage of McManama, 179 Ind.App. 513. 386 
N.E.2d 953 (1979). vacated on other grounds, 
272 Ind. 483. 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980); In re Mar* 
riage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 
1978); Inman v. Inman. 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 
1982); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa. 309 N.W.2d 755 
(Minn.1981); Ruben v. Ruben. 123 N.H. 358. 
461 A.2d 733 (1983); Lynn v. Lynn, 91 NJ. 510. 
453 A.2d 539 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 
NJ. 488. 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Muckleroy v. 
Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14. 498 P.2d 1357 (1972); 
Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, App.Div.. 486 N.Y. 
S.2d 338 (1985); O'Brien v. O'Brien. 106 App. 
Div.2d 223. 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985); Conner v. 
Conner, 97 App.Div.2d 88. 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 
(1983); Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App.Div.2d 153. 
452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); Conteh v. Conteh, 117 
Misc.2d 42. 457 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1982); Pacht v. 
Jadd, 13 Ohio App.3d 363. 469 N.E.2d 918 
(1983); Lira v. Lira, 68 Ohio App.2d 164. 428 
N.E.2d 445 (1980). later proceeding. 12 Ohio 
App.3d 69. 465 N.E.2d 1353 (1983); Hubbard v. 
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.1979); Lehmicke v. 
Lehmicke, Pa.Supcr. . 489 A.2d 782 
(1985); Hodge v. Hodge. — Pa.Supcr. — . 486 
A.2d 951 (1984); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 
N.W.2d 264 (S.D.1984); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-
Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984); Frausto v. 
Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980); De-
Witt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis.2d 44. 296 N.W.2d 761 
(1980). superseded by statute, In re Marriage o( 
Lundberg, 107 Wis.2d 1. 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 
1984). 
2. Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal.App.2d 786. 78 Cal.Rptr. 
131 (1969); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97 III. 
App.3d 1023. 53 Ill.Dcc. 397. 423 N.E.2d 1201 
(1981); Lynn v. Lynn. 91 NJ. 510. 453 A.2d 539 
(1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488. 453 
A.2d 527 (1982); Pacht v. Jada\ 13 Ohio App.3d 
363. 469 N.E.2d 918 (1983); Saint-Pierre v. 
Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D.1984). 
3. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal.App.3d 634. 184 
Cal.Rptr. 796 (1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 
NJ. 488. 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Lesman v. Les-
man. 88 A.D.2d 153. 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982). 
] ( )7S M«*- 4 ^ 3 ATLANTIC KKPOKTKR, IM SKKIES 
fort—not divisible as "marital property." 4 
And some other courts, in declining to find 
that a graduate degree or professional li-
cense is marital property, express the view 
that such items are best considered when 
awarding alimony.s 
Notwithstanding the overwhelming num-
ber of jurisdictions which hold that a de-
gree or license is not marital property, 
Jeanne urges adoption of a minority view 
advanced by an intermediate appellate 
court in Michigan and a trial court in Mas-
sachusetts, both holding that a professional 
degree or license is marital property. 
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich.App. 
258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983); Reen v. Reen, 
8 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 2193 (Mass.Prob. and 
Fam.Ct Dec. 23, 1981).* In Reen, the 
court held, without elaboration, that a hus-
band's license to practice orthodontia con-
stituted marital property. Woodworth 
held that a husband's law degree, earned 
during marriage, was marital property. In 
rejecting the majority view, the court held 
that the fact that an educational degree or 
license does not conform with traditional 
property concepts—not being transferable, 
assignable nor subject to sale, conveyance 
or pledge—was outweighed by the need to 
achieve the "most equitable solution" when 
one spouse sacrifices and works for the 
benefit of the other who pursues a profes-
sional degree and enhances his earning ca-
pacity. 337 N.W.2d at 335. That marriage 
is not a commercial enterprise or invest-
ment from which dashed expectations or 
efforts ought to be recompensed was, in 
the Michigan court's opinion, merely a 
4. In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 III.App.3d 
234, 83 III.Dec. 425. 470 N.E.2d 551 (1984); Wil-
cox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind.App. 661. 365 N.E.2d 792 
(1977); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ. 488. 453 
A.2d 527 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien. 106 App. 
Div.2d 223. 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985); Conner v. 
Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88. 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1983); 
Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 
(S.D.1984); Frausto v. frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 
(Tcx.Civ.App. 1980). 
5. Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333. 631 P.2d 115 
(1981); Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, App.Div., 486 
N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 
App.Div.2d 223. 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985); Con-
teh v. Conteh, 117 Misc.2d 42. 457 N.Y.S.2d 363 
characterization of "marriage while it en-
dures"; it failed, the court said, to focus 
upon dissolution of the marriage and how 
best to compensate, not for a failed expec-
tation, but for one spouse's share of the 
fruits of a degree which she helped the 
other earn. Id, at 336. The view that 
valuation of a degree is too speculative to 
constitute marital property was also reject-
ed, it being concluded that courts have 
been adept at calculating future earnings 
in a number of contexts, such as personal 
injury, wrongful death and workers' com-
pensation cases. Id. Lastly, the view that 
the non-degree spouse's contributions are 
best considered when awarding alimony 
was also rejected; the court reasoned that 
the purpose of alimony was for spousal 
support, involving a variety of factors in 
the determination of whether alimony 
should be awarded, including financial con-
dition and the ability to be self-supporting. 
In the case of a spouse who has worked 
and supported the other spouse through 
graduate school, the court said that the 
former will usually be capable of self-sup-
port. Moreover, as Michigan courts have 
discretion to terminate an alimony award 
upon remarriage of the spouse who is 
awarded alimony, the court concluded that 
the award of alimony was not an adequate 
means for recognizing the contributions of 
a spouse who has helped the other through 
graduate school. 
The effect of Woodworth in Michigan is 
by no means clear. More recently, the 
issue of whether a professional degree is a 
(1982); Pacht v. Jada\ 13 Ohio App.3d 363. 469 
N.E.2d 918 (1983); Lira v. Lira. 68 Ohio App-Zd 
164. 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980). later proceeding, 12 
Ohio App.3d 69. 465 N.E.2d 1353 (1983); Dan-
iels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Ops.2d 458. 185 N.E.2d 
773 (1961); Hodge v. Hodge. — Pa.Super. —. 
486 A.2d 951 (1984). 
6. Jeanne also relies on two New York trial court 
cases to support the contention that a profes-
sional degree or license is marital property. Wc 
note, however, that on appeal the judgments 
were reversed in both cases. See Kutanovski * 
Kutanovski, App.Div.. 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985): 
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Mtsc.2d 233. 452 N.Y. 
S.2d 801 (1982). 
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marital property asset has generated a 
split of opinion among Michigan's interme-
diate appellate courts. Olah v. Olah, IM.5 
Mich.App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984), re-
jecting Wood worth, held that an education-
al degree is unique to its possessor and 
lacks any of the typical attributes of prop-
erty, even when interpreted in its broadest 
sense. In Wailing v. Watling, 127 Mich. 
App. 624, 339 N.W.2d 505 (1983), the court 
concluded that the wife had been sufficient-
ly compensated for her contributions to-
wards her husband's dental degree while in 
his last year of school, having received the 
benefits of a nineteen-year marriage and 
having received contributions from the hus-
band for all but the last year of her edu-
cation towards an advanced degree. 
Our cases have generally construed the 
word "property" broadly, defining it as a 
term of wide and comprehensive significa-
tion embracing " 'everything which has ex-
changeable value or goes to make up a 
man's wealth—every interest or estate 
which the law regards of sufficient value 
for judicial recognition.'" Deering v. 
Deering, 292 Md. 115, 125, 437 A.2d 883 
(1981); Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 
32, 36, 209 A.2d 914 (1965). In Bouse v. 
Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767 
(1942), we said that the word "property/* 
when used without express or implied qual-
ifications, "may reasonably be construed to 
involve obligations, rights and other intan-
gibles as well as physical things." "Good-
will," for example, has been characterized 
as a legally protected valuable property 
right. Schill v. Remington Putnam Co., 
179 Md. 83, 88-89, 17 A.2d 175 (1941) 
In Deering, we recognized a spouse's 
pension rights to be a form of marital 
property subject to equitable distribution. 
292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d 883. In that case, 
involving consolidated appeals, appellant 
wives appealed from decrees which denied 
them any monetary award based on their 
husbands' pensions which were unmatured, 
fully vested pension rights based on obliga-
tory contributions deducted from their pay. 
Id. at 118, 120, 437 A.2d"883. Citing Weir 
v. AKCHKK Md. l ( )79 
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r. Weir, 173 NJ.Super. 130, 413 A .2d 638 
(1980) and /// re Marriage of Brown, 15 
Cal.3d MS, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2<1 561 
(1976) (on banc), wo concluded that a 
spouse's pension rights, "to the extent ac-
cumulated during the marriage," constitute 
a form of "marital property" subject to 
distribution. 292 Md. at 128,437 A.2d 883. 
In so holding, we noted that regardless of 
the type of retirement plan, vested or un-
vested, noncontributory or contributory, 
the critical issue was "whether a property 
right has been acquired during the mar-
riage and whether equity warrants its in-
clusion in the marital estate in light of its 
limitations." Id. at 127, 437 A.2d 883 (cit-
ing Weir, supra, 413 A.2d at 640). We 
said that as 
" 'pension benefits represent a form of 
deferred compensation for services ren-
dered, the employee's right to such bene-
fits is a contractual right, derived from 
the terms of the employment contract. 
Since a contractual right is not an expect-
ancy but a chose in action, a form of 
property, . . . an employee acquires a [ju-
dicially recognized] property right to pen-
sion benefits when he enters upon the 
performance of his employment con-
tract.' " Id. at 127, 437 A.2d 883 (citing 
Brown, supra, 126 Cal.Rptr. at 637, 544 
P.2d at 565). 
[1] While, as earlier indicated, we have 
in some contexts construed the term "prop-
erty" in a broad sense, there is nothing in 
the Maryland Act to suggest that the Gen-
eral Assembly intended that a medical de-
gree or license, earned during marriage, 
would constitute "marital property" sub-
ject to equitable distribution upon divorce 
by a monetary award. We therefore hold, 
in accordance with the majority view, that 
a professional degree or license does not 
•possess any of the basic characteristics of 
property within the ambit of marital prop-
erty under § 8-201(e) of the Act. While 
pension rights, as in Deering, constitute a 
current asset which the individual has a 
contractual right to receive, such rights are 
plainly distinguishable from a mere expect-
ancy of future enhanced income resulting 
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from a professional degree. The Utter is 
but an intellectual attainment; it is not a 
present property interest. It is personal to 
the holder; it cannot be sold, transferred, 
pledged or inherited. It does not have an 
assignable value nor does it represent a 
guarantee of receipt of a set monetary 
amount in the future, such as pension bene-
fits. Quite simply, a degree/license does 
not have an exchange value on an open 
market. In re Marriage of Graham, su-
pra, 574 P.2d at 77. At best, it represents 
a potential for increase in a person's earn-
ing capacity made possible by the degree 
and license in combination with innumera-
ble other factors and conditions too un-
certain and speculative to constitute "mari-
tal property" within the contemplation of 
the legislature. See also Aufmuth v. Auf-
muth, 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 152 Cal.Rptr. 668 
(1979), overruled on other grounds, In re 
Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.3d 808, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 853, 614 P.2d 285 (1980); In re Mar-
riage of Weinstein, 128 Ill.App.3d 234, 83 
Ill.Dec. 425, 470 N.Ed.2d 551 (1984); Maho-
ney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 
(1982). Moreover, as Dewitt v. Dewitt, 98 
Wis.2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980), makes 
clear, income earned after the marriage is 
dissolved as a result of the degree/license 
would in no event constitute "marital prop-
erty" within the definition of that term in 
7. Questions relating to the equitable division of 
a professional degTee or license have been the 
subject of numerous law review articles. See 
Fitzpatrick and Doucette. "Can the Economic 
Value of an Education Really be Measured? A 
Guide for Marital Property Dissolution." 21 
J.Fam.L. 511 (1982-33); Krauskopf. "Recom-
pense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal 
Protection for the Marital Investor in Human 
Capital,- 28 Kan.L.Rev. 379 (1980); Loeb and 
McCann, "Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of An 
Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Mar-
riage," 66 Marq.L.Rev. 495 (1983); Moore. 
"Should A Professional Degree be Considered A 
Marital Asset Upon Divorce?", 15 Akron LRcv. 
543 (1982); Raggio. "Professional Goodwill and 
Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Dis-
tribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage." 16. 
Number 2, Fam.L.Q. 147 (1982); "Equitable Dis-
tribution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theo-
ries Toward Compensating Spousal Contribu-
tions." 49 Brooklyn L.Rcv. 301 (1983); Com-
§ 8-201(e). since it would not have been 
acquired during the marriage. 
(2] The cases thus lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that the trial judge in this 
case correctly found that Thomas' medical 
degree and license were not encompassed 
within the legislatively intended definition 
of marital property in the Maryland stat-
ute. See n. 1, supra, at 1077.7 
IV 
[3] Jeanne does not challenge the 
amount of her alimony award and we do 
not, therefore, consider its adequacy in the 
circumstances of this case. We note that 
under § 11-106 of the Family Law Article, 
the chancellor was empowered to take into 
account such matters as the husband's 
earning capacity in making an alimony 
award. Specifically, § 11-106 enjoins the 
chancellor to consider a number of enumer-
ated factors "necessary for a fair and eq-
uitable award" including, among others, 
"the contributions, monetary and nonmone-
tary, of each party to the well-being of the 
family"; "the ability of the party from 
whom alimony is sought to meet that par-
ty's needs while meeting the needs of the 
party seeking alimony"; and "the financial 
needs and financial resources of each par-
ty." 
ments. "Division of Marital Property on Di-
vorce: What Does the Court Deem 'Just and 
Right?". 19 Hous.L.Rev. 503 (1932); Notes, 
"Domestic Relations: Consideration of En-
hanced Earning Capacity of Recently Educated 
Spouse in Divorce Settlements," 17 Suffolk U.L 
Rev. 901 (1983); Comment. "For Richer or 
Poorer—Equities in the Career—Threshold. No-
Asset Divorce." 58 Tul.L.Rev. 791 (1984); The 
Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Pro-
fessional Degree Upon Divorce," 35 U.Fla.LRev. 
130 (1983); "A Property Theory of Future Earn-
ing Potential in Dissolution Proceedings," 56 
Wash.L.Rcv. 277 (1981); "Family Law: Ought a 
Professional Degree Be Divisible As Property 
Upon Divorcer, 22 Wm. & Mary L.Rcv. 517 
(1981). See also 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Sep-
aration § 898 (1983); Annot.. 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294 
(spouse's professional degree or license as mari-
tal property for purposes of alimony, support 
or property settlement). 
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[ t] We share Thomas' view that if pub-
lic policy dictates that some economic com-
pensation he made to a spouse who makes 
monetary and nonmonetary contributions 
to the other spouse's acquisition of a pro-
fessional degree/license, equitable results 
can be achieved under § 11-106. Indeed, 
this section permits the chancellor to con-
sider the circumstances surrounding the 
acquisition by one spouse of a professional 
degree/license, as well as that spouse's 
potential income. Any income actually 
earned as a result of one spouse's acquisi-
tion of a professional degree/license, to-
gether with the sacrifices of the other 
spouse toward its attainment, are factors 
which may, and presumably were m this 
case, considered by the court in making its 
alimony award to Jeanne. 
DECREE AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS. 
